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ABSTRACT 
The demand for grain freight transportation is a derived demand; consequently changes in 
the grain supply chain in production and handling, and those in the transportation domain will 
affect the demand for grain transportation. The U.S. transportation industry (e.g. railroad and 
trucking), and the grain supply chain in general have witnessed structural changes over the years 
that have potential long-run implications for demand, intermodal competition, and grain shippers 
mode choices both nationally and regionally. Deregulation of the railroad and trucking industries 
initiated innovations (e.g. shuttle trains) that have revolutionized the way grain is marketed. 
These and other related trends in agriculture including bioenergy suggest a dynamic environment 
surrounding grain transportation and the need to revisit agricultural transportation demand and 
evaluate changes over time. A majority of freight demand studies are based on aggregate data 
(e.g. regional) due to lack of disaggregate data. Aggregation of shippers over large geographic 
regions leads to loss of information with potential erroneous elasticity estimates. This study 
develops a method to estimate transportation rates at the grain elevator level to estimate a shipper 
link specific cost function for barley, corn, durum, hard red spring wheat, and soybeans shippers.   
The aim of this study is to assess and characterize the nature of rail-truck competition for 
the transportation of five commodities over distance and time as well as to assess whether North 
Dakota grain shippers’ mode choices reflect an allocatively efficient mix assuming the choice of 
mode is based on shipping rates. Our findings indicate that in general, rail dominates most of the 
grain traffic, however, the degree of dominance is variable by commodity. Additional findings 
suggest that grain shippers utilize more rail than they would if they chose modes based on rates. 
This may suggest unmeasured service quality advantages of rail in comparison to truck.  
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background 
The United States General Accounting Office (GAO 2003) has indicated that the 
economic vitality of the U.S. is to a great extent dependent on the security, availability and 
dependability of its transportation system. Transportation plays a vital role in the delivery of raw 
materials and component parts to finished goods producers, in the delivery of finished goods to 
domestic consumers, in the export of raw materials, finished goods and intermediate goods, and 
in the import of goods to domestic producers and consumers. An illustration of the importance of 
the transportation system to the economy can be seen in its critical role of moving agricultural 
products to domestic users and for export. Agricultural products are carried using three principal 
modes of transportation, including trucks, barges, and railroads. Agriculture is an important 
source of demand for transportation in the U.S., accounting for close to 1 in 5 ton-miles of 
highway freight and 1 in 10 ton-miles of rail and barge freight transported in 2010 (Casavant el 
al. 2010). The demand for transportation in general is derived from the demand for other 
activities or goods. Specifically, in agricultural transportation, this means factors that alter 
agricultural demand and supply in production areas and export demand will shift the demand for 
agricultural transportation (Boyer 1997). The U.S. railroad, trucking, and grain supply industries 
have witnessed structural changes over the years that have potential implications for demand, 
pricing, and intermodal competition for grain transportation, both nationally and regionally.  
 
1.2. Changes in the Railroad Industry 
Major structural changes have occurred in the railroad transportation industry, 
particularly those related to regulatory changes in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s. Concerns 
about financial stability and the apparent lack of competition following decades of regulation led 
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to passage of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform (4R) Act in 1976 and the 
Staggers Act in 1980, which deregulated the railroad industry. Ellig (2002) notes that in the late 
1970s, more than twenty percent of railroads in the United States were operated by bankrupt 
firms. Consequently, deregulation was in direct reaction to the idea that the industry was in need 
of greater pricing and operating freedom to protect against further bankruptcies (Meyer 1973).  
Following deregulation, U.S. Class I Railroads adopted various cost reduction strategies 
to enhance their profitability including the sale or lease of unprofitable branch lines to short line 
railroads and the abandonment of other branch lines (Babcock and Bunch 2003). The 
abandonment and sale of unprofitable lines by Class I railroads following deregulation spurred 
the growth of short line railroads. The American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association 
(ASLRRA) notes that nationally, short line railroads have expanded their networks from 8,000 
miles in 1980 to 50,000 miles presently.  
Moreover, the pricing freedom given to railroads has led to several productivity 
enhancing innovations. Gallamore (1999) observes that regulation stifled innovation. He notes 
that deregulation has led to improvement of railroad operation in several areas, including safety 
standards, track structure, locomotives, and containerization. Annual productivity and cost 
savings significantly improved after the passage of the Staggers Act. Wilson (1997) finds 
significant productivity improvement after deregulation, but that these effects have tended to 
diminish in the long term. Bitzan and Keeler (2003) note that overall productivity growth 
accelerated slightly between 1983 and 1997 and innovations that led to elimination of cabooses 
and related crew reduced Class I Railroad costs by 5 - 8% in 1997, corresponding to annual 
industry cost savings of between $2billion and $3.3billion.  
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Costs reducing strategies and innovations in the railroad industry have noticeably 
increased the average rate of return on investment for the railroad industry from 2.5% during the 
1970s to above 10% during 2006 – 2007 according to the Association of American Railroads 
(AAR 2008). In fact, Waters (2007) notes that some major railroads are approaching or reaching 
normal rates of return; posing an imminent regulatory challenge for differential pricing (higher 
rates for shippers with inelastic demand). 
Deregulation has benefitted shippers as well. Shippers have witnessed falling rail rates as 
well as improved service quality in the form of speed, reliability, and availability of railcars since 
deregulation of the rail industry (Grimm and Smith 1986). Quality of service improvement 
(speed and reliability) stemming from rerouting flexibility and contracts between shippers and 
carriers was an unpredicted effect of rail deregulation (Ellig 2000). Grimm and Winston (2000) 
estimate that the benefits to shippers in the first ten years after deregulation was greater than $12 
billion in 1999 dollars ($14.7 billion in 2007 dollars). According to Dennis (2000), rate 
reductions between 1982 and 1996 enabled shippers to save an estimated $28 billion per annum. 
These accrued benefits have been realized by all grain producers and shippers, although more so 
in regions with more transport competition (Bitzan et al. 2003).  
Specifically in the grain shipping domain, Wilson and Dahl (2010) identify five major 
technological innovations that have resulted in improved efficiency. These include demurrage 
provisions for grain loading, forward instruments for car allocation, a shift from box-car shipping 
to covered hoppers adoption of short line railroads, and increases in shipment size following 
adoption of multi-car, unit, and shuttle trains. Shuttle trains were introduced by Burlington 
Northern (Burlington Northern Santa Fe since 1996) in the late 1990s. They are considered more 
efficient than all other service types including unit trains, multi-car, and single-car movements, 
 4 
 
due to operational differences. For example, the primary operational difference between shuttle 
and unit trains is side track capacity in terms of the number of railcars that can be loaded or 
assembled for loading. Side track capacity is measured in equivalent number of cars according to 
the North Dakota Department of Transportation (NDDOT 2007). An elevator requires 6,600 feet 
of track space to hold 110-railcars (shuttle train) with the total track requirement exceeding 7,000 
feet to accommodate dedicated locomotive power and spotting clearance (NDDOT 2007). Unit 
trains (typically 52 railcars), on the other hand, require half that amount of space. Multicar trains 
(usually 26 railcars) require less than half the space for unit trains. Additionally, The U.S. 
Senate, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation (2002) notes that unit trains 
typically have to be matched with one of a similar size or with several smaller multi-car blocks 
before a large grain train can be put together. Shuttle trains do not require putting a train 
together. Dedicated power, locomotives, and railcars involved in shuttle movements remain in a 
single block as they move from origin to destination, thus enhancing rail car utilization. Shuttle 
trains are a more dedicated service than unit train services. Prater et al. (2013) note that 
efficiency stemming from shuttle train implementation has benefitted both the railroad (in the 
form of lower cost) and agricultural producers located in close proximity to shuttle loading 
elevators (in the form of lower rates). For example, the construction of elevators with larger 
capacities and subsequent shipment in shuttle trains have played a role in reducing rail rates 
charged to wheat shippers in North Dakota (Ndembe 2015). Wilson and Dahl (2010) observe 
that the number of shuttle origin rail elevators on BNSF lines more than doubled between 2000 
and 2010 from 118 to 263. 
Despite its benefits, railroad deregulation may have had some unintended consequences. 
Various forms of restructuring following enactment, including mergers, purchases, 
 5 
 
consolidation, and acquisitions have increased the concentration of the railroad industry from 43 
Class I carriers in 1980 to 7 in 1997 (Miljkovic 2001). Consolidation concerns in concentrated 
industries were initially raised in the seminal article by Williamson (1968) in which attention 
was drawn to the fact that horizontal mergers can lead to higher rates and related deadweight 
losses. He also showed the tradeoff between cost savings and reduced competition. Some argue 
that concentration, represented by reduction in the number of carriers, has meant shippers have 
fewer options to choose from. This has likely reduced the level or perceived level of competition, 
raising various concerns by shippers; especially those so called “captive shippers” (Larson and 
Spraggins 1998; U.S. Senate, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 2002; 
Davidson USA Today 2007). It should also be noted that a large amount of research suggests 
that mergers have resulted in cost savings in the rail industry (Bitzan and Wilson 2007). 
Agricultural producers and shippers have continued to express worries about reduction in rail to 
rail competition, rising rail rates, poor rail service, rail capacity constraints, and unfair allocation 
of rail capacity (Prater et al. 2010). Whereas rates have declined for commodities like coal, 
motor vehicles and miscellaneous mixed shipments, those for grains rose 9 percent between 1987 
and 2004 (GAO 2006). On the other hand, Bitzan and Keeler (2014) find that the revenue cost 
margins for those commodities thought to be most captive did not increase between 1986 and 
2008, while those for commodities thought to be non-captive rose.  Earlier, Grimm and Winston 
(2000) found that the overall welfare loss from potential higher rates paid by captive shippers 
compared to those by non-captive shippers was small with minimal redistribution effects.  
Despite the fact that regulation of competitive shipments was observed to stifle railroad 
innovation and reduce intermodal and intramodal competition (Gallamore 1999), the Staggers 
Rail Act which deregulated the railroad industry retained rate regulation in captive markets 
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(MacDonald 1989). This suggests that the Act acknowledged the fact that not all rail markets are 
competitive, giving the ICC (STB since 1996) the jurisdiction to regulate maximum rates 
charged to captive shippers (MacDonald 1989). Modal Competition has historically been 
observed to be limited in states like Montana and North Dakota (MacDonald 1989, Babcock et 
al. 2014, Prater el al. 2013).  MacDonald (1989) observed that competition is weakest in North 
Dakota and Montana based on the number of railroads in wheat crop reporting districts (CRD). 
Additionally, agricultural shippers in both states are highly dependent on rail transportation 
given their long distance from inland waterways and the significantly higher cost of transporting 
grain for long distances to markets by truck (Prater el al. 2013), limiting rail-truck competition. 
 
1.3. Changes in the Trucking Industry 
In the trucking domain, route restrictions and limited entry stemming from regulation 
gave trucking firms monopoly power over certain routes, providing impetus for them to charge 
rates that exceeded competitive rates (Moore 1986). Under regulation, regional trucking carriers 
benefitted from prevention of potential new entrants in their markets; and in return, they had to 
fulfill the common carrier obligation (provide services to all communities under their 
jurisdiction) even though some of these markets were unprofitable relative to others (Allen 
1981). Opponents of trucking deregulation argued that deregulation would terminate common 
carrier service obligations and thereby lead to the cessation or deterioration of for-hire motor 
carrier service at “reasonable rates” to small isolated communities (Allen 1981). On the other 
hand, advocates of regulatory freedom anticipated that greater rate freedom, entry of new firms, 
and removal of regulatory constraints would lead trucking firms to reduce costs (Ying 1990) and 
lower prices (Ying and Keeler 1991). Consequently, the rationale behind deregulation of the 
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trucking industry by the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 was to provide shippers and other users with 
efficient truck freight rates (Ying and Keeler 1991).  
Operational flexibility stemming from the elimination of route restrictions permitted 
many carriers to reduce empty backhauls, consequently lowering cost (Keeler 1986). Using cost 
simulations, Ying (1990) shows that following a year of higher expenditures, efforts to stay 
competitive led to substantial cost savings over time from 1% in 1981 to 23% in 1984. 
Additionally, Ying and Keeler (1991) in their simulations point out that deregulation lowered 
truck rates from the beginning, with the effects getting bigger over time. Their result shows that 
truck rates dropped 15 -20% by 1983, and by 25-35% by 1985. Additionally, larger trucks, 
coupled with the interstate highways have significantly improved truck transit times and 
operating cost performance (Gallamore 1999). Improvements in trucking have fostered 
intermodal and intramodal competition with resultant benefits to shippers and consumers. 
 
1.4. Changes in the Grain Supply Chain 
In addition to changes in the transportation industries, significant changes have been 
observed in the U.S. grain supply chain in cultivation, processing, and handling. These have far-
reaching implications for demand and intermodal competition in the transportation of 
agricultural commodities. Noticeable increases in grain transportation by truck in tons have been 
observed, while those for rail and barge have remained fairly flat over the years between 1978 
and 2013. USDA attributes observed changes in grain movement patterns to substantial increases 
in annual production of corn, due to emerging markets for the grain (e.g. ethanol and other 
biofuels). This change has had an impact on grain transportation because many of the emerging 
markets that have induced the changes in commodities produced (e.g. local ethanol and biofuel 
facilities) entail local (short distance) movements, often dominated by truck transport. Trucks 
 8 
 
accounted for 31 percent of all U.S grain movement in 1978. However, by 2013, they 
represented 64 percent, more than doubling that for 1978. Modal changes in grain transportation 
based on USDA modal share analysis data from 1978 to 2013 in the U.S are shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Trend in U.S Modal Grain Transportation 1978- 2013 
 
Concurrently with changes in the types of commodities produced and handled and with 
changes in grain markets, there has been an increase in the size of rail shipments. Grain elevators 
facilitate grain accumulation that creates economies of shipment size. Owing to this advantage, 
railroads have been abandoning lines and shifting their service to larger elevators, called shuttles. 
These facilities have sufficient track space and capacity to load more than 100 railcars. 
Increasing use of these facilities has led to the closure of many smaller country elevators, as 
farmers and shippers move grains longer distances on rural roads to shuttle elevators often to 
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benefit from comparatively lower rates (Casavant et al. 2010). USDA (2013) shows that shuttle 
train movements (which they describe as those with 75 railcars and above) of grains by tonnage 
have increased substantially since 1994. They note that the percentage of rail grains and oilseeds 
(by tonnage) moved by shuttle trains have increased from 12.9 percent in 1994 to 49.5 percent in 
2011 with an observed peak of 50.6 percent in 2010.  
While the lower rates afforded by elevator consolidation have enhanced rail’s advantage 
over truck in long distance movements, increased production of biofuels has provided farmers 
and shippers with options to sell their grains locally, potentially affecting grains available for 
shipment by rail. In the U.S, Rail had been the dominant mode of grain transportation over barge 
and truck from 1978 to 1992, only facing slight dips below truck in 1985 and 1991. However, 
from 1993 onward, trucks have dominated rail in the percentage of tons of grain movement (see 
Figure 1). These observed changes in the transportation industry and the grain supply chain have 
potential regional impacts. 
 
1.5. The Case of North Dakota 
The importance of transportation to agriculture is more pronounced in states that are 
highly dependent on production agriculture, and those with fewer competitive modes to get their 
products to far away markets. North Dakota has been described as an agricultural state which, 
historically, is highly dependent on railroads for out of state shipment of grains. Leistritz et al. 
(2002) indicate that agriculture has ranked consistently at the top of North Dakota’s economic 
base; second only to Federal payments. Only recently with the growth in oil production has 
mining and mining related activities (e.g. oil and gas extraction) overtaken Agriculture as the 
state’s top gross state product (GSP) contributor. In 2014, agriculture, forestry, fishing, and 
hunting accounted for close to 7 percent of the state’s GSP while mining and related activities 
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including oil and gas extraction made up approximately 16 percent (Bureau of Economic 
Analysis 2015). Agricultural shippers in North Dakota are significantly dependent on rail 
transportation, owing to their long distances from consumption centers, terminal markets, and 
barge loading facilities (Prater et al. 2010). Figure 2 shows North Dakota Grain Supply Chain. 
 
Figure 2: Depiction of North Dakota Grain Supply Chain 
 
Vachal and Button (2003) point out that a majority of the 600 million bushels of grain 
produced yearly in North Dakota is marketed to destinations out of state. Research by Tolliver 
and Dybing (2007) finds that railroads transported an estimated 78 percent by tons of North 
Dakota grains during the 2004 crop marketing year. This is similar to observations by Casavant 
el al. (2010) that show that railroads transported 70% of grains and oilseeds produced in North 
Dakota in 2010. Most recently, Vachal (2012) shows that 75% of North Dakota elevator 
shipment of major crops is transported by rail, while 25 percent goes by truck. Shippers willing 
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to use water (barge) to haul their commodities have to ship them to the closest barge facility in 
Minneapolis/St Paul or Duluth in Minnesota, incurring additional transportation cost.     
In addition to this observed dependency of North Dakota grain shippers on railroads, 
there has been a reduction in rail transportation options due to increased abandonment of branch 
lines. In fact, a total of 1774 miles of railroad have been abandoned in North Dakota since 1936. 
Before 1980, only 144 miles were abandoned. A total of 1630 were abandoned between 1980 
and 2009 following passage of the Staggers Act in 1980. Dependency on a single mode and a 
perceived reduction in competition between railroads stemming from industry concentration has 
raised concerns about captivity.   
However, Bitzan et al. (2003) find that railroad concentration at the county level has 
played a smaller role in determining rates over time. They attribute this unexpected result to an 
increase in truck sizes and the ensuing potential for trucks to compete over longer distances. 
Longer truck competition has extended the size of markets over which railroads compete. They 
conclude that if inter railroad competition exists over larger geographic areas due to the ability of 
trucks to move freight at lower costs for longer distances, then railroad  concentration in a given 
county is irrelevant.  
Additionally, some have argued that increasing abandonment and sale of unprofitable 
routes has fostered intramodal competition within the state amongst short line railroads. Short 
line railroads operating in the state act as subsidiaries of the two carriers and hence do not 
directly compete their affiliated Class I (Babcock el al. 2014). However, by operating in areas 
not served by their affiliated Class I, they compete in drawing grain from the Class I with which 
they are not affiliated. For example, Dakota Missouri Valley and Western (DMVW), a local 
subsidiary of Canadian Pacific (CP), serves areas in the state that BNSF does as well, but not CP 
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(Babcock el al. 2014). As such DMVW competes with BNSF for this traffic. Additionally, the 
Red River Valley and Western (RRVW), a subsidiary for BNSF in North Dakota, operates in 
areas of the state where CP has a strong presence (Babcock el al. 2014). In that case, RRVW 
competes with CP for traffic. In this way, regional and local affiliates compete on behalf of both 
Class I railroads (Babcock el al. 2014). 
Prater et al. (2010) indicate that shippers in states like North Dakota with less rail-rail 
competition pay the highest rail rates in the U.S. Sparger and Marathon (2015) estimate that the 
revenue-variable cost (R/VC) ratio of rail shipments, which is a reflection of differential pricing, 
was above 300 percent for three states, including North Dakota; almost doubling the 180 percent 
statutory threshold of potentially competitive traffic. The 180% threshold was set by law to 
protect shippers from railroad market power (180% is the threshold for potentially captive 
traffic). On the other hand, rail consolidation has been fostered by the growth and construction of 
shuttle facilities and the resulting consolidation of the grain elevator system trend that has 
benefitted shippers. The Congressional Research Service (CRS 2005) notes that by consolidating 
their network and rolling stock around shuttles, Class I Railroads are increasingly exploiting 
operational efficiencies and enhancing their profitability. Carriers’ efficiency enhancement is 
likely reflected as better rates to shippers.  
Sarmiento and Wilson (2005) note that equipment utilization and availability are 
enhanced by shuttle services, making them two or three times more productive than single and 
multi-car movements. They add that grain cycle times have almost been cut in half in some 
regions with annual trips increasing from between 14 and 18 trips to 30 trips with some carriers 
pointing to a 30% reduction in car placement costs. To benefit from these rates, shippers are 
required to be able to load 110 or more 111-ton hopper cars within 15 hours; in some instances 
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as often as three times per month, requiring 400,000 bushels for each shipment (NDDOT, 2007). 
The importance of storage capacity, therefore, required shippers to construct new facilities or 
upgrade existing facilities to meet carrier requirements (e.g. storage and track space to handle 
100 or more rail cars). Increasing use of shuttle elevators has potentially enabled some shippers 
to benefit from economies of size in shipping in the form of lower rates. Vachal and Button 
(2003) show that shuttle grain elevators offer relatively favorable rates, and consequently they 
are likely to attract more grain and expand their draw area. Apart from favorable rates, the Upper 
Great Plains Transportation Institute (UGPTI 2012) identifies service quality as a distinguishing 
characteristic of shuttle elevators as reflected in shorter delays in deliveries. On average between 
2006 and 2013, shuttle trains had 12 days delay on deliveries while other rail services had a 17 
days delay based on Elevator Transportation Activities and Service Surveys from UGPTI. The 
effect of elevator consolidation can be observed with the decrease in the number of licensed 
grain elevators over time.  Figure 3 shows the trend in the number of licensed elevators between 
1990 and 2013 based on data from North Dakota Grain Movement database. The number of 
licensed elevators has dropped from 448 in 1990 to 199 in 2013.   
Due to the central role played by agriculture in the state, North Dakota grain 
transportation has also likely been affected by increasing demand for grains for industrial usage 
(e.g. biofuels). Changes identified nationally by Casavant (2010) have also been observed within 
North Dakota. Despite the dominance of traditional crops, including wheat (hard red spring and 
durum) and barley, corn and soybeans have been showing significant growth over the years; 
partly attributable to increased demand for ethanol and biodiesel both nationally and locally.   
Ethanol and biodiesel constitute the two principal biofuels which use corn and soybeans as 
inputs. The increasing production of biofuel, particularly ethanol, has meant increased movement 
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of corn locally to ethanol plants. Higher premiums offered by ethanol plants relative to elevators 
are likely to attract more grains and provide more options for local shippers (Schill 2007). Most 
elevators delivering corn to ethanol plants are within 50 miles, which is cost efficient for 
trucking (Shapouri et al. 1995).   
 
Figure 3: Trend in Licensed Grain Elevators in North Dakota 1990-2013 
 
Corn production in North Dakota has risen from approximately 37 million bushels in 
1990 to 396 million bushels in 2013 based on data from USDA National Agricultural Statistics. 
Similarly, within the same time period, soybean production has increased from approximately 13 
million bushels to a little over 141 million bushels. On the other hand, hard red spring wheat 
production fell from 277 million bushels in 1990 to 235 million bushels in 2013, while durum 
wheat saw a bigger decline falling to 29 million bushels in 2013 from 104 million bushels in 
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1990. Barley production has seen the greatest decline, falling from close to 130 million bushels 
in 1990 to 46 million bushels in 2013.  
The use of corn ethanol has also diverted corn from the export market. USDA projected 
that 2.6 billion bushels of corn that the ethanol industry consumed in 2010 would be diverted 
from U.S. exports. The Increasing usage of corn in general has meant corn production has 
replaced other grains in many instances. This observation has been echoed in the local media. 
The Forum of Fargo-Moorhead (a local newspaper) of April 02, 2013 had the caption “Wheat 
losing ground to corn in North Dakota”. It observed that since 1997, corn production has 
increased tremendously relative to other crops. An increase use of corn or soybeans locally is 
likely to alter the derived demand for rail transportation, as trucks dominate short distance 
movements. Production trends for barley, corn, durum, hard red spring and soybeans in North 
Dakota between 1990 and 2013 based on data from USDA, NASS  are shown in Figure 4. 
Presently, there are five ethanol plants in North Dakota, producing 440 million gallons of 
ethanol using 156 million bushels of corn annually (North Dakota Ethanol Council NDEC). 
NDEC indicates that most of the corn used to produce ethanol (80 percent) is bought locally 
from farmers. The increasing demand for corn locally can be observed from changes in local 
corn transportation. Based on data from the North Dakota Grain Movement database, local corn 
movements have increased from close to 160 thousand bushels in 1990 to almost 5 million 
bushels in 2013. This increasing trend in local corn consumption coincides with increasing 
industrial usage locally (e.g. ethanol production).  
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Figure 4:  North Dakota Grain Production Trend (000) Bushels, 1990 and 2013 
 
1.6. Objectives 
The main objectives of this research are to estimate freight transportation demand and 
changes over time for five principal grains: barley, corn, durum, hard red spring wheat, and 
soybeans shipped from North Dakota to four main destinations: Duluth, MN; Minneapolis, MN; 
GULF (New Orleans, LA) and Pacific North West (Portland, OR) between 2006 and 2013. 
Emphasis will be placed on evaluating changes in shipper captivity, changes in the nature of 
intermodal competition, and changes in modal service quality for North Dakota shippers. To do 
this, a link-specific transportation demand model is estimated. The links involve individual grain 
elevators within North Dakota and four principal destinations for grains outlined above. Unlike 
previous freight transportation models undertaken in the state which use aggregate data often 
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involving whole regions, this study uses a disaggregate approach involving grain elevators as the 
primary unit of observation. Special attention is placed on distinguishing rail rates by elevator 
types related to grain elevator shipment capabilities (e.g. shuttle, unit, and multi-car shipments). 
This distinction is important due to distinct differences between shuttle elevators and non-shuttle 
elevators. In addition to the benefits to shippers from lower rates stemming from economies of 
shipment size compared to those of other shipment types, shuttle trains have been identified as 
having relatively better quality of service reflected as shorter delivery time in days (UGPTI 
2012). These may suggest a change in shipper demand for rail accompanying the shift of rail 
service to the shuttle orientation. The specific objectives of this study are threefold as follows:   
(1)  To estimate modal transportation demand elasticities over time. 
(2)  To identify the distances for which rail and truck compete and changes over time. 
(3)  To assess whether North Dakota grain shippers’ transportation choices reflect an  
“Allocatively” efficient mix of transportation assuming the choice of mode is based on 
shipping rates (“Allocative” Efficiency and Mode Choice).     
 
Objectives 1 and 2 will be accomplished by estimating the derived demand for transportation 
assuming firms minimize the cost of goods transportation, whereas the cost minimization 
objective will be tested in objective 3 and it will help to identify the role of service quality in 
transportation mode choice, as well as changes over time.    
 
1.7. Rationale 
Structural changes occurring in the U.S. railroad and trucking industries (e.g. rising track 
abandonment) stemming from deregulation, coupled with those in the grain supply chain in 
production (e.g. shift towards corn), processing (e.g. surge in biofuel production), and handling 
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(e.g. development, growth and expansion of shuttle grain elevators) have potential transportation 
demand implications for North Dakota grain marketing. The Staggers Rail Act that deregulated 
the railroad industry initiated fundamental changes in the railroad industry relative to previous 
policies (e.g. 4R, 3R, Inter State Commerce Act). In fact, Keeler (1983) describes the Staggers 
Act as a more drastic modification in federal policy towards the railroads compared to the 
Interstate Commerce Act of 1887. MacDonald (1989) points to the impact of railroad 
deregulation on grain transportation, noting that the impacts of deregulation are more noticeable 
in Great Plains states (e.g. North Dakota) given that unregulated barge competition in the Corn 
Belt made regulation ineffective. He summarizes the principal goals of the 1980 Staggers Act as 
follows:  
(1)  Elimination of rate bureaus. 
(2)  Provide more freedom to restructure rates; use of shipment specific contract rates. 
(3)  Permit easier abandonment of unprofitable lines. 
(4)  Retain rate regulation only where a rail carrier has market dominance. 
 
One of the most important provisions of the Staggers Act is its limitation of regulation to 
cases where market dominance exists (goal 4). Essentially, the ICC defined market dominance to 
mean situations where a railroad does not face effective competition - that is, where the shipper 
is considered captive. North Dakota has been used extensively as an example of “captive 
market” (MacDonald 1989, Koo et al. 1993, Prater et al. 2010, and Sparger and Marathon 2015). 
This view is related to the comparatively limited level of intramodal, intermodal, geographic, and 
product competition in North Dakota relative to other states or regions. Limited competition, in 
most cases, is reflected in the form of higher shipping rates paid by North Dakota shippers.  
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Intramodal competition describes competition between two or more rail railroads often 
reflected in the form of price competition. Unlike the trucking industry which is characterized by 
many operators or firms (perfect competition), the railroad industry in North Dakota is highly 
concentrated. Two U.S class I railroads, the Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF) and the 
Canadian Pacific (SOO-line) are responsible for all out of state rail grain movements.  
In addition to being highly dependent on two carriers, shippers in North Dakota are 
located long distances from barge transportation - an alternative competitor mode to rail. 
Shippers willing to use barge transportation have to truck their commodities to the closest barge 
terminal, incurring additional costs on the way. The truck/barge combination using the 
Mississippi waterway alternative, although feasible, is limited because waterways only serve 
specific markets (e.g. it is unreasonable to ship to PNW using the Mississippi waterway). 
Consequently, intermodal competition, reflected by competition between railroads and barge 
transportation is limited. However, deregulation has increased intermodal competition between 
rail and truck. Furthermore, increases in local processing (e.g. ethanol) have increased rail truck 
competition. An illustration of the nature of shipment cost is useful to understanding the reason 
for limited intermodal competition, particularly for rail grain shipments out of North Dakota. 
Koo et al. (1993) and the Congressional Research Service (CRS 2005) provide a hypothetical 
cost curve for the three main modes involved in grain transportation in the U.S shown in Figure 5 
to illustrate competition between modes according to distance between an origin and destination. 
The illustration in Figure 5 shows that, generally, trucking has a relative advantage for 
shorter-distance traffic while rail and barge dominate longer-distance hauls [(Koo et al. (1993), 
Congressional Research Service (CRS 2005)]. Potential trucking dominance of the short haul 
stems from the fact that it has relatively small fixed and terminal costs that offset comparatively 
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higher line haul cost over short distances. Line haul cost refers to those costs that vary with 
operations (e.g. fuel, labor, tire wear). The hypothetical cost curve of trucking is shown as 𝑇𝑇′. 
The cost curve for barge traffic, depicted as 𝑊𝑊′, suggests that water transportation has the 
lowest distance-related unit cost as well as higher terminal or fixed cost compared to other 
modes. Consequently, barge transportation has considerable advantages for long-distance trips 
relative to short-distances trips. As alluded to earlier, barge operations are confined to U.S. 
waterways including the Mississippi, Illinois, Ohio, and the Columbia and Snake Rivers. 
 
Figure 5: Hypothetical Shipment Cost Curve (Koo et al. 1993) 
 
This benefits shippers in close proximity to these waterways. Given the lack of 
waterways in North Dakota, the only other mode comparable to barge serving shippers in the 
state is railroad transportation. The cost curve for railroad traffic 𝑅𝑅′ lies between that for truck 
and barge transportation. Koo and Uhm (1984) noted that the shape of the railroad cost curve is a 
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reflection of the “rate taper” concept which they described as rates which increase at a 
decreasing rate with distance attributable to economies of long haul. They noted that railroad 
firms realize economies of haul as distance increases, specifically because fixed terminal cost 
can be spread over greater mileage. Because most destinations for North Dakota grain (e.g. 
Portland, OR) are located at distances in which rail transport has a cost advantage, intermodal 
competition between rail and truck is limited in North Dakota.  
Geographic and product competition are also likely limited. Bitzan and Tolliver (1998) 
note that geographic and product competition can be viewed as different forms of intramodal 
competition. Intramodal competition in the pure sense looks at how railroad firms compete in a 
similar location to haul a given commodity to market. Generally, on the other hand, Geographic 
and product competition looks at railroad firms competing at different locations to haul the same 
commodity or similar commodities to market (Bitzan and Tolliver 1998).  
Geographic competition is defined in two different ways. First, it represents competition 
between railroads that are able to provide services for similar products to a given destination 
from different origins. Second, Geographic competition defines competition between railroads 
shipping freight from the same origin to different destinations. In the U.S, railroad network 
ownership is not separate from operation (e.g. railroad firms own, operate, and maintain their 
own networks). Although there are some areas were railroads have shared networks for 
interconnectivity, the large class I railroads are often described as regional duopolies (e.g. BNSF 
and UP in the West, and NS and CSX in the East). The limited number of railroads and shared 
network for railroads originating commodities out of North Dakota potentially means low 
intramodal competition. However, the fact that similar wheat is grown in other geographic 
regions presents an opportunity for geographic competition. For example, if BNSF charges 
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higher rates for shipping hard red spring wheat to the Pacific North West (e.g. Portland, OR) 
then receivers in that area can decide to get their wheat shipments from Canada using the 
Canadian National railroad. In this case, Geographic competition can substitute for intramodal 
competition in North Dakota.  
Product competition represents competition at different locations in shipping substitute 
products. North Dakota has historically led U.S hard red spring wheat production. Winter wheat 
can serve as a substitute for hard red spring wheat. Kansas is the largest producer of winter 
wheat. Similarly, if BNSF increases rates for shipping hard red spring wheat from North Dakota, 
then a receiver in Portland, OR, might switch from hard red spring wheat to winter wheat from 
Kansas. This is also an indication that product competition can be effective in North Dakota.  
Vachal (1993) indicates that these and other related issues make transportation issues in North 
Dakota unique compared to other areas.  
Agricultural transportation demand evaluations are necessary for transportation policy 
analysis and carriers’ business operation decisions. Specifically, elasticities obtained from grain 
transportation demand studies can help regulators assess the nature of competition and help 
carriers in pricing decisions. Although a number of authors have characterized North Dakota 
grain shippers as “captive”, the degree of captivity realized by such shippers is an empirical 
issue. An assessment of transport demand elasticities allows informed consideration of the 
degree of captivity in policy and provides carriers with better information in pricing.  
Railroads are an example of multi-product industry characterized by a large amount of 
common costs. Significant parts of the railroads’ costs do not fluctuate with the level or types of 
outputs (Waters 2007). This makes marginal cost pricing undesirable and in some instances 
unfeasible (requiring government subsidies) and average cost (full cost) pricing will likely lead 
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to loss of traffic to other modes (MacDonald 1989). Consequently, second best pricing (e.g. 
differential pricing) is necessary for carriers to recoup their cost of providing services. Studies 
have shown that shippers with less viable alternative competitive modes like North Dakota grain 
shippers pay comparatively higher rail rates. Rail transportation demand for such traffic is often 
fairly inelastic.  
However, it is likely that the nature of the demand for transport services has changed over 
time or in the long-run for several reasons. First, observed efficiency improvements stemming 
from innovations in the transportation industries, and railroads in particular (increasing use of 
longer trains), have potentially led to lower rates and improved quality of service for shippers. 
Satar and Peoples (2010) note that shippers who are limited to rail services are not disadvantaged 
compared to those that have access to both rail and barge services if high rail rates are followed 
with superior transportation services. Second, the development and growth of industrial usage for 
grains locally, including corn ethanol and soybeans for biofuels, are likely to provide nearby 
alternatives to shippers, reducing their need for railroads to ship commodities. Third, 
improvements in operational efficiency in the trucking industry (e.g. improved fuel efficiency) 
have likely enabled trucks to compete for longer distances, enhancing intermodal competition.  
On the other hand, recent stories of highway infrastructure deterioration and congestion 
may suggest that trucks have been less effective in competing with railroads over longer 
distances (Bitzan and Keeler 2014). Similarly, the recent increase in the transportation of crude 
oil from the Bakken in western North Dakota has led to observed delays in agricultural rail 
shipments and related losses to shippers. Railroads point to both capacity issues and bad weather 
to explain delays (cold weather can sometimes freeze rail tracks and locomotive engine oil). 
Increasing oil activity has also likely had a negative impact on truck transportation. Road 
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deterioration from heavy truck movements servicing the oil patch region has potentially 
increased delays for grain truck movements as well. The gravity of the issue led policy makers to 
organize a conference in December 2015 in Fargo, ND bringing together carriers and shipper 
groups.  During the conference titled “Post-Harvest Handling and Transportation for 
Agricultural Products: Issues and Alternatives” representatives for the two Class I railroads in 
the state promised to make improvements to their system to better serve shippers. All of these 
trends suggests a dynamic environment surrounding grain transportation. Consequently, there is 
a need to revisit agricultural transportation demand in North Dakota, and examine changes over 
time.   
As illustrated previously, rail carriers use information embedded in elasticities for pricing 
their services. Policy makers also use this information in regulatory decisions as the best way to 
assess captivity is to look at the relevant demand elasticities. This is particularly important for 
agricultural commodities, given that they move long distances to markets and the cost of 
transportation often constitutes a significant proportion of the value of commodities at 
destinations. 
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Review of Freight Transportation Studies 
Attempts to understand the reasons behind the steady decline in rail share of freight 
traffic and the rise of that of motor carriers and issues concerning the welfare impacts of the 
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) value-of-service pricing were two main motivations 
behind economists’ interest in developing intercity freight demand models (Winston 1981). After 
the Second World War, rail share of freight traffic fell by almost 32 percent from 68.6 to 36.7 
percent while that for motor carriers rose from 5.4 percent to 22.6 percent. In the case of value-
of-service pricing, the interest was on the scale of traffic misallocation attributable to ICC rate 
regulation. These and other related factors created interest in freight demand models that aimed 
to provide policy recommendations to enable railroads to regain traffic that was lost to motor 
carriers (Winston 1981).   
Early aggregate freight demand models (e.g. Miklius et al. 1976 and Boyer 1977) used 
linear logit models to estimate modal elasticities for freight services. Miklius et al. (1976) used 
two separate linear binary logit choice models to estimate the elasticities and cross price 
elasticities for cherry shipments from Washington, Oregon, and Montana and for apple 
shipments from Washington. Shippers’ choices in the logit model were specified as a function of 
modal rates (truck and rail), transit times, and dependability of transit time. The selection of 
commodity (cherries and apples) and inclusion of transit time and transit time dependability 
served to evaluate quality of service. Quality of service was expected to be an important 
consideration in shippers’ mode choice selection for cherries given the relatively higher 
perishability of cherries compared to apples. As expected, the own price elasticity for truck and 
rail service as well as the elasticities for both modes with respect to transit time were found to be 
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relatively elastic (price sensitive) for cherries. The elasticity with respect to transit time was 
more sensitive (elastic) than own price elasticity for both modes. Results for the apple model 
were less conclusive due to an unexpected positive sign for rail transit time and the statistical 
insignificance for truck transit time. The authors pointed to incomplete specification and the lack 
of interrelationship between inventory and transport mode decisions as potential explanations for 
unsatisfactory results with the apple model.    
Boyer (1977) applied a linear logit model to estimate potential modal split fluctuations in 
freight traffic between rail and truck stemming from freight rate deregulation for a cross-section 
of 17 class of manufactured commodities transported between two states. His dependent variable 
included rail share of total output (ton-miles); the annual sum total for rail and truckload motor 
carriers. Independent variables included relative freight rates, length of haul, tons, and 
commodity value. Two different forms of freight rate were used: one involving the ratio of rail 
and truck modal rates (price-ratio) and the other involving the difference between the two modal 
rates (price-difference). Commodity dummy variables were included to evaluate potential modal 
choice selection unrelated to the value per ton of the commodities hauled. Results using either of 
the freight rates were similar. Some dummy variables representing commodity groups were 
significant indicating potential differences between commodities. Modal split sensitivity analysis 
showed that there was moderate change in in rail share of total traffic stemming from percentage 
changes in the relative rate variables.  
Oum (1979) examined both the price-ratio and price-difference models and showed that 
both models have weaknesses and should only be used to estimate choice probabilities and that 
they are unsuitable in evaluating price responsiveness of demand for freight transportation. 
These shortcomings motivated the development (Friedlander and Spady 1980 and Oum 1979) 
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and use of more sophisticated models with underlying microeconomic theory in estimating 
demand for agricultural transportation (Buckley and Westbrook 1991). A review of these 
pioneering studies (Friedlaender and Spady 1980 and Oum 1979) is presented in the 
methodology section. Freight demand models that have been estimated for grain transportation in 
North Dakota in the past are highlighted below.  
 
2.1.1. Review of North Dakota Freight Transportation Studies 
A number of grain transportation demand studies of North Dakota shippers have been 
undertaken in the past. While all of these studies provide useful insights, none provide a 
complete picture of grain transportation demand in North Dakota. Some evaluate demand only at 
one point in time, others do not consider regional differences within the state (e.g. using 
disaggregate model approach), and some only evaluate demand for one or two of the principal 
destinations for North Dakota grains. A review of the approaches and principal findings of some 
North Dakota transportation demand studies done in the past is necessary for comparative 
analysis and to elucidate the peculiarities of evaluations done herein.   
Wilson (1984) assessed shippers’ derived demand to analyze intermodal competition for 
North Dakota wheat and barley shipments to Duluth and Minneapolis using data between 1973 
and 1982. He introduced dummy variables to test for the impact of rail car shortages and the 
introduction of multi-car rates on intermodal competition. He estimated a total of four separate 
models for each of the two commodities and destination pairs and tested hypotheses to determine 
the effects of rail car shortages and multi-car rates separately and jointly on the structure and the 
cost and derived demand. Results indicated that rail car shortages have caused a change in 
relative prices and modal shares. However at the time of the study, they did not have substantial 
effects on the structure of cost and derived demand. This served as an indication that structural 
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changes in cost and derived demand had not yet been observed. The railroad own-rate elasticities 
were different across origin-destination pairs and commodities and for the most part were 
inelastic. With respect to motor carriers, own rate elasticities for wheat movements to Duluth and 
barley movements to Minneapolis were elastic whereas wheat shipments to Minneapolis and 
barley shipments to Duluth were inelastic. He concluded that estimated effects were a reflection 
of intermodal competition.   
Wilson et al. (1988) developed a system of behavioral equations including demand and 
supply functions to analyze the market for transportation services, modal rate behavior, and 
determinants of railroad market power and pricing decisions for transportation of wheat 
(including HRS wheat and durum) from North Dakota to Minneapolis and Duluth using monthly 
data from 1973 to 1983. They used the same time period as in Wilson (1984) that represent 
periods before and after partial deregulation of the railroad industry. The theoretical foundation 
of their model was based on a generalization of dominant-firm price-leadership in which the 
railroad is considered the dominant firm and motor carrier industry forming the competitive 
fringe. Three sets of hypotheses were posed and dummy variables introduced to test them, 
including whether more railcars and the availability of multi-car services imply better services, if 
monthly shifts in the functions were observed in the structural equations, and likely interaction 
between the index representing railcar availability and modal prices. Their output data 
represented aggregated quantities shipped from each CRD aggregated across the state and 
converted to ton-miles. Monthly rail and truck rates were collected from a central point chosen 
from each CRD and a weighted average state rate was obtained based on the CRD’s proportion 
of total ton-mile traffic for the state for that period. Their results indicated that following 
deregulation, rail rates were affected more by competitive conditions than cost. It was observed 
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that own and cross price elasticities for both rail and truck services increased during the 
deregulation period. Estimated price elasticities for rail service were all above unity in absolute 
value whereas those for truck were highly dependent on the availability of rail cars. Results 
pointed to the importance of supply elasticity of truck services. They attributed the observed 
rightward shift in the truck supply function and through equilibrium a leftward movement in the 
railroad demand function to reduction in real price of fuel and technological improvements 
during that period. The culminating effects have seen the railroads move into the more elastic 
portion of their demand function in the deregulated period. They concluded that the long run 
capacity for trucking to serve as a competitor for railroads in a given market is reliant on the 
price of fuel, technological improvements on the supply side, and the availability of railcars on 
the demand side. In addition to using a derived demand model based on shippers cost which is 
embedded in economic theory, this study makes several improvements to previous North Dakota 
agricultural freight transportation demand studies in particular and other related studies in 
general.  
Dybing (2002) used a shipper derived transportation demand model similar to that by 
(Wilson 1984) to estimate North Dakota HRS wheat, durum, and barley shippers’ demand for 
transportation services to Minneapolis and Duluth. However, the shipper cost function so derived 
was link specific involving the state’s CRDs and the two destinations. He estimated a separate 
model for each commodity and destination pair for a total of six models using a pooled cross-
sectional and time series data (panel) from 1996-2001. Input variables included truck and rail 
rates while track capacity was used as a proxy for quality of service. Last, distance to destination 
was used as another important factor affecting modal demand. Rail rates were obtained from 
BNSF and weighted by elevator capacity in each CRD to get a weighted average rate. Truck 
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rates, on the other hand were estimated from a survey of elevators across the state and adjusted to 
reflect past rates using the trucking producer price index from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
Results indicated that the demand for truck transportation was elastic (absolute value of own 
price elasticity greater than 1 or value less than -1) for all cases except for HRS wheat 
transportation to Duluth.  
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CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Derived Demand for Freight Transportation 
Transportation demand studies play an important role in the development and enactment 
of transportation policies. Specifically, freight transportation demand models have been used 
extensively to evaluate the impact of regulatory changes in the rail and truck transportation 
sectors. They have also been used to forecast and to evaluate shippers’ responsiveness to changes 
in prices and modal attributes (e.g. quality of services). The multi-attribute nature of freight, 
including the diversity of modes and outputs (e.g. hauling agricultural commodities is different 
from moving crude oil) has led to a variety of freight transportation demand models. Based on 
the data used, Winston (1983) classifies freight transportation demand models into two broad 
categories; aggregate and disaggregate categories. He describes disaggregate models as those 
having an individual decision maker’s distinct choice of a given freight mode for a given 
shipment as their basic unit of observation. Aggregate models, on the other hand, have the 
combined share of a specific freight mode at the regional or national level as their primary unit 
of observation. Additionally, he notes that aggregate models like those initially developed by 
Friedlander and Spady (1980) and Oum (1979) which arose due to limitations of aggregate split 
models derive a given firm’s transportation demand for particular modes by estimating a cost 
function with a specified functional form.   
Freight transportation demand models have utilized a multiplicity of functional forms in 
their evaluations. Oum (1989) notes that the choice of the model, hence functional form used, is 
likely to affect potential forecast and related estimates including elasticities of demand with 
respect to price and quality of service attributes. He classifies functional forms, especially those 
used to estimate aggregate transportation demand models into four main categories including: 
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(1)  Linear demand model 
(2)  Log-linear demand model 
(3)  Logit model applied to aggregate market share data 
(4)  Transcendental logarithmic (translog) demand system  
 
Oum (1989 and 1979) describes freight transportation demand models involving 
functional forms (1) - (3) as ad hoc due to their lack of formal economic theory. He adds that this 
principal limitation makes results obtained from such evaluations inadequate for several reasons. 
In the case of linear models, the assumption of linearity in effects may be unrealistic. For the log-
linear or Cobb-Douglas models, elasticity does not change across the range of data points and is 
not reliant on the location of the demand curve. Such a restriction makes it impractical, 
particularly in cases where the aim of the estimation involves calculating elasticities over cross-
sectional links and over time within a link. In the case of the logit model, he provides three 
reasons why they are not appropriate to use in evaluating the nature of demand (e.g. price 
responsiveness). First, logit models impose numerous rigid restrictions on estimated price 
responsiveness of demand parameters including substitution and cross price elasticities. Second, 
in linear logit models that involve a ratio of prices as an explanatory variable, price 
responsiveness of demand parameters do not change with respect to the mode selected as the 
base which serves as the denominator in logit equations. Third, the technology underlining the 
linear logit model for use in freight demand is irregular and inconsistent.    
The transcendental logarithmic functional form (4), originally developed by Christensen 
et al. (1971), is an example of a family of functions described as “flexible functions”. Thompson 
(1988) notes that their development was driven by the need for functional forms that imposed 
 33 
 
fewer maintained assumptions like those imposed by the Cobb-Douglass function. The notion of 
“flexibility” of functional forms was formalized by Diewert (1971). His definition of a flexible 
functional form entails that the function have parameter values in such a manner that its first and 
second derivatives are respectively the same as those of the arbitrary function for any given point 
in the range of the function. Friedlander and Spady (1980) show that the translog cost function is 
a second order Taylor series expansion of an arbitrary function. Other flexible forms representing 
a second order Taylor series expansion that have the capability of providing a quadratic estimate 
of the unknown true function include the generalized Leontief (Diewert 1971) and normalized 
quadratic functional forms (Thompson 1988 and Oum 1979).  
Beginning with Oum (1989 and 1979) and Friedlander and Spady (1980), who derive 
shipper demand for freight transportation using the translog demand system, a plethora of other 
studies including (Wilson 1984 and 1982, Dybing 2002, Buckley and Westbrook 1991) have 
used a similar approach to estimate agricultural shipper demand for freight transportation. 
Friedlander and Spady (1980), following from Oum (1979a and 1979b), point to three important 
factors to consider in analyzing freight transportation demand. Freight transportation demand is a 
productive input; hence it should be viewed and treated analytically like any other input.  
Second, the total cost of transportation encompasses the rate and cost of inventory related to 
shipping and storage. Third, the rate and shipment characteristics that affect inventory costs (e.g. 
shipment size, length of haul) are often determined together by the firm. As such, they suggested 
that the best approach to analyze freight demand is to derive explicitly input demand equations 
from the firm’s cost function that includes rates and factors reflecting shipment characteristics 
using estimation techniques that correct for endogeneity.   
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3.1.1. Theoretical Framework 
To derive the demand for freight transportation and estimate intermodal competition, 
Oum (1979b) considers freight transportation services as productive inputs to firms’ production 
and distribution of goods and services. He assumed that there exists a twice continuously 
differentiable production function which involves using inputs: capital (𝐾), labor (𝐿), and freight 
transportation to produce aggregate output(𝑄). Two main assumptions were made about the 
production function. First, the function is linearly homogenous (exhibiting constant returns to 
scale), increasing, and quasi-concave in inputs. Second, the freight transportation services (𝑇) 
are separable from other inputs involved in the production process. Given these assumptions, the 
production process is represented as: 
𝑄 = 𝑓 (𝐾, 𝐿, 𝑓(̅𝑇))                                                          (1) 
Where, 
𝑄 = firm level output 
 𝑇 = R, H, W  
 𝑅 = freight hauled by railway  
 𝐻 = freight hauled by highway  
 𝑊 = freight hauled by waterway 
 
 𝑓(̅𝑇) is linear homogenous in 𝑇, other variables defined are as defined previously.  
Based on the duality theorem initially proposed by Shephard (1973), if producers minimize input 
cost, the ensuing cost function has sufficient information to entirely represent the production 
process. Consequently, rather than undertake the two-step process of specifying a production 
functional form and then solving the constrained cost minimizing problem, it is more reasonable 
to directly specify a cost function. The cost function can be specified as follows: 
𝐶 = 𝑓(𝑄, 𝑊𝐿 , 𝑊𝐾, 𝑊𝑇 ) (2) 
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Where, 
  𝐶 = total cost  
𝑊𝐿 = price of labor 
 𝑊𝐾 = price of capital 
 𝑊𝑇 = price of freight transportation services 
 
𝐶 is linear homogenous in aggregate output 𝑄 and satisfies regularity conditions above. 
Binswanger (1974) points to the advantages of using cost rather than production functions to 
estimate production parameters (e.g. cost functions are homogenous in prices notwithstanding 
the homogeneity properties of the production function).   
Oum (1979b) points to the homothetic separability equivalence theorem by Blackorby et 
al. (1977) for justification of his model. This theorem indicates that if a production function is 
increasing and satisfies conditions for continuity, monotonicity and quasi-concavity, the 
homothetic separability of transportation services 𝑇 from other inputs in the production process 
including capital and labor (𝐾, 𝐿) is equal to the separability of the freight transportation service 
input price  𝑊𝑇 from those of capital and labor (𝑊𝐾, 𝑊𝐿) and aggregate output 𝑄 in the cost 
function (𝐶). Friedlander and Spady (1980) develop a similar approach to estimate derived 
demand for freight transportation. The transportation sectoral cost function (𝐶𝑇) which 
conserves the regularity conditions of the cost function in (2) can be described as follows: 
𝐶𝑇 = (𝑊𝑅 , 𝑊𝐻, 𝑊𝑊) (3) 
Where,  
𝑊𝑅 = price of railraod freight services 
 𝑊𝐻 = price of highway freight services 
 𝑊𝑊 = price of waterway freight services 
 
3.1.1.2. Empirical Specification 
Following developments from (1), (2) and (3) where estimating firms’ demand for freight 
transportation assumes that their transportation costs are separable from their total cost, the total 
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transportation cost of North Dakota grain shippers can be estimated similarly. Their total 
transportation cost can be described as a function of rail and truck prices (𝑊𝑅 , 𝑊𝑇), quantity 
shipped(𝑄), distance (𝐷), and whether the elevators is a shuttle elevator all of which are likely 
to influencing mode choice (including the shuttle dummy will allow distinguishing shuttle 
elevator demand from non-shuttle elevator demand). North Dakota grain shippers’ transportation 
cost function can be specified as:  
𝑇𝐶 = 𝑓(𝑊𝑅, 𝑊𝑇 , 𝑄, 𝐷, 𝑆𝐻𝑈𝑇) (4) 
Where, 
   𝑇𝐶 = total transportation cost 
𝑊𝑅 = price of rail transportation 
𝑊𝑇 = price of truck transportation 
𝑄 = quantity shipped (tons) 
𝐷 = distance  
𝑆𝐻𝑈𝑇 = shuttle elevator dummy 
 
Following Shephard’s Lemma (1973), modal input demand functions can be derived from 
shippers total transportation cost as follows: 
𝜕𝑇𝐶
𝜕𝑊𝑖
= 𝑋𝑖,        𝑖 = 𝑇, 𝑅  (5) 
Where, 
 𝑋𝑖 = 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑘 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
This study utilizes a link specific cost function involving individual grain elevators in the 
state to evaluate agricultural freight demand for five principal commodities shipped from North 
Dakota including barley, corn, hard red spring and durum wheat, and soybeans. The link specific 
transportation cost model is similar to that by Oum (1979) given as: 
𝑇𝐶𝑙 = 𝑓(𝑊𝑖𝑙, 𝑄, 𝐷𝑙 , 𝑇, 𝑆𝐻𝑈𝑇 )    (6) 
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Where,  
𝑇𝐶𝑙 = total rail and truck transportation cost on link l; 
𝑊𝑖𝑙 = i × l vector of prices of i modes on link l; 
𝑄 = total output on link l (tonmiles); 
𝐷𝑙 = distance of link 
𝑇 = time trend 
𝑆𝐻𝑈𝑇 = shuttle elevator dummy 
𝑙 = 1, 2, . . . l 
 
The links involve grain elevators within the state shipping to the four principal 
destinations for North Dakota grain, including Duluth, MN; Minneapolis, MN; New Orleans, LA 
and Portland, OR. New Orleans, LA and Portland, OR are used to represent both the Gulf and 
Pacific Northwest respectively. Oum (1979a) used aggregate data for estimation due to the lack 
of data at the disaggregate level. He noted that the use of disaggregate data is useful in the 
analyses of multi modal demand for freight transportation, especially in the evaluation of 
intermodal competition because it more precisely models individual shipper’s production and 
distribution activities. By using disaggregate data at the level of the country elevators; the model 
in equation (6) closely represents the marketing and distribution process of North Dakota grain 
shippers. Moreover, it allows us to distinguish shuttle elevator demand from non-shuttle demand.      
To estimate the link specific transportation cost in equation (6), it needs to be specified in 
a given functional form. Oum (1979a) indicates that for the study of intermodal substitutability 
(intermodal competition), such a functional form should be able to permit free variability of 
Allen partial elasticities of substitution and be “flexible” enough to provide a valid second order 
estimation to an arbitrary differentiable function. He adds that the translog function originally 
developed by Christensen et al. (1971), in addition to being consistent with neoclassical theory of 
production, provides a system of costs and demand functions that are most conveniently 
estimable. The translog form of the link specific model is given as:  
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𝐼𝑛𝑇𝐶𝑙 = 𝛼0+ ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝐼𝑛(𝑊𝑖𝑙)𝑖  + 𝜌𝑞𝐼𝑛(𝑄) + 𝛽𝑡𝐼𝑛(𝐷𝑙) + 𝜓𝜙𝑇 + 𝜛𝜍𝑆𝐻𝑈𝑇 + 
1
2
∑ 𝜏𝑖𝑗𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑗 (𝑊𝑖𝑙)𝐼𝑛(𝑊𝑗𝑙) + 
 ∑ 𝜏𝑖𝑞𝐼𝑛(𝑊𝑖𝑙)𝐼𝑛(𝑄𝑙)𝑖  + ∑ 𝜏𝑖𝑡𝐼𝑛(𝑊𝑖𝑙)𝐼𝑛(𝐷𝑙)𝑖  + ∑ 𝜏𝑖𝜙𝐼𝑛(𝑊𝑖𝑙)𝑖 𝑇 + 
1
2
∑ 𝜏𝑖𝜍𝐼𝑛𝑖 (𝑊𝑖𝑙)𝑆𝐻𝑈𝑇 +                         
 
1
2
𝜏𝑞𝑞(𝐼𝑛𝑄𝑖𝑙)
2 + 𝜏𝑞𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑄𝑖𝑙𝐼𝑛𝐷𝑙 + 
1
2
𝜏𝑡𝑡(𝐼𝑛𝐷𝑙)
2 + 
1
2
𝜏𝜙𝜙(𝑇)
2 + 𝜏𝑞𝜙𝐼𝑛𝑄𝑖𝑙𝑇 + 𝜏𝑞𝜍𝐼𝑛𝑄𝑖𝑙𝑆𝐻𝑈𝑇 +  
𝜏𝑡𝜙𝐼𝑛(𝐷𝑙)𝑇 + 𝜏𝑡𝜍𝐼𝑛(𝐷𝑙)𝑆𝐻𝑈𝑇 + 𝜏𝑡𝜙𝐼𝑛(𝐷𝑙)𝑇 + 𝜏𝑡𝜍𝐼𝑛(𝐷𝑙)𝑆𝐻𝑈𝑇 + 𝜏𝜙𝜍𝑇𝑆𝐻𝑈𝑇                              (7) 
 
Where, all independent variables are divided by their means. The translog cost function 
has the same properties as the usual translog cost function, including homogeneity of degree one 
in input prices. A proportional change in rates of all transportation modes used in shipping grain 
on a particular link will alter shippers’ total cost proportionately on that link. Necessary and 
sufficient homogeneity and symmetry conditions for specifying a cost function with linear 
homogeneity in shipping rates are: 
∑ 𝛼𝑖 = 1𝑖 , 
 ∑ 𝜏𝑖𝑗 = ∑ 𝜏𝑖𝑗 = 0𝑗𝑖 ,  
∑ 𝜏𝑖𝑞 = ∑ 𝜏𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝜏𝑖𝜙 = ∑ 𝜏𝑖𝜍 =𝑖𝑖 0, 𝜏𝑖𝑗 = 𝜏𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑖   
Input share equations for rail and truck can be obtained from the translog cost function 
using Shephard’s Lemma and logarithmic differentiation. From Shephard’s lemma: 
𝜕𝑐
𝜕𝑤𝑖
= 𝑥𝑖 (8) 
Similarly, for the link specific transportation cost function, we have: 
𝜕𝑇𝐶𝑙
𝜕𝑤𝑖𝑙
= 𝑥𝑖𝑙 (9) 
Where, 𝑥𝑖𝑙 is the quantity of rail or truck transportation on link, 𝑙. In logarithmic form we have: 
𝜕𝐼𝑛𝑇𝐶𝑙
𝜕𝐼𝑛(𝑤𝑖𝑙)
=
𝜕𝑇𝐶𝑙
𝜕𝑤𝑖𝑙
×
𝑤𝑖𝑙
𝐶
 (10) 
Substituting for 
𝜕𝑇𝐶𝑙
𝜕𝑤𝑖𝑙
  in (10), we get  
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𝜕𝐼𝑛𝑇𝐶𝑙
𝜕𝐼𝑛(𝑤𝑖𝑙)
= 𝑥𝑖𝑙
𝑤𝑖𝑙
𝐶
= 𝑆𝑖𝑙                               (11) 
Where, 𝑆𝑖𝑙 is the expenditure factor share for rail or truck transportation on a particular 
link. The total cost function (7) is estimated together with factor share equations (11) using 
Zellner’s Seemingly Unrelated Regression or Three Stage Least Squares (3SLS) after testing for 
potential endogeneity of input prices (rail and truck rates) using the omitted variable version of 
the Hausman test. Endogeneity arises when one or more explanatory variable is correlated with 
the error term either due to an omitted variable, measurement error, or simultaneity (Wooldridge, 
2006). The omitted variable version of the Hausman test involves two steps. First ordinary least 
square (OLS) is used to separately regress each of the input prices being tested for endogeneity 
on instruments (crop production and fuel prices) for rail and truck rates and other exogenous 
variables in the translog cost function excluding endogenous variable interactions. Total cost is 
then regressed on predicted values obtained from the first stage process together with 
interactions of predicted values and other exogenous variables in the original cost function 
including original input prices to obtained unrestricted residual sum of square using OLS. A 
second OLS regression which excludes predicted values and their interactions with exogenous 
variables is undertaken to obtain a restricted residual sum of squares. An F-test is used to test the 
joint significance of the slopes of generated predicted values and interaction of the predicted 
values with other variables in the cost function. The F-test is given as:  
𝐹 =
(𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅−𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑈)/𝑛𝑢𝑚.𝑜𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 
𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑈/𝑑.𝑓.𝑈
                (12.1) 
Where,  
𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑈 = Unrestricted residual sum of squares; 
𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅 = 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 ; 
𝑑. 𝑓.𝑈 = Degress of freedon for unrestricted model; 
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Given that the factor shares sum up to 1, one of the factor share equations is dropped to 
avoid perfect collinearity. Results remain the same no matter which equation is dropped. North 
Dakota grain movement data between 2006 and 2013 are used to estimate separate models for all 
five commodities. The link specific cost function is also tested for concavity in modal factor 
prices by taking the characteristics roots of the hessian matrix. Concavity requires that the link 
specific cost function satisfies first and second order conditions. The first order condition 
requires that the cost function be non-decreasing in modal input prices. The second order 
conditions entails that the Hessian matrix be negative definite given in terms of characteristic 
roots. The Transcendental Logarithmic parameters are transformed to obtain the Hessian matrix 
given that parameters in the cost function are in natural logs. The two by two (two modal input 
prices) Hessian matrix is shown below. 
𝐻 = [
𝜕2𝑇𝐶𝑙
𝜕𝑊𝑖𝑙
2
𝜕2𝑇𝐶𝑙
𝜕𝑊𝑖𝑙𝜕𝑤𝑗𝑙
𝜕2𝑇𝐶𝑙
𝜕𝑊𝑖𝑙𝜕𝑤𝑗𝑙
𝜕2𝑇𝐶𝑙
𝜕𝑊𝑗𝑙
2
]             (12.2) 
Where,  
 
𝜕2𝑇𝐶𝑙
𝜕𝑊𝑖𝑙
2 =
𝑇𝐶𝑙
𝑊𝑖𝑙
2 [
𝜕2𝑙𝑛 𝑇𝐶𝑙
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑖𝑙
2 −
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐶𝑙
𝜕𝑊𝑖𝑙
+
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐶𝑙
𝜕𝑊𝑖𝑙
∗
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐶𝑙
𝜕𝑊𝑖𝑙
]  
 
𝜕2𝑇𝐶𝑙
𝜕𝑊𝑖𝑙𝜕𝑤𝑗𝑙
=
𝑇𝐶𝑙
𝑊𝑖𝑙𝑊𝐽𝑙
[
𝜕2𝑙𝑛 𝑇𝐶𝑙
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑖𝑙𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑊𝐽𝑙
+
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐶𝑙
𝜕𝑊𝑖𝑙
∗
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐶𝑙
𝜕𝑊𝐽𝑙
] 
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The link specific model with two input prices (rail and truck rates), one output (ton-
miles), link distance (miles) and a time trend to be estimated is given as:  
𝐼𝑛𝑇𝐶𝑙 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐼𝑛(𝑅𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑙) + 𝛼2𝐼𝑛(𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑘𝑙) + 𝜌1𝐼𝑛(𝑇𝑀𝑙) + 𝜌2𝐼𝑛(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑙) + 𝜌3𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 + 𝜌4𝑆𝐻𝑈𝑇                  
+𝜏11
1
2
(𝐼𝑛  𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑙)
2 + 𝜏22
1
2
(𝐼𝑛 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑘𝑙)
2 + 𝛽11
1
2
(𝐼𝑛 𝑇𝑀𝑙)
2 + 𝛽22
1
2
(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑙)
2 + 𝛽33
1
2
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒2 
+𝜏12𝐼𝑛(𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑙). 𝐼𝑛(𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑘𝑙) + 𝜒11𝐼𝑛(𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑙). 𝐼𝑛(𝑇𝑀𝑙) + 𝜒12𝐼𝑛( 𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑙). 𝐼𝑛(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑙) 
+𝜒13𝐼𝑛(𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑙). 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 + 𝜒14𝐼𝑛(𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑙). 𝑆𝐻𝑈𝑇+𝜒21𝐼𝑛(𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑘𝑙). 𝐼𝑛(𝑇𝑀𝑙) 
+𝜒22𝐼𝑛(𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑘𝑙). 𝐼𝑛(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑙) + 𝜒23𝐼𝑛(𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑘𝑙). 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒+𝜒24𝐼𝑛(𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑘𝑙). 𝑆𝐻𝑈𝑇   
+𝛽12𝐼𝑛(𝑇𝑀𝑙 ). 𝐼𝑛(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑙) + 𝛽13𝐼𝑛(𝑇𝑀𝑙). 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 + 𝛽14𝐼𝑛(𝑇𝑀𝑙). 𝑆𝐻𝑈𝑇 + 𝛽23𝐼𝑛(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑙). 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒  
+𝛽24𝐼𝑛(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑙). 𝑆𝐻𝑈𝑇 + 𝛽34𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒. 𝑆𝐻𝑈𝑇 + 𝜔𝑓 ∑ 𝐸𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑒𝑓 +  𝜀𝑖          (13) 
Where,  
𝑇𝐶𝑙 = total rail and truck transportation cost on link l;  
𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑙 = rail rate on link l;   
𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑘𝑙 = truck rate on link l;  
𝑇𝑀𝑙 = tonmiles on link l;  
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑙 = average link distance;  
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 = time trend 
𝐸𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑒 = elevator fixed effects dummies 
𝑆𝐻𝑈𝑇 = shuttle elevator dummy (shuttle = 1, 0 otherwise) 
 
Following Shephard’s Lemma (1973) the corresponding cost share equations for each input rail 
and truck, 𝑆1𝑙, 𝑆2𝑙 respectively are shown below:  
𝑆1𝑙 = 𝛼1 + 𝜏11𝐼𝑛(𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑙) + 𝜏12𝐼𝑛(𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑘𝑙)+𝜒11𝐼𝑛(𝑇𝑀𝑙) + 𝜒12𝐼𝑛(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑙) + 𝜒13𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 + 𝜒14𝑆𝐻𝑈𝑇 
    
𝑆2𝑙 = 𝛼2 + 𝜏22𝐼𝑛(𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑘𝑙) + 𝜏12𝐼𝑛(𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑙) + 𝜒21𝐼𝑛(𝑇𝑀𝑙) + 𝜒22(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑙) + 𝜒23𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 + 𝜒24𝑆𝐻𝑈𝑇 
 
Where, 𝑇𝐶𝑙 is obtained by summing all transportation modal costs as specified in 
Buckley and Westbrook (1991). The other variables are as defined previously. For ease of 
interpretation, and given that the translog function is a Taylor series expansion, all independent 
variables except the time trend and the shuttle dummy are normalized (divided) by their means. 
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The estimated coefficients on the first-order terms of the cost equation(𝛼1, 𝛼2, 𝜌1, 𝜌2) represent 
cost elasticity with respect to that variable, while all variables are at their sample mean time is at 
the first year and shuttle dummy is zero. Additionally, for the transportation shipping rate (rail, 
and truck) these estimated coefficients (𝛼1, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛼2) depict each mode’s share of total 
transportation cost at the means of all variables except time and the shuttle dummy.   
Satar and Peoples (2010) indicate that knowledge about the substitutability and 
complementarity of various modes is vital in understanding whether shippers can possibly view 
different modes of transportation as a choice of competing shipping services or as a set of 
services used together. For cost minimizing firms, the elasticity of substitution between two 
inputs measures the proportional change in the input ratio for a related change in the input price 
ratio. Consequently, the elasticity of substitution between rail and truck services for example 
measures the shift in traffic brought about by a change in the relative price, giving a measure of 
the level of competition between the two modes (Buckley and Westbrook 1991). In the case of 
North Dakota grain shippers, this shows the level of competition between rail and truck.  
The Allen-Uzawa (1962) elasticity of substitution shown in equation (14) provides 
information whether two inputs are substituteS or complements: 
𝜎𝑖𝑗 = (
𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝑆𝑖𝑆𝑗
⁄ ) + 1            𝑖 ≠ 𝑗       (14) 
Inputs 𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑗 are “Allen substitutes” and complements if 𝜎𝑖𝑗 > 0 and 𝜎𝑖𝑗 < 0 respectively. For 
“Allen substitutes”, an increase in the price of one input causes the increase in the usage of 
another. On the other hand, if an increase in price of one input leads to the decrease in utilization 
of the other, the inputs are described as complements. The elasticity of input demand with 
respect to the price of another input (cross price elasticity) and own price are shown in equation 
(15) and (16) respectively below: 
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𝜀𝑖𝑗 = (
𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝑆𝑖
) + 𝑆𝑗 = 𝜎𝑖𝑗𝑆𝑗         (15) 
𝜀𝑖𝑖 = (
𝜏𝑖𝑖
𝑆𝑖
) − 1 + 𝑆𝑖          (16) 
Estimated elasticities in equations (15) and (16) do not take into account changes in the quantity 
demanded of the final product in response to changes in freight rates. It is compensated (Hicks) 
demand elasticity. 
Modal demand elasticities can be used to assess the perceived dependence on a given 
mode and changes in the dependence over time. Consider that i = 1 and 2 for rail and truck 
transportation respectively. If the own price elasticity of demand for rail services |𝜀11| decreases 
in absolute value over time, then North Dakota shippers are increasingly dependent on rail for 
transport services (they view truck services as less viable alternatives). Oum (1979) shows that 
for the two mode case, the cross price elasticity of rail with respect to truck price 𝜀12 , or the 
cross price elasticity of truck with respect to rail price 𝜀21 is given by the absolute value of the 
own price elasticity of rail  𝜀11 or the absolute value of the own price elasticity truck  𝜀22 
respectively. This is the case because the elasticities are conditional demand (calculated from a 
compensated or Hicksian demand function) elasticities- conditional on output level. They do not 
account for the impact of price change on total output shipped (or change in elasticity of demand 
for the product). A general representation is given as: 
𝜀𝑖𝑗 = |𝜀𝑖𝑖|           (17) 
Equation (17) shows that a relationship exists between own and cross price elasticity in the two 
mode case. Knowledge about cross price elasticities can be used to calculate own price elasticity 
of rail and truck. Conditional elasticities mean a one percent price increase in all prices will not 
change the amount of a mode used. These can be specified for rail and truck respectively below: 
𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑙:                𝜀11 + 𝜀12 = 0       →       |𝜀11| = 𝜀12            (18) 
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𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑘:            𝜀22 + 𝜀21 = 0        →       |𝜀22| = 𝜀21            (19) 
 
 
3.1.1.3. Potential Outcomes 
Considering rail, if the absolute value of the own price elasticity of rail, |𝜀11|, is low this 
suggests that rail can increase its prices without a big reduction in traffic. Moreover, reductions 
in truck prices won’t have much of an impact on rail traffic as reflected by a low cross-price 
elasticity,(𝜀12) thus, rail is the dominant mode for that traffic. On the other hand, if the absolute 
value of the own price elasticity of demand for rail, |𝜀11|  increases over time, then North Dakota 
shippers are less dependent on rail for transport services (they view truck services as a more 
viable alternative). The latter case is likely if grain elevators are increasingly shipping for shorter 
distances or if trucking improvements make it seem like a more viable option at longer distance. 
The determination of likely distances where rail and truck compete is an empirical issue (we do 
not know what constitutes shorter distances). Similarly, decreasing and increasing own price 
elasticity of demand for truck will have related outcomes to those explained above.  
Oum (1979) shows a method for calculating unconditional (ordinary or Marshallian) 
demand elasticities. Ordinary demand elasticities account for the impact of price change on total 
output shipped. The Marshallian elasticity of demand, 𝑀𝑖𝑗  for one mode (ith) with respect to the 
price of another mode (jth) is given as: 
𝑀𝑖𝑗 = (𝜎𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾𝑗Ω)?̂?𝑗          (20) 
 
Where, 
 ?̂?𝑗 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑗𝑡ℎ 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 
Ω = 𝑜𝑤𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦  
𝛾𝑗 =
𝑑𝑝
𝑑𝑝𝑗
𝑝𝑗
𝑝
= 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑤. 𝑟. 𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑎  
𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑗𝑡ℎ 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒 
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𝜎𝑖𝑗 = 𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑡ℎ −  𝑗𝑡ℎ 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
 
To calculate the ordinary demand elasticities shown in equation (19), the own price 
elasticity of demand for the commodity (Ω), and the proportionate change in the price of the 
commodity with respect to a change in the price of the transportation mode (𝛾𝑗), were both 
arbitrary assumed to be unity by Oum. Oum (1979) further noted that the level of competition 
does not vary only by commodity type, but there is potential variability in modal competition at 
different distances. To ascertain the level of competition at different distances and points where 
one mode dominates another, he provides a rule of thumb linking the relationship between 
distances, mode shares, and elasticities.   
 
3.1.1.4. Distance Competition Rule of Thumb 
Following the rule of thumb by Oum (1979) where, 𝑖 𝑜𝑟 𝑗 = 1, 2, stands for rail and truck 
respectively the following can be deduced: Using equation (14) it can be observed that the 
elasticity of substitution between the ith mode and the jth mode: 𝜎𝑖𝑗 = (
𝝉𝒊𝒋
𝑺𝒊𝑺𝒋
) + 𝟏 gets bigger as 
the absolute deviation between the mode shares |𝑆𝑖 − 𝑆𝑗|  increases. For example, the elasticity 
of substitution between rail and truck: 𝜎12 = (
𝜏12
𝑆1𝑆2
) + 1 , gets bigger as the absolute deviation 
between the two mode share, |𝑆1 − 𝑆2|, increases.   
Oum (1979) shows that, it is also the case that if |𝑆1 − 𝑆2| is large and 𝑆1 > 𝑆2 in a given 
freight market, own price elasticity for trucking will be high and consequently, so will cross 
price elasticity of demand for trucking with respect rail price. Two things cause an increase in 
the cross price elasticity of demand for trucking services with respect to rail services and own 
price elasticity of demand for trucking when, |𝑆1 − 𝑆2| is large and 𝑆1 > 𝑆2 :   
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First, 𝜎21 becomes larger as, |𝑆1 − 𝑆2| becomes large. Second, 𝑆1 is larger (Recall 𝜀21 =
𝜎21𝑆1Recall from equation (18) that the absolute value of the own price elasticity of trucking is 
equal to the cross price elasticity of truck with respect to rail:  (|𝜀22| = 𝜀21. 
This suggests that  |𝜀22| will also be large, since 𝜀21 is large and positive. High own price 
elasticity for trucking is likely to occur on longer hauls dominated by rail (Oum 1979).  
If |𝑆1 − 𝑆2| is large and 𝑆1 < 𝑆2 in a given freight market, Oum (1979) shows that own 
price elasticity of demand for rail services will be high. He notes that two factors increase the 
cross price elasticity of demand for rail services with respect to trucking as follows: First, 𝜎12 
becomes larger. Second, 𝑆2 is larger. Recall  𝜀12 = 𝜎12𝑆2. From equation (17) the absolute value 
of the own price elasticity for rail is obtained from cross price elasticity of rail with respect to 
truck: (|𝜀11| = 𝜀12. This suggests that |𝜀11| will also be large since  𝜀12 is large. Depending on 
the commodity type and the quality of service needed by shippers, trucks have been shown to 
dominate short hauls. This may occur for shipments from grain elevators in the East of the state 
to Duluth and Minneapolis, MN.  
Oum (1979) suggests that, as distance increases, the rail elasticity of demand decreases 
while that for truck increases. Also, as shipping distance becomes shorter, the truck elasticity of 
demand decreases (becomes more inelastic) while that for rail increases (becomes more elastic). 
For example, on links from grain elevators to PNW and Gulf destinations where rail is likely to 
dominate the majority of the traffic with no significant or existing intermodal competition, 
demand for truck is likely to be highly price-elastic.  
In summary, the own price elasticity of rail demand 𝜀11 is likely to decrease with 
distance, while that for truck, 𝜀22 will likely increase with distance. Rail will likely dominate 
long hauls and trucks short hauls, leaving the medium haul as the likely market for intermodal 
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competition. In this case, we are unsure what the medium haul distance is. Oum (1979) identifies 
for each commodity group in his study the upper bound of the distance for which truck mode 
dominates and the lower bound of distance that rail dominates. This study will use similar 
criteria for each of the five commodities under evaluation. Most studies arbitrarily state the 
distance which a given mode dominates (CRS 2005) or develop conceptual models on modal 
distance competition (Koo el al. 1993) without calculating these distanceS or showing the 
relationship between elasticities and distance or changes over time. This study actually shows the 
distances in which one mode dominates the other by commodity and changes in elasticity by 
distance and over time. The criteria for modal dominance are given as follows:  
A link is described as truck dominated if the absolute value of the own price elasticity of 
rail is greater than one and twice that of the own price elasticity of truck: 
|𝜀11| > 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 |𝜀11| > 2|𝜀22| 
A link is rail dominated if the absolute value of the own price elasticity of truck is greater 
than one and twice the absolute value of the own price elasticity of rail: 
|𝜀22| > 1 and |𝜀22| > 2|𝜀11| 
After establishing the criteria for link dominance, it is also essential to assess how elasticities 
change over distance and time. This will provide insight into the relative usage of different 
modes for different distances and over time.  
 
Rail own price elasticity estimate by link distance is given as: 
𝑅𝑎𝑖𝑙: (𝜀11)𝑙𝑑 = (
?̂?11
𝑅𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑑
) − 1 + 𝑅𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑑                   (21) 
Where, 
?̂?11 = estimated second order rail term in link specific cost function 
 𝑅𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑑 = rail share by link distance 
𝑅𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑑 = 𝛼1 + ?̂?12 ∗ 𝐼𝑛 (
𝑙𝑑
𝑎𝑣𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡
) + ?̂?11 ∗ 𝐼𝑛 (
𝑡𝑚
𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑚𝑙𝑠
)  
?̂?12 = rail rate link distance interaction estimate 
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?̂?11 = rail rate output interaction estimate 
𝑙𝑑 = assigned link distance in 50 miles increment based on range in dataset  
𝑎𝑣𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 = simple average link distances for all links in dataset  
𝑡𝑚 = 𝑙𝑑 ∗ 𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑠 (avtons = simple average tons shipped for all links)  
𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑚𝑙𝑠 = simple average output for all links in dataset   
 
Truck own price elasticity estimate by link distance is given as: 
𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑘: (𝜀22)𝑙𝑑 = (
?̂?22
𝑇𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑑
) − 1 + 𝑇𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑑                  (22) 
Where, 
?̂?22 = estimated second order truck term in link specific cost function 
 𝑇𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑑 = truck share by link distance 
𝑇𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑑 = 𝛼2 + ?̂?22 ∗ 𝐼𝑛 (
𝑙𝑑
𝑎𝑣𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡
) + ?̂?21 ∗ 𝐼𝑛 (
𝑡𝑚
𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑚𝑙𝑠
)  
?̂?22 =  rail rate link distance interaction estimate 
?̂?21 = rail rate output interaction estimate 
𝑙𝑑 = assigned link distance in 50 miles increment based on range in dataset  
𝑎𝑣𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 = simple average link distances for all links in dataset  
𝑡𝑚 = 𝑙𝑑 ∗ 𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑠 (avtons = simple average tons shipped for all links)  
𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑚𝑙𝑠 = simple average output for all links in dataset   
 
 
Rail own price elasticity estimate over time is given as: 
𝑅𝑎𝑖𝑙: (𝜀11)𝑡𝑖𝑚 = (
?̂?11
𝑅𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑚
) − 1 + 𝑅𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑚       (23) 
Where, 
𝑅𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑚 = 𝛼1 + ?̂?13 ∗ (𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒)  
?̂?13 = 𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒  
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 = 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑  
all other parameters are as defined previously 
     
Truck own price elasticity estimate over time is given as: 
𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑘: (𝜀22)𝑡𝑖𝑚 = (
?̂?22
𝑇𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑚
) − 1 + 𝑇𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑚       (24) 
Where, 
𝑇𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑚 = 𝛼2 + ?̂?23 ∗ (𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒) 
?̂?23 = truck rate time trend interaction parameter estimate  
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 = time trend  
all other variables are as defined previously 
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The potential impact of shuttle elevators on grain transportation can be evaluated by 
looking at the variation in intermodal competition (truck-rail competition) exhibited by 
elasticities of different elevator types (shuttle and non-shuttle) over distance and time. The rail 
and truck own-price elasticities by link distance presented in equations (21) and (22) can be 
modified for shuttle elevators as shown in equation (25) and (26) respectively.  
Rail own price elasticity estimate by link distance for shuttle elevators is given as: 
𝑅𝑎𝑖𝑙: (𝜀11)𝑠ℎ𝑢𝑡−𝑙𝑑 = (
?̂?11
𝑅𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑢𝑡−𝑙𝑑
) − 1 + 𝑅𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑢𝑡−𝑙𝑑                  (25) 
Where, 
𝑅𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑢𝑡−𝑙𝑑 = rail share by link distance 
𝑅𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑑 = 𝛼1 + ?̂?12 ∗ 𝐼𝑛 (
𝑙𝑑
𝑎𝑣𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡
) + ?̂?11 ∗ 𝐼𝑛 (
𝑡𝑚
𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑚𝑙𝑠
) + ?̂?14(SHUT)  
?̂?14 = rail rate shuttle dummy interaction estimate 
SHUT = shuttle dummy variable 
All other variables defined previously 
 
Truck own price elasticity estimate by link distance for shuttle elevators is given as: 
𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑘: (𝜀22)𝑠ℎ𝑢𝑡−𝑙𝑑 = (
?̂?22
𝑇𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑢𝑡−𝑙𝑑
) − 1 + 𝑇𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑢𝑡−𝑙𝑑                      (26) 
Where, 
 𝑇𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑢𝑡−𝑙𝑑 = truck share by link distance 
𝑇𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑢𝑡−𝑙𝑑 = 𝛼2 + ?̂?22 ∗ 𝐼𝑛 (
𝑙𝑑
𝑎𝑣𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡
) + ?̂?21 ∗ 𝐼𝑛 (
𝑡𝑚
𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑚𝑙𝑠
) + ?̂?24(SHUT)  
?̂?24 =  rail rate shuttle dummy interaction estimate 
SHUT = shuttle dummy variable 
All other variables defined previously 
 
3.2. Mode Choice and Allocative Efficiency 
Railroads play a value-added role in agriculture by moving commodities (especially bulk) 
for long distances from production regions often located in rural areas to consumption centers or 
ports for export. Railroads have increased emphasis on larger capacity grain elevators. This has 
led to widespread implementation and use of longer trains (e.g. shuttle train). This technological 
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improvement in grain transportation and logistics has reduced carrier costs and provided better 
rates to shippers. Moreover, it has been shown by surveys undertaken by UGPTI (2012) to 
improve the quality of service provided by railroads to grain shippers.   
Several studies have evaluated and found improvements in the quality of service 
stemming from innovations in the railroad industry following partial deregulation including 
improvements in speed, reliability and railcar availability. Other studies have found productivity 
gains (Grimm and Smith 1986, Ellig 2000, Bitzan and Keeler 2003, Prater et al. 2010). However, 
despite observed innovations in the transportation and logistics of grains, Wilson and Dahl 
(2010) and Sarmiento and Wilson (2005) note that only a few studies have evaluated technology 
adoption in grain shipping (Vachal et al. 1999; Vachal and Button 2003, Wilson and Wilson 
2001, MacDonald 1989). Vachal et al. (1999) assess the potential of marketing hard red spring 
wheat in 100 plus car trains in North Dakota and indicate that the increased flexibility brought 
about by their use will benefit market participants. They concluded that the advent of larger 
trains is likely to lead to further rationalization of the state’s grain procurement system, 
ultimately leading to fewer elevators, increasing rail line abandonment, and longer producer 
deliveries. Vachal and Button (2003) provide a market based synopsis of the likely impact of 
shuttle rates on grain flow in North Dakota using different scenarios. In the base scenario, with 
10 shuttle facilities accounting for 45% of the state land area, two percent of the elevators are 
able to handle a third of the grains produced. They surmise that potential concentration of 
bushels around these facilities will have future potential impacts for local roads, short line 
railroads, bridge infrastructure, local processors and communities, and the North Dakota elevator 
industry. Wilson and Wilson (2001) evaluate efficiency gains related to innovation in the 
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marketing of agricultural commodities. They find that rates for all five main grains transported 
by rail fell significantly and have diminished over time after passage of the staggers Act.     
Studies aimed at evaluating shippers’ quality of service evaluations including those 
related to transportation of agricultural commodities often rely heavily on surveys to elicit 
shippers’ evaluation of quality of service attributes. Such undertakings are subjective and may 
not accurately reflect the importance of service quality in mode choice. A more objective 
evaluation will be to empirically analyze their utilization of different modes at given prices.  
Additionally, it is likely that potential service quality improvements brought about by the 
shuttle innovation is an important consideration to grain shippers in markets like North Dakota 
with limited shipping options. Satar and Peoples (2010), using a generalized shipper 
transportation cost function, find that shippers with access to all major transportation modes 
(barge, truck, and rail) attain “allocative efficiency” with respect to market price, while those 
with limited access (truck and rail) choose an “allocatively inefficient” mix.  Specifically, they 
find that shippers use more trucking than they should if their choice of mode is based on 
minimizing costs. They interpret these results to mean that capacity constraints or poor service 
quality on routes not facing barge competition leads to a shadow price of using rail services that 
is higher than its market price. 
Similarly, if limited rail capacity and/or inconsistent rail service quality in North Dakota 
increases the shadow price of using rail services, we might expect to see an underutilization of 
rail services.  To the extent that shuttles have allowed an improved use of rail capacity and 
enhance the predictability /consistency of rail service quality, we might expect North Dakota 
shippers to use a less “allocatively inefficient” mix of rail and truck that reflects optimization 
based increasingly on market rates. This would suggest that shuttles have resulted in service 
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improvement in addition to lower transportation rates. Another possibility is that increasing 
highway congestion and infrastructure deterioration has led to a reduction in service quality by 
trucks.   
Additionally, Satar and Peoples (2010) note that rail carriers have expanded the US rail 
system by increasing their investment in infrastructure. Consequently, shippers who are 
constrained to using rail, in this case North Dakota grain shippers, likely do not face a significant 
disadvantage relative to those with rail and barge access if high rail costs are followed with 
superior transportation services. Beginning from 2000, railroads have spent $10 Billion to 
expand tracks, construct freight yards and add locomotives with more than $12 Billion planned 
in upgrades (Machalaba 2008). BNSF, one of the two main class I railroads serving the state 
announced plans to spend $250 Million to expand rail traffic on its network in North Dakota 
following agricultural shippers complaints about delays (Kyle, 2014). By the end of 2014 it was 
also announced that BNSF had completed a $400 Million track upgrade project in North Dakota 
that included placing 55 miles of new double track between Williston and Minot, and other 
siding projects for the Dickinson, Jamestown, Devils Lake, and Hillsboro North Dakota rail 
subdivisions respectively (Bonham, 2014).   
 
3.2.1.  Theoretical Model 
Studies of freight demand often use the neoclassical cost approach, which assumes that 
firms minimize cost subject to their output constraint with market rates for different modes used 
as input prices (shippers’ perspective). Atkinson and Halvorsen (1984) argue that the existence 
of additional constraints may cause a firm to fail to minimize costs. That is, firms may not use an 
“allocatively efficient” mix of inputs when choosing inputs based on market input prices alone.    
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It is generally assumed that shippers will employ each input until the marginal product of 
a single dollar paid for one input is equal to the marginal product of the value of a dollar of 
another so as to minimize cost and employ an allocatively efficient mix of inputs. In this case, 
for a shipper with rail and truck transportation as inputs, we have: 
𝑀𝑃𝑟
𝑅𝑟
=
𝑀𝑃𝑡
𝑅𝑡
            (25) 
𝑀𝑃𝑟 and 𝑀𝑃𝑡 represent the marginal products of rail and truck transportation and Rr and 
Rt are input prices representing rates paid for rail and truck services, respectively. However, 
unreliable and unpredictable service or capacity constraints may cause the true price of using a 
particular mode to be above that reflected by market price. Alternatively, it may reduce the 
actual productivity of a particular mode. The actual marginal productivities, and input prices that 
shippers are faced with (those that exist taking into account the effects of service quality are 
characterized as shadow marginal productivities) (𝑀𝑃𝑟
∗ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑀𝑃𝑡
∗) and shadow input 
prices(Rr
∗  and Rt
∗). Thus shippers select a mix of inputs such that: 
𝑀𝑃𝑟
∗
𝑅𝑟
∗ =
𝑀𝑃𝑡
∗
𝑅𝑡
∗            (26) 
If poor service quality decreases the productivity of a shipper’s input (rail or truck) or 
raises the cost of acquiring an additional unit of input, the shadow marginal product of the dollar 
value of that input will be less than the marginal product of the dollar value of that input as 
reflected by market price (when hiring the same amount of inputs). For example for rail we have: 
𝑀𝑃𝑟
∗
𝑅𝑟
∗ <
𝑀𝑃𝑟
𝑅𝑟
           (27) 
This would result in the shipper using less rail transportation than if based on market 
price.  Consider a generalized shipper transport cost function with two input prices (rates paid by 
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shippers for rail and truck transportation), one output, one technology characteristic (distance), 
and a time trend given below:  
𝑇𝐶 = 𝐶(𝑊𝑟, 𝑊𝑡, 𝑄, 𝐷, 𝑇)         (28) 
Where, 
 𝑇𝐶 = 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 
𝑊𝑟 = 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
𝑊𝑡 = 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑘 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
𝑄 = 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑑 (𝑡𝑜𝑛 − 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑠) 
𝐷 = 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒    
𝑇 = 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑  
 
Previous research undertaken to test for “allocative efficiency” including Atkinson and 
Halvorsen (1984) and Oum and Zhang (1995) have shown that allocative efficiency can be tested 
by estimating a firm’s cost function with an embedded “shadow cost function”. If unpredictable 
service quality or capacity constraints changes the cost of using rail or truck, the actual price 
(shadow price) of using any of these two inputs will diverge from the market price (existing 
rate). Shippers are assumed to base their input utilization decisions on these unobserved shadow 
prices, consequently minimizing total shadow costs.  Shippers’ shadow cost function in this 
study is given as:  
𝐶𝑆 = 𝐶𝑆(𝑘𝑊𝑖𝑙,𝑄, 𝐷𝑙 , 𝑇)                                          (29) 
Where, 
  𝐶𝑆 = shippers′shadow cost on link l;  
𝑤𝑖𝑙 = i × l vector of shadow prices of ith modes on link l; 
𝑄𝑙 = total output on link l (tonmiles); 
𝐷𝑙 = distance of link; 
𝑇 = time trend; 
 
Input shadow prices can be defined by the factor of proportionality  𝑘 times the market 
input price (Lau and Yotopolous 1971) represented as:  
𝑊𝑖
∗ = 𝑘𝑖𝑊𝑖           (30) 
 55 
 
The factor of proportionality (𝐾𝑖) is a measure of the existing linkage between the true input 
prices (shadow prices) and the market prices (existing rate shippers pay for rail or truck 
transportation) for inputs. The factor proportionality is represented as below: 
𝑘𝑖 =
𝑊𝑖
∗
𝑊𝑖
           (31) 
 
3.2.2. Empirical Model 
To test if North Dakota shippers are using an “allocatively efficient” mix of 
transportation with respect to observed market prices (shipping rate), the allocative efficiency 
model will closely follow that undertaken by Bitzan and Peoples (2013) to evaluate “allocative 
efficiency” in the airline industry. Factors of proportionality are estimated for transportation rates 
for all five commodities under evaluation. This will enable a comparative analysis of different 
commodities and the potential effect of shuttle elevators on shippers’ allocative efficiency. For 
example the primary commodity handled by shuttle elevators in North Dakota is hard red spring 
wheat. Other than corn, shuttle shipments rarely occur for the other four commodities under 
evaluation. Consequently, if there is an underutilization of rail, it is likely that the factor 
proportionality (𝑘𝑖) for the rail input for hard red spring wheat may move closer to unity over 
time due to improved capacity and consistency in service quality identified with shuttle 
movements.  
Applying Shephard’s Lemma (1973) to the shadow cost function as shown in Atkinson 
and Halvorsen (1984) provides input demand of the following form:  
𝜕𝐶𝑆
𝜕𝑊𝑖
∗ = 𝑋𝑖           (32) 
The total actual cost becomes: 
𝐶 = ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑋𝑖 = ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝐶𝑆
𝜕𝑊𝑖
∗         (33) 
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Atkinson and Halvorsen (1984) also show that the share of shadow cost attributed to input 𝑖 is: 
𝑘𝑖𝑊𝑖𝑥𝑖
𝐶𝑆
= 𝑆𝑖
𝑠           (34) 
Input 𝑋𝑖 therefore is: 
𝑆𝑖
𝑠𝐶𝑆
𝑘𝑖𝑊𝑖
= 𝑋𝑖           (35) 
The total actual cost function becomes: 
𝐶 = ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑖
𝑆𝑖
𝑠𝐶𝑆
𝑘𝑖𝑊𝑖
= 𝐶𝑆 ∑
𝑆𝑖
𝑆
𝑘𝑖
𝑖                      (36) 
Taking the logarithm, we get: 
𝐼𝑛 𝐶 = 𝐼𝑛 𝐶𝑆 + 𝐼𝑛 ∑ (
𝑆𝑖
𝑠
𝑘𝑖
)𝑖          (37) 
Estimating the shadow cost function as an embedded part of the total cost function using the 
translog functional form we get the following shadow cost function: 
𝐼𝑛𝐶𝑆 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝐼𝑛(𝑘𝑖𝑊𝑖) + 𝜌0𝐼𝑛𝑄0 + 𝛽𝑛𝐼𝑛(𝐷𝑙)𝑖  + 𝜓𝜙𝑇 +
1
2
∑ 𝜏𝑖𝑗𝐼𝑛(𝑘𝑖𝑊𝑖)𝐼𝑛(𝑘𝑗𝑊𝑗) +𝑖𝑗
∑ 𝜏𝑖0𝐼𝑛(𝑘𝑖𝑊𝑖)𝑖0 𝐼𝑛𝑄0 + ∑ 𝜏𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛 𝐼𝑛(𝑘𝑖𝑊𝑖)𝐼𝑛(𝐷𝑙) + ∑ 𝜏𝑖𝜙𝐼𝑛(𝑊𝑖𝑙)𝑇 +𝑖𝜙
1
2
𝜏00(𝐼𝑛𝑄0)
2 +
𝜕0𝑛𝐼𝑛𝑄0𝐼𝑛(𝐷𝑙) +
1
2
𝜏𝑛𝑛(𝐼𝑛 𝐷𝑙)
2 +
1
2
𝜏𝜙𝜙(𝑇)
2 + 𝜏𝑜𝜙𝐼𝑛𝑄0𝑇 + 𝜏𝑛𝜙𝐼𝑛(𝐷𝑙)𝑇         (38) 
The translog shadow cost function has the same properties AS the usual translog cost 
function, including homogeneity of degree one in shadow input prices. A proportional change in 
shadow rates of all transportation modes used in shipping grain will alter the shippers’ total cost 
proportionately. Necessary and sufficient homogeneity and symmetry conditions for specifying a 
cost function with linear homogeneity in shipping rates are: 
∑ 𝛼𝑖 = 1𝑖 , 
 ∑ 𝜏𝑖𝑗 = ∑ 𝜏𝑖𝑗 = 0𝑗𝑖 ,  
∑ 𝜏𝑖𝑜 = ∑ 𝜏𝑖𝑛 = ∑ 𝜏𝑖𝜙𝑖 = 0, 𝜏𝑖𝑗 = 𝜏𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑖     
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The shadow cost share equations can be obtained from the shadow cost function using 
Shephard’s Lemma (1973) and logarithmic differentiation as follows: 
𝜕𝐼𝑛𝐶𝑆
𝜕𝐼𝑛(𝑘𝑖𝑊𝑖)
=
𝜕𝐼𝑛𝐶𝑆
𝜕𝐶𝑆
𝜕𝐶
𝜕(𝑘𝑖𝑊𝑖)
𝜕(𝑘𝑖𝑊𝑖)
𝜕𝐼𝑛(𝑘𝑖𝑊𝑖)
=
1
𝐶𝑆
𝑋𝑖(𝑘𝑖𝑊𝑖) = 𝑆𝑖
𝑆                  (39) 
𝑆𝑖
𝑠 = 𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑗 𝐼𝑛(𝑘𝑗𝑊𝑗) + ∑ 𝜏𝑖00 𝐼𝑛𝑄0 + ∑ 𝜏𝑖𝑛𝐼𝑛(𝐷)𝑛                   (40) 
From equation (37), (38), and (40) we can get the total cost function: 
𝐼𝑛 𝐶 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝐼𝑛(𝑘𝑖𝑊𝑖) + 𝜌0𝐼𝑛𝑄0 + 𝛽𝑛𝐼𝑛(𝐷𝑙)𝑖  + 𝜓𝜙𝑇 +
1
2
∑ 𝜏𝑖𝑗𝐼𝑛(𝑘𝑖𝑊𝑖)𝐼𝑛(𝑘𝑗𝑊𝑗) +𝑖𝑗
∑ 𝜏𝑖0𝐼𝑛(𝑘𝑖𝑊𝑖)𝑖0 𝐼𝑛𝑄0 + ∑ 𝜏𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛 𝐼𝑛(𝑘𝑖𝑊𝑖)𝐼𝑛(𝐷𝑙) + ∑ 𝜏𝑖𝜙𝐼𝑛(𝑊𝑖𝑙)𝑇 +𝑖𝜙
1
2
𝜏00(𝐼𝑛𝑄0)
2 +
𝜕0𝑛𝐼𝑛𝑄0𝐼𝑛(𝐷𝑙) +
1
2
𝜏𝑛𝑛(𝐼𝑛 𝐷𝑙)
2 1
2
+ 𝜏𝜙𝜙(𝑇)
2 + 𝜏𝑜𝜙𝐼𝑛𝑄0𝑇 + 𝜏𝑛𝜙𝐼𝑛(𝐷𝑙)𝑇 +
𝐼𝑛 (∑
𝛼𝑖+∑ 𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑗 𝐼𝑛(𝑘𝑗𝑊𝑗)+∑ 𝜏𝑖00 𝐼𝑛𝑄0+∑ 𝜏𝑖𝑛𝐼𝑛(𝐷𝑙)𝑛
𝑘𝑖
𝑖 )                        (41) 
The total cost is jointly estimated with factor share equations in a seemingly unrelated system of 
equations. To obtain the factor share equations, it is worthy to note that shippers’  expenditure 
share on factor 𝑖 is given as: 
𝑆𝑖
𝐴 =
𝑊𝑖𝑋𝑖
𝐶
           (42) 
The actual share expenditure can be put in terms of shadow share equations as stipulated by 
Atkinson and Halvorsen (1984) using equations (34) and (36): 
𝑆𝑖
𝐴 =
𝑆𝑖
𝑆 𝑘𝑖⁄
∑ (
𝑆𝑖
𝑆
𝑘𝑖
⁄ )𝑖
          (43) 
Substituting for  𝑆𝑖
𝑆 from equation (40) we get: 
𝑆𝑖
𝐴 =
(𝛼𝑖+∑ 𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑗 𝐼𝑛(𝑘𝑗𝑊𝑗)+∑ 𝜏𝑖00 𝐼𝑛𝑄0+∑ 𝜏𝑖𝑛𝐼𝑛𝐷𝑙𝑛 ) 𝑘𝑖⁄
∑ (𝛼𝑖+∑ 𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑗 𝐼𝑛(𝑘𝑗𝑊𝑗)+∑ 𝜏𝑖00 𝐼𝑛𝑄0+∑ 𝜏𝑖𝑛𝐼𝑛𝐷𝑛 )𝑖 𝑘𝑖⁄
                   (44)             
The total cost function 41) is estimated together with factor share equations (44) using 
Zellner’s Seemingly Unrelated Regression. However, given that the factor shares sum up to 1, 
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one of the cost share equations is dropped to avoid perfect collinearity. Results are invariant as to 
which equation is dropped. Additionally, given homogeneity of degree zero in factor of 
proportionality(𝑘𝑖), the absolute value of all 𝑘𝑖 cannot be estimated. Consequently, one 𝑘𝑖is 
normalized to one and all other 𝑘𝑖
′𝑠 are measured relative to the normalized factor proportionality 
(Atkinson and Halvorsen 1984). The “allocative efficiency” model, with two inputs (rail and 
truck), one output (ton-miles), link distance (miles), and a time trend is shown in equation 45: 
𝐼𝑛𝑇𝐶𝑙 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐼𝑛(𝑘1 𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑙) + 𝛼2𝐼𝑛(𝑘2 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑘 𝑙) + 𝜌1𝐼𝑛(𝑇𝑀𝑙) + 𝜌2𝐼𝑛(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑙) + 𝜌3𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 + 
𝜏11
1
2
𝐼𝑛(𝑘1𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑙)
2 + 𝜏22
1
2
𝐼𝑛(𝑘2𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑘𝑙)
2 + 𝛽11
1
2
(𝐼𝑛 𝑇𝑀𝑙)
2 + 𝛽22
1
2
(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑙)
2 + 𝛽33
1
2
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒2 + 
𝜏12𝐼𝑛(𝑘1𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑙). 𝐼𝑛(𝑘2𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑘𝑙) + 𝜒11𝐼𝑛(𝑘1𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑙). 𝐼𝑛(𝑇𝑀𝑙) + 𝜒12𝐼𝑛( 𝑘1 𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑙). 𝐼𝑛(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑙) + 
𝜒13𝐼𝑛(𝑘1𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑙). 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒+𝜒21𝐼𝑛(𝑘2 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑘𝑙). 𝐼𝑛(𝑇𝑀𝑙)+𝜒22𝐼𝑛(𝑘2 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑘𝑙). 𝐼𝑛(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑙) + 
𝜒23𝐼𝑛(𝑘2 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑘𝑙). 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 + 𝛽12𝐼𝑛(𝑇𝑀𝑙 ). 𝐼𝑛(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑙) + 𝛽13𝐼𝑛(𝑇𝑀𝑙). 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 + 𝛽23𝐼𝑛(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑙). 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 + 
𝐼𝑛 [
𝛼1+𝜏11𝐼𝑛(𝑘1 𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑙)+𝜏12𝐼𝑛(𝑘2 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑘 𝑙) +𝜒11𝐼𝑛(𝑇𝑀𝑙)+𝜒12𝐼𝑛(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑙)+𝜒13𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒
𝑘1
(
𝛼1+𝜏11𝐼𝑛(𝑘1 𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑙)+𝜏12𝐼𝑛(𝑘2 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑘𝑙) +𝜒11𝐼𝑛(𝑇𝑀𝑙)+𝜒12𝐼𝑛(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑙)+𝜒13𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒
𝑘2
)
]         (45) 
Where, 
 𝑇𝐶𝑙 = 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑘 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑛 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘 𝑙 ; 
𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑙 = 𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑛 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘𝑙 ; 
𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑘𝑙 = 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑘 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑛 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘 𝑙 ; 
𝑇𝑀𝑙 = 𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑛 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘 𝑙 ; 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑙 = 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒; 
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 = 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 
 
All independent variables except the time trend are normalized (divided) by their means. 
The cost share equations for rail and truck represented by 𝑆1𝑙, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑆2𝑙, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 with 𝑘1, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑘2 
representing corresponding factors of proportionality are shown below:   
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𝑆1𝑙 =
(𝛼1+𝜏11𝐼𝑛(𝑘1𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑙)+𝜏12𝐼𝑛(𝑘2𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑘 𝑙) +𝜒11𝐼𝑛(𝑇𝑀𝑙)+𝜒12𝐼𝑛(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑙)+𝜒13𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒)
𝑘1
⁄
(𝛼1+𝜏11𝐼𝑛(𝑘1𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑙)+𝜏12𝐼𝑛(𝑘2𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑘 𝑟𝑙) +𝜒11𝐼𝑛(𝑇𝑀𝑙)+𝜒12𝐼𝑛(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑙)+𝜒13𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒)
𝑘1
⁄
+(𝛼2+𝜏22𝐼𝑛(𝑘2𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑘 𝑙) + 𝜏12𝐼𝑛(𝑘1𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑙)+𝜒21𝐼𝑛(𝑇𝑀𝑙) + 𝜒22𝐼𝑛(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑙) + 𝜒23𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒)
𝑘2
⁄
       (46) 
      
𝑆2𝑙 =
(𝛼2+𝜏22𝐼𝑛(𝑘2𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑘 𝑙) + 𝜏12𝐼𝑛(𝑘1 𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑙)+𝜒21𝐼𝑛(𝑇𝑀𝑙) + 𝜒22𝐼𝑛(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑙) + 𝜒23𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒)
𝑘2
⁄
(𝛼2+𝜏22𝐼𝑛(𝑘2𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑘 𝑙) + 𝜏12𝐼𝑛(𝑘1 𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑙)+𝜒21𝐼𝑛(𝑇𝑀𝑙) + 𝜒22𝐼𝑛(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑙) + 𝜒23𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒)
𝑘2
⁄
+(𝛼1+𝜏11𝐼𝑛(𝑘1 𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑙)+𝜏12𝐼𝑛(𝑘2 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑘 𝑙) +𝜒11𝐼𝑛(𝑇𝑀𝑙)+𝜒12𝐼𝑛(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑙)+𝜒13𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒)
𝑘1
⁄
      (47) 
 
3.2.3. Potential Outcomes  
Since one 𝑘𝑖 is normalized to one, a value of 𝑘𝑖 greater than unity (> 1) for the other 𝑘𝑖 is 
an indication that shippers’ shadow price for that input is greater than the market price. In the 
context of North Dakota grain shippers, using rail transportation, it would suggest that the 
transport rate does not fully reflect the cost of using that mode. Shippers use less of that mode 
than they would if optimizing based on rates. Consequently, if truck is the normalized mode, and 
𝑘𝑖 for rail is greater than 1, it suggests an underutilization of rail. In this situation, a decrease in 
𝑘𝑖 over time would reflect an improvement I n rail service quality (less underutilization of rail).   
On the other hand, a value of 𝑘𝑖 less than one (< 1) for the non-normalized 𝑘𝑖 suggests 
that the shadow price for that normalized mode is higher than market price (i.e. there is a 
disadvantage to using the normalized mode not reflected in market price). This will additionally 
suggest using less of that mode than if optimizing based on rates.  
If the factor of proportionality 𝑘𝑖 increasingly gets closer to one or is one, this will mean 
North Dakota shippers increasingly or entirely base their mode choice decision on rates alone, 
utilizing the “allocatively” efficient mix of inputs.  This would suggest that shadow prices of the 
modes reflect actual market rates.       
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CHAPTER 4. DATA AND VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION 
4.1. Introduction 
This study, unlike other agricultural freight transportation demand studies, undertaken in 
North Dakota and elsewhere, uses individual grain elevators as the primary unit of observation.  
Data for other related studies have been aggregated by arbitrarily choosing a central point of a 
region (e.g. CRD) as the primary unit of observation (Dybing 2002; Wilson 1984; Wilson et al. 
1988). This aggregation process may fail to capture individual elevator decisions and how they 
vary based on the rates they experience. Using individual elevators enables potential isolation of 
quality of service effects and those related to variability in rate structures by elevator type.  
Railroads use four main service types in grain shipments including single car, multi-car, 
unit, and shuttle services. These services are related to the type of grain elevator and are 
classified according to the number of railcars that can be generated as shuttle (100 or more), unit 
(between 52 and 99), multi-car (26 to 52), and single-car elevators (between 1 and 25). Grain 
elevators able to generate longer trains can use other service types as well. For example, shuttle 
elevators can use 100 cars or more services as well as those involving services for less than 100 
cars. However, elevators that have the capacity to only use services involving relatively shorter 
trains cannot generate longer trains due to capacity and track space limitations. For example, unit 
train elevators cannot use shuttle services. The same applies to the other service types.  
Apart from being an indication of the number of cars generated by a shipment, rail 
services type (type of elevator) also reflect rail rates. Longer trains (shuttles) offer comparatively 
lower rates relative to other service types because cost can be split over a larger number of cars 
(economies of shipment size). The link specific cost function, involving elevator shipments to 
the major destinations of North Dakota grain facilitates uses estimated elevator-specific rail rates 
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per period. These estimated rates are a better reflection of the spatial nature of transportation 
compared to using rates for aggregated regions. Shuttle elevator locations based on data from the 
North Dakota grain movement database are shown in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6: North Dakota Shuttle Elevator Facilities 2006-2013 
 
To our knowledge, no study has evaluated agricultural transportation demand using the 
elevator as the primary unit of observation. In addition to improving the quality of results 
obtained, using individual elevators will help identify potential changes (e.g. lower rates and 
better service) brought about by the increasing use of longer trains. This is important given that 
the state is viewed as a captive market in theory (Koo el al. 1993).  
In addition, agricultural freight transportation demand for North Dakota has often been 
done for two of the four principal destinations for the states’ grains. These analyses have often 
been undertaken for at most two commodities. For example Dybing (2002), Wilson (1984), and 
Wilson et al. (1988) all use Minneapolis and Duluth, MN as the only destinations in their 
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models. Dybing (2002), and Wilson (1984) both looked at wheat (hard red spring) and barley 
shippers, while Wilson et al. (1988) looked at wheat shipments (hard red spring wheat).   
This study evaluates transportation demand for five commodities including barley, corn, 
durum wheat, hard red spring wheat, and soybeans to all four principal destinations for North 
Dakota grains (Minneapolis, Duluth, Gulf, and Pacific North West). Looking at different 
commodities and destinations has several advantages. As alluded to previously, the increasing 
demand for biofuel has led to a surge in corn and soybean production as they are two principal 
ingredients for making ethanol and biodiesel. This increase has potential implications for the 
demand for traditional commodities (e.g. wheat and barley) by taking acreage away as farmers 
increase corn and soybean production to reap benefits associated with bioenergy. Moreover, 
bioenergy provides grain producers with an alternative market for their commodities both locally 
and to out of state destinations.  
The five commodities under consideration are grown at varying levels in different regions 
of the state. This variation in crop production means highway and railroad distances, which play 
a determining role in shippers’ mode choice decisions and a critical factor in carriers’ cost 
structure , are likely to vary. Additionally, taking potential variation in shipping distance into 
consideration enables proper evaluation of the distances in which one mode dominates the other 
(intermodal competition).  
Data used for this study, including grain movement, rail, and truck rates are obtained 
from the North Dakota grain movement database at the Upper Great Plains Transportation 
Institute (UGPTI), the STB railroad annual public use waybill sample, and the USDA, 
Agricultural Marketing Service, Grain Truck and Ocean Rate Advisory (GTOR). The grain 
movement database contains grain elevator information submitted to the North Dakota Public 
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Service Commission by all licensed grain elevators in the state. This includes elevator number 
(identifier); grain type hauled (identifier); location (city, crop reporting district); volume shipped 
(bushels); mode (truck and four rail service types); period of shipment (month and year) and 
destination of shipment including within North Dakota and to four major out of state destinations 
Duluth, MN (DUL), Minneapolis, MN (MPLS); Gulf; and Pacific Northwest (PNW).  Table 1 
contains a summary of tons (thousands) and percentages of tons shipped to various destinations 
for each commodity. The table also shows percentage shipped by each mode (rail and truck) by 
destination for each of the five commodities involved in this study between 2006 and 201.  
   Table 1: Tonnage and Percentage Shipped by Destination and Mode (2006-2013) 
 
Commodity 
DUL, MN 
 
Tons (%) 
[Rail: Truck, %] 
MPLS, MN 
Tons (%) 
[Rail: Truck, %] 
Gulf 
 
Tons (%) 
[Rail: Truck, %] 
PNW 
Tons (%) 
[Rail: Truck, %] 
Barley 
 
238 (6) 
[99: 1] 
2,645 (69) 
[59:41] 
577 (15) 
[68:32] 
363 (10) 
[98:2] 
Corn 
 
50 (0.3) 
[98: 2] 
1,582 (9) 
[97: 3] 
2,317 (13) 
[81: 19] 
13,734 (77.7) 
[99: 1] 
Durum 
 
1,965 (40 ) 
[99:1] 
1,431 (30) 
[91:9] 
1,347 (28) 
[98:2] 
92 (2) 
[98:2] 
Hard Red 
Spring  
 
3,562 (10) 
[99: 1]   
13,809 (39) 
[96: 4] 
6,132 (17) 
[95: 5] 
12,075 (34) 
[99.6: 0.4] 
Soybean 
 
150 (0.6) 
[96: 4] 
1,519 (6) 
[98: 2] 
829 (3.4) 
[88: 12] 
22,255 (90) 
[99.9: 0.1] 
  *Tonnage for destination described as “Other Minnesota” not included due to lack of destination point specificity 
 
The waybill sample contains railroad shipment data from a stratified sample. Railroads 
are mandated to submit this information the Surface Transportation Board (STB) which replaced 
the ICC in 1996 for regulatory purposes. The annual rail waybill sample contains rail 
transportation information for different commodities transported from one Bureau of Economic 
Analysis region (BEA) to another. BEA regions incorporate several counties within a state, and 
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in some instances they overlap to include more than one state. Information from the waybill used 
to calculate rates in this study includes Standard Transportation Commodity Code identifier, date 
of shipment (month and year), origin Bureau of Economic Analysis region (OBEA), destination 
Bureau of Economic Analysis region (TBEA), distance of shipment; tons shipped, number of 
railcars in shipment, and revenue for the specific movement. GTOR provides quarterly truck 
rates for five U.S regions based on surveys indexed by diesel prices. GTOR notes that fuel prices 
(diesel) constitute 37% (largest input) of the operational cost for commercial trucks. 
Construction of input prices and other variables used in the link specific cost function are 
presented in the next sections.   
 
4.2. Link Distance 
The Standard Point Location Code (SPLC) and the ZIP code for cities with grain 
elevators were identified and used in PCMILER® to calculate direct rail and highway distances 
from individual origin elevators to two cities, Duluth, MN and Minneapolis, and two U.S 
regions, Pacific North West and the Gulf. Two major port cities, Portland, OR, and New Orleans, 
LA were used as representative destinations for the PNW and Gulf regions respectively. SPLC 
provides information on all ports served by rail or motor carriers. However, ZIP codes were 
preferred to calculate highway distances because some rail ports are not linked by highways. 
PCMILER® contains updated map information, enhancing the accuracy of calculations. The 
distance of a link in the link specific cost function involving individual elevators and a given out 
of state destination is calculated by taking the simple average between rail and highway distance 
for individual elevators. The average link distance is estimated as: 
𝐴𝐿𝐷𝑒𝑑 (
𝑅𝐷𝑒𝑑+𝑇𝐷𝑒𝑑
2
)          (48) 
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Where, 
𝐴𝐿𝐷𝑒𝑑 = 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑑 
𝑅𝐷𝑒𝑑 = 𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑒, 𝑡𝑜 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑑   
𝑇𝐷𝑒𝑑 = 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑘 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑑  
 
 
4.3. Rail Rates 
The public use railroad waybill sample provides railroad shipment information for 
individual shipments between BEAs. In terms of rail shipments, North Dakota is divided into 
four OBEA regions, namely: Fargo-Moorhead (113), Grand Forks (110), Bismarck (112), and 
Minot regions (111). A map representing the four regions is shown in Figure 7. Given the 
disaggregate nature of the analysis in this study, a railroad pricing model was developed to 
estimate rail rates at the grain elevator level rather than using rates at the BEA level to represent 
all elevators located within that region. In this way, rates were allowed to vary based on distance 
and elevator size. 
The railroad pricing model was estimated for each commodity and origin BEA. For 
example, to estimate wheat rates four separate models were estimated (one for each OBEA). 
Estimated parameters from the pricing model are used in a second step to approximate rates by 
elevator type (e.g. elevators with shuttle, unit, and multi-car shipment capabilities) and distance 
from destination. The pricing model has revenue-per ton-mile as the dependent variable and 
railroad supply and demand determinants as regressors, including distance of shipment (length of 
haul); load factor (weight per railcar); type of service (number of rail cars in shipment including 
shuttle, unit, and multi-car services), a time trend, and seasonal variables (months of the year).  
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Figure 7: North Dakota Origin Bureau of Economic Analysis Regions 
 
 
The model is estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). The general form of the double log 
rail rate regression model for each commodity and origin BEA is given as: 
𝐼𝑛 (𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑇𝑀) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑑 𝐼𝑛(𝑆𝐻𝑅𝑇)) + 𝛽𝑙 𝐼𝑛 (𝐿𝑂𝐴𝐷) + 𝛽𝑠𝑆𝐻𝑈𝑇 + 𝛽𝑢𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑇 + 𝛽𝑡𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸 
+𝛿 ∑ 𝑀𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐻 + 𝜀                                         (49)  
Where, 
  𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑇𝑀 = real revenue per ton − mile (in 2010 prices)  
𝑆𝐻𝑅𝑇 =  length of haul in short − line miles 
𝐿𝑂𝐴𝐷 =  load factor representing weight per railcar  
𝑆𝐻𝑈𝑇 =  dummy variable shuttle train shipment, 100 cars or more 
𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑇 =  dummy variable unit train shipment, 52 and 99 railcars  
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 =  time trend, year of shipment 
𝑀𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐻 =  dummy variable month of shipment  
𝜀 =  normal effect error term   
 
Revenue per ton-mile and load factor used in the regression in equation (49) are calculated as: 
𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑇𝑀 =
𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑉
(𝑈𝑇𝑂𝑁)∗(𝑆𝐻𝑅𝑇)
         (50) 
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𝐿𝑂𝐴𝐷 =
𝑈𝑇𝑂𝑁
(𝑈𝐶𝐴𝑅)
                                                      (51) 
Where, 
𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑉 =  total revenue for shipment  
𝑈𝑇𝑂𝑁 = total tons shipped 
𝑈𝐶𝐴𝑅 = number of railcars in shipment  
All other variables are as defined previously  
 
Estimating the pricing model for each commodity by OBEA reflects potential variation in 
rates brought about by regional differences. For example rates for corn shipments originating in 
the east of the state might be different from those in western regions given that more corn is 
grown in the eastern region and given differences in transport options among eastern and western 
shippers. Regressors included in the model have varying effects on rates charged by railroads. 
From the specified model in equation (49), the natural log of length of haul in short-line miles is 
expected to have a negative effect on the natural log of real revenue per ton-mile. The literature 
on the influence of distance on transportation rates suggests that as distances increases, the rate 
per ton-mile of freight decreases. This is particularly the case with railroads, because a 
significant part of rail shipment cost is constant regardless of the distance. MacDonald (1989) 
noted that cost components such as switching, classification, and loading of cars are not 
impacted by the distance of shipment. Additionally, some costs associated with movement (e.g. 
cost of reaching a traveling speed) do not increase at the same rate with mileage.  
Railroads previously used 100-ton covered hopper cars. However, because of innovations 
related to track composition, the weight limit and load per car has increased substantially. In the 
1970s, a significant portion of rail branch lines were limited to gross car weights of 220,000 
pounds which permitted net loads of 70 to 80 tons (NDDOT 2007). Presently, Class I railroad 
main line tracks are able to support 286,000-pound cars, enabling freight loads of between 110 
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and 115 tons. Some railroads operate 315,000 pound cars with corresponding net loads of 125 
tons in particular corridors (NDDOT 2007). 
Similarly, the natural log of load factor is expected to have a negative effect on the 
natural log of rate per ton-mile due to economies of shipment size (railroad cost does not 
increase proportionately with shipment size). Economies of shipment size have increasingly 
benefited carriers and shippers alike given technological advances. For example, the increasing 
use of larger-capacity rail cars has led to increasing railroad revenue per car without a 
corresponding direct increase in cost to shippers (increase per car payload). Shippers are often 
charged for total capacity so if $3,000 is charged per car, then a shipper that loads 110 tons in a 
car pays $27.2 per ton whereas another shipper that loads 100 tons pays $30 per ton. This way, 
the load factor is a reflection of rail car capacity utilization. The latter shipper pays for unused 
car capacity. These facts mean the natural log of rate per ton-mile should decrease at a 
decreasing rate with the increasing number of rail cars and load factor. The load factor measures 
the average weight per car. Because the shuttle and unit train dummy variables are a reflection of 
a larger number of cars in a shipment, relative to multi-car shipments (including single car) 
which serves as the basis for comparison, both are expected to have a negative sign reflecting 
their relative rate advantage over multi-car services.  
The time trend and monthly dummy variables are included to indicate changes over time 
and likely changes in rates by month. The time trend is expected to have an indeterminate sign 
for different commodities. Rates might be increasing or decreasing over time. Signs for monthly 
dummy variables are expected to vary by month by commodity owing to differences stemming 
from seasonal variations (e.g. planting, harvesting, and off seasons). For example hard red spring 
wheat is often planted from April to early June with harvest taking place between August and 
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September. As such, the demand for rail transportation of hard red spring wheat is likely to 
increase in late September and peak in the fourth quarter (October, November, and December). 
Rates for the fourth quarter of the year are expected to be relatively higher than those in the first 
three quarters of the year. Estimated rail equations are used in conjunction with shipment 
distances and elevator capacities to estimate rates by elevator. Equations for the second stage 
process for estimating elevator specific rail rates by elevator type (shuttle, unit, and multi-car 
elevator rates) are shown in equation (52), (53), and (54) below: 
Shuttle elevator rate estimate: 
(𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑇𝑀𝑒𝑜𝑑̂ ) = 𝐸𝑥𝑝 [𝛽0̂ + 𝛽?̂?𝑙𝑛(𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑒𝑜𝑑) + 𝛽?̂? 𝐼𝑛(𝐿𝑂𝐴𝐷̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑜𝑡) + 𝛽?̂?(𝑆𝐻𝑈𝑇) + 𝛽?̂?(𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸) 
+𝛿𝑓𝑒𝑏(𝐹𝐸𝐵) + 𝛿𝑚𝑎𝑟(𝑀𝐴𝑅) + 𝛿𝑎𝑝𝑟(𝐴𝑃𝑅) + 𝛿𝑚𝑎𝑦(𝑀𝐴𝑌) + ?̂?𝑗𝑢𝑛(𝐽𝑈𝑁) + 𝛿𝑗𝑢𝑙(𝐽𝑈𝐿) 
+𝛿𝑎𝑢𝑔(𝐴𝑈𝐺) + 𝛿𝑠𝑒𝑝(𝑆𝐸𝑃) + 𝛿𝑜𝑐𝑡(𝑂𝐶𝑇) + ?̂?𝑛𝑜𝑣(𝑁𝑂𝑉) + 𝛿𝑑𝑒𝑐(𝐷𝐸𝐶)]                                  (52) 
Unit elevator rate estimate: 
(𝑈𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑇𝑀𝑒𝑜𝑑̂ ) = 𝐸𝑥𝑝 [𝛽0̂ + 𝛽?̂?𝐼𝑛(𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑒𝑜𝑑) + 𝛽?̂? 𝐼𝑛(𝐿𝑂𝐴𝐷̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑜𝑡) + 𝛽?̂?(𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑇) + 𝛽?̂?(𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸) 
+𝛿𝑓𝑒𝑏(𝐹𝐸𝐵) + 𝛿𝑚𝑎𝑟(𝑀𝐴𝑅) + 𝛿𝑎𝑝𝑟(𝐴𝑃𝑅) + 𝛿𝑚𝑎𝑦(𝑀𝐴𝑌) + ?̂?𝑗𝑢𝑛(𝐽𝑈𝑁) + 𝛿𝑗𝑢𝑙(𝐽𝑈𝐿) 
+𝛿𝑎𝑢𝑔(𝐴𝑈𝐺) + 𝛿𝑠𝑒𝑝(𝑆𝐸𝑃) + 𝛿𝑜𝑐𝑡(𝑂𝐶𝑇) + ?̂?𝑛𝑜𝑣(𝑁𝑂𝑉) + 𝛿𝑑𝑒𝑐(𝐷𝐸𝐶)]                                (53)      
Multi-car elevator rate estimate: 
(𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑇𝑀𝑒𝑜𝑑̂ ) = 𝐸𝑥𝑝 [𝛽0̂ + 𝛽?̂?𝐼𝑛(𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑒𝑜𝑑) + 𝛽?̂? 𝐼𝑛(𝐿𝑂𝐴𝐷̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑜𝑡) + 𝛽?̂?(𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸) 
+𝛿𝑓𝑒𝑏(𝐹𝐸𝐵) + 𝛿𝑚𝑎𝑟(𝑀𝐴𝑅) + 𝛿𝑎𝑝𝑟(𝐴𝑃𝑅) + 𝛿𝑚𝑎𝑦(𝑀𝐴𝑌) + ?̂?𝑗𝑢𝑛(𝐽𝑈𝑁) + 𝛿𝑗𝑢𝑙(𝐽𝑈𝐿) 
+𝛿𝑎𝑢𝑔(𝐴𝑈𝐺) + 𝛿𝑠𝑒𝑝(𝑆𝐸𝑃) + 𝛿𝑜𝑐𝑡(𝑂𝐶𝑇) + ?̂?𝑛𝑜𝑣(𝑁𝑂𝑉) + 𝛿𝑑𝑒𝑐(𝐷𝐸𝐶)]                                (54) 
Where, 
  𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑇𝑀𝑒𝑜𝑑 = shuttle rate for elevator 𝑒 in obea, 𝑜 and destination, 𝑑 
 𝑈𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑇𝑀𝑒𝑜𝑑 = unit rate for elevator 𝑒 in obea 𝑜 and destination, 𝑑   
𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑇𝑀𝑒𝑜𝑑 = multi − car rate for elevator e in obea o and destination d   
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑒𝑜𝑑 = actual distance elevator e in obea o and destinaton d   
𝐿𝑂𝐴𝐷̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑜𝑡 = mean load factor between 2006 and 2013  
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𝛽0̂ = intercep estimate   
𝛽?̂? = distance estimate 
𝛽?̂? = load factor estimate 
𝛽?̂? = shuttle train estimate 
𝛽?̂? = unit train estimate 
𝛽?̂? = time trend estimate 
𝛿𝑖 = monthly estimate (base = January)  
All rates in 2010 dollars 
 
 
4.3.1. Rail Rates by Commodity 
One of the principal issues with using the waybill to estimate rail rates is data availability. 
The waybill is a stratified sample; hence there is a disparity in data reporting by origin-
destination region and commodity. Some regions and commodities are more represented (higher 
number of observations) than others. For this reason, the origin bureau of economic analysis 
regions that make up the state were redefined for some commodities, while others remained as 
originally defined for rail rate assignment purposes. An effort was made to ensure that this 
division matches with region crop production pattern. For corn and barley, the state was split into 
two regions. The first region is obtained by combining the Fargo-Moorhead (OBEA-113) and the 
Grand-Forks (OBEA-110) regions, while the second represents a combination the Minot 
(OBEA-111) and Bismarck (112) regions. In the case of soybeans, the state was split into three 
regions Fargo-Moorhead (OBEA-113), Grand-Forks (OBEA-110) and a combination of Minot 
(OBEA-111) and Bismarck (112) regions. Wheat originating from North Dakota has the largest 
number of observations in the waybill. Sufficient observations were available to estimate rail 
rates for all four origin bureau of economic analysis regions that make up the state. 
Consequently, these four regions were left unchanged for wheat rail rate estimation.  Redefined 
regions for corn and barley, soybeans and unchanged wheat (hard red spring wheat and durum) 
regions are shown in Figures 8, 9, and 10 respectively.  
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Figure 8: Corn and Barley Redefined Bureau of Economic Analysis Regions 
 
Figure 9: Soybeans Redefined Origin Bureau of Economic Analysis Regions  
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Figure 10: Wheat Bureau of Economic Analysis Regions 
 
 
Due to different rail pricing by commodity, separate estimations are performed by 
commodity. Also, in analyzing the grain elevator link specific cost function, rail rates are 
assigned to grain elevators based on their shipment service capabilities. For example a grain 
elevator capable of making a shuttle shipment (more than 100 railcars) is assigned a shuttle rate.  
The same applies for grain elevators with unit train shipment capabilities; they are assigned unit 
rail rates. Since elevators with multi-car shipment capabilities cannot make unit or shuttle 
shipments, multi-car grain elevators are assigned only multi-car rail rates. The North Dakota 
Grain movement database and the waybill sample were used to determine commodities that 
benefit from longer train transportation, particularly shuttle and those that do not. For example 
rail transport of barley from North Dakota is mainly undertaken by multi-car rail services, while 
wheat and corn benefit from shuttle transportation. A very limited amount of soybeans 
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transported from OBEA-110 benefit from shuttle services. Therefore, soybean rates were based 
on unit and multi-car rail estimates. The first and second stage rate estimation equations by 
commodity with all variables as defined previously are shown in equation 55 to 58 with t-
statistics in brackets below parameter estimates.  
 
4.3.1.1. Barley 
Rail rate regression general form: 
𝐼𝑛(𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑇𝑀) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑑𝐼𝑛(𝑆𝐻𝑅𝑇) + 𝛽𝑙 log(𝐿𝑂𝐴𝐷) + 𝛽𝑡𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸 + 𝛿 ∑ 𝑀𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐻 + 𝜀       (55) 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Rail rate regression estimate (OBEA: 110, 113): 
(𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑇𝑀̂ ) = 𝐸𝑥𝑝[2.045 − 0.6235 ∗ 𝐼𝑛(𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇) − 0.259 ∗ 𝐼𝑛(𝐿𝑂𝐴𝐷̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) + 0.042 ∗ (𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸) 
       (1.82)    (-34.97)         (-1.03)          (7.98) 
 
−0.0302 ∗ (𝐹𝐸𝐵) + 0.019 ∗ (𝑀𝐴𝑅) + 0.149 ∗ (𝐴𝑃𝑅) + 0.026 ∗ (𝑀𝐴𝑌) + 0.072 ∗ (𝐽𝑈𝑁) 
    (-0.5)         (0.34)     (2.13)          (0.42)    (1.06) 
 
+0.042 ∗ (𝐽𝑈𝐿) + 0.007 ∗ (𝐴𝑈𝐺) + 0.023 ∗ (𝑆𝐸𝑃) + 0.015 ∗ (𝑂𝐶𝑇) + 0.050 ∗ (𝑁𝑂𝑉)   
    (.56)       (0.12)  (0.43)       (0.24)  (0.85) 
 
+0.031 ∗ (𝐷𝐸𝐶)]                                                                                                                     (55.1) 
  (0.56) 
𝑛 = 172,  𝑆𝑆𝑅 = 3.130,  𝑅2 = 0.904 
 
Rail rate regression estimate (OBEA: 111, 112): 
(𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑇𝑀̂ ) = 𝐸𝑥𝑝[6.477 − 0.656 ∗ 𝐼𝑛(𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇) − 1.172 ∗ 𝐼𝑛(𝐿𝑂𝐴𝐷̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) + 0.024 ∗ (𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸) 
         (4.32)     (-19.54)         (-3.57)       (3.574) 
 
+0.112 ∗ (𝐹𝐸𝐵) + 0.173 ∗ (𝑀𝐴𝑅) − 0.042 ∗ (𝐴𝑃𝑅) + 0.125 ∗ (𝑀𝐴𝑌) + 0.183 ∗ (𝐽𝑈𝑁) 
   (1.16.)        (1.93)    (0.33)        (1.22)   (1.65) 
 
+0.220 ∗ (𝐽𝑈𝐿) + 0.161 ∗ (𝐴𝑈𝐺) + 0.056 ∗ (𝑆𝐸𝑃) + 0.106 ∗ (𝑂𝐶𝑇) + 0.056 ∗ (𝑁𝑂𝑉)   
   (2.51)        (1.99)             (0.73)       (1.38)           (0.75) 
 
+0.036 ∗ (𝐷𝐸𝐶)]                                                  (55.2) 
  (0.46) 
𝑛 = 127,  𝑆𝑆𝑅 = 2.562,  𝑅2 = 0.831 
 
 74 
 
4.3.1.2. Corn  
Rail rate regression general form: 
𝐼𝑛(𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑇𝑀) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑑𝐼𝑛(𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇) + 𝛽𝑙 𝐼𝑛(𝐿𝑂𝐴𝐷) + 𝛽𝑠𝑆𝐻𝑈𝑇 + 𝛽𝑢𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑇 + 𝛽𝑡𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸 
+𝛿 ∑ 𝑀𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐻 + 𝜀                          (56)  
Rail rate regression estimate (OBEA: 110, 113) 
(𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑇𝑀̂ ) = 𝐸𝑥𝑝 [7.289 − 0.695 ∗ 𝐼𝑛(𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇) − 1.266 ∗ 𝐼𝑛(𝐿𝑂𝐴𝐷̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) − 0.020(𝑆𝐻𝑈𝑇) 
         (15.19) (-16.02)           (-18.50)           (-1.19) 
+0.075 ∗ (𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑇) + 0.038 ∗ (𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸) − 0.032 ∗ (𝐹𝐸𝐵) − 0.006 ∗ (𝑀𝐴𝑅) − 0.008 ∗ (𝐴𝑃𝑅) 
   (-1.19)                   (13.48)                   (-1.05)  (-0.18)                   (-0.25) 
 
+0.039 ∗ (𝑀𝐴𝑌) + 0.044 ∗ (𝐽𝑈𝑁) + 0.042 ∗ (𝐽𝑈𝐿) + 0.029 ∗ (𝐴𝑈𝐺) + 0.067 ∗ (𝑆𝐸𝑃) 
   (1.03)                    (1.38)              (1.34)                   (0.76)            (1.63) 
 
+0.089 ∗ (𝑂𝐶𝑇) + 0.026 ∗ (𝑁𝑂𝑉) + 0.044 ∗ (𝐷𝐸𝐶)]                                                          (56.1)                                                        
   (2.62)         (0.96)               (1.63)      
  
𝑛 = 423,  𝑆𝑆𝑅 = 6.885,  𝑅2 = 0.647 
 
Rail rate regression estimate (OBEA: 111, 112)  
(𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑇𝑀̂ ) = 𝐸𝑥𝑝[2.087 − 0.184 ∗ 𝐼𝑛(𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇) − 1.536 ∗ 𝐼𝑛(𝐿𝑂𝐴𝐷̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) − 0.105 ∗ (𝑆𝐻𝑈𝑇) 
                     (0.82)    (0.428)          (-4.58)          (-3.41) 
 
−0.085 ∗ (𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑇) + 0.056 ∗ (𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸) + 0.053 ∗ (𝐹𝐸𝐵) − 0.033 ∗ (𝑀𝐴𝑅) + 0.029 ∗ (𝐴𝑃𝑅) 
   (-3.41)                     (14.81)        (1.41)  (-0.85)                  (0.63) 
   
+0.019 ∗ (𝑀𝐴𝑌) + 0.037 ∗ (𝐽𝑈𝑁) + 0.074 ∗ (𝐽𝑈𝐿) − 0.006 ∗ (𝐴𝑈𝐺) − 0.026 ∗ (𝑆𝐸𝑃) 
    (0.46)                   (1.08)    (1.94)       (-0.14)  (-0.49)          
 
+0.013 ∗ (𝑂𝐶𝑇) + 0.060 ∗ (𝑁𝑂𝑉) + 0.100 ∗ (𝐷𝐸𝐶)]                  (56.2)       
   (0.29)                   (1.96)     (3.34)      
 
𝑛 = 108,  𝑆𝑆𝑅 = 0.542,  𝑅2 = 0.790 
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4.3.1.3. Soybeans 
Rail rate regression general form: 
𝐼𝑛(𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑇𝑀) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑑𝐼𝑛(𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇) + 𝛽𝑙 𝐼𝑛(𝐿𝑂𝐴𝐷) + 𝛽𝑢𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑇 + 𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸 + 𝛿 ∑ 𝑀𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐻 + 𝜀  (57)  
                                                                                       
Rail rate regression estimate (OBEA: 110): 
 
(𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑇𝑀̂ ) = 𝐸𝑥𝑝[4.134 − 0.418 ∗ 𝐼𝑛(𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇) − 1.024 ∗ 𝐼𝑛(𝐿𝑂𝐴𝐷̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) − 0.040(𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑇) 
                     (5.88)     (-11.94)          (-7.40)          (-1.48) 
 
+0.050 ∗ (𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸) + 0.039 ∗ (𝐹𝐸𝐵) − 0.005 ∗ (𝑀𝐴𝑅) − 0.001 ∗ (𝐴𝑃𝑅) − 0.016 ∗ (𝑀𝐴𝑌) 
  (10.72)                   (1.37)              (-0.16)        (-0.03)  (-0.27) 
 
+0.067 ∗ (𝐽𝑈𝑁) + 0.061 ∗ (𝐽𝑈𝐿) + 0.058 ∗ (𝐴𝑈𝐺) + 0.009 ∗ (𝑆𝐸𝑃) + 0.056 ∗ (𝑂𝐶𝑇) 
  (1.29)       (1.40)   (1.29)         (0.32)            (2.51) 
 
+0.060 ∗ (𝑁𝑂𝑉) +0.028 ∗ (𝐷𝐸𝐶)]                                                                                        (57.1) 
   (2.54)         (1.03)         
𝑛 = 289,  𝑆𝑆𝑅 = 3.205,  𝑅2 = 0.540 
 
Rail rate regression estimate (OBEA: 111, 112): 
(𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑇𝑀̂ ) = 𝐸𝑥𝑝[0.271 − 0.334 ∗ 𝐼𝑛(𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇) − 0.143 ∗ 𝐼𝑛(𝐿𝑂𝐴𝐷̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) − 0.217(𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑇) 
         (-0.16)     (-8.20)         (-0.39)         (-3.25) 
 
+0.020 ∗ (𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸) + 0.040 ∗ (𝐹𝐸𝐵) − 0.027 ∗ (𝑀𝐴𝑅) − 0.101 ∗ (𝐴𝑃𝑅) − 0.070 ∗ (𝑀𝐴𝑌) 
   (2.35)           (0.65)                 (-0.42)          (-1.25)      (-0.89) 
 
+0.164 ∗ (𝐽𝑈𝑁) − 0.024 ∗ (𝐽𝑈𝐿) − 0.038 ∗ (𝐴𝑈𝐺) − 0.015 ∗ (𝑆𝐸𝑃) + 0.037 ∗ (𝑂𝐶𝑇) 
   (1.65)         (-0.26)  (-0.34)        (-0.21)           (0.79) 
 
+0.022 ∗ (𝑁𝑂𝑉) +0.068 ∗ (𝐷𝐸𝐶)]                     (57.2) 
  (0.46)         (0.97)         
            
𝑛 = 188,  𝑆𝑆𝑅 = 5.725,  𝑅2 = 0.750 
 
Rail rate regression estimate (OBEA: 113): 
(𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑇𝑀̂ ) = 𝐸𝑥𝑝[2.752 − 0.445 ∗ 𝐼𝑛(𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇) − 0.682 ∗ 𝐼𝑛(𝐿𝑂𝐴𝐷̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) − 0.036 ∗ (𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑇) 
         (5.66)    (-19.15)          (-6.69)        (-1.45) 
 
+0.0467 ∗ (𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸) − 0.005 ∗ (𝐹𝐸𝐵) + 0.017 ∗ (𝑀𝐴𝑅) − 0.040 ∗ (𝐴𝑃𝑅) − 0.005 ∗ (𝑀𝐴𝑌) 
 (14.93)   (-0.26)                 (0.91)   (-1.39)     (-0.14) 
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−0.0002 ∗ (𝐽𝑈𝑁) − 0.054 ∗ (𝐽𝑈𝐿) + 0.047 ∗ (𝐴𝑈𝐺) − 0.042 ∗ (𝑆𝐸𝑃) + 0.045 ∗ (𝑂𝐶𝑇) 
(0.0002)                      (-1.15)              (1.86)         (-1.98)   (2.87) 
 
+0.034 ∗ (𝑁𝑂𝑉) +0.022 ∗ (𝐷𝐸𝐶)]                                 (57.3) 
(2.14)        (1.23)         
                   
𝑛 = 500,  𝑆𝑆𝑅 = 4.577,  𝑅2 = 0.610 
 
 
4.3.1.4. Wheat  
Rail rate regression general form: 
𝐿𝑛(𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑇𝑀) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑑𝐿𝑛(𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇) + 𝛽𝑙 log(𝐿𝑂𝐴𝐷) + 𝛽𝑠𝑆𝐻𝑈𝑇 + 𝛽𝑢𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑇 + 𝛽𝑡𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸 
+𝛿 ∑ 𝑀𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐻 + 𝜀                          (58)  
Rail rate regression estimate (OBEA: 110) 
(𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑇𝑀̂ ) = 𝐸𝑥𝑝[2.972 − 0.431 ∗ 𝐼𝑛(𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇) − 0.740 ∗ 𝐼𝑛(𝐿𝑂𝐴𝐷̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) − 0.189 ∗ (𝑆𝐻𝑈𝑇) 
                    (4.06.)    (-45.23)         (-4.68)                    (-9.77) 
 
−0.151 ∗ (𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑇) + 0.062 ∗ (𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸) − 0.022 ∗ (𝐹𝐸𝐵) + 0.015 ∗ (𝑀𝐴𝑅) + 0.022 ∗ (𝐴𝑃𝑅) 
   (-9.77)                    (21.87)        (-0.68)  (0.47)                    (0.71) 
   
+0.008 ∗ (𝑀𝐴𝑌) − 0.002 ∗ (𝐽𝑈𝑁) + 0.024 ∗ (𝐽𝑈𝐿) + 0.056 ∗ (𝐴𝑈𝐺) + 0.051 ∗ (𝑆𝐸𝑃) 
   (0.22)          (-0.07)    (0.75)       (1.94)  (1.82)        
 
+0.080 ∗ (𝑂𝐶𝑇) + 0.027 ∗ (𝑁𝑂𝑉) + 0.051 ∗ (𝐷𝐸𝐶)                                                            (58.1) 
   (2.43)                   (0.83)     (1.57)                                     
 
𝑛 = 710,  𝑆𝑆𝑅 = 16.807,  𝑅2 = 0.880 
 
Rail rate regression estimate (OBEA: 111)  
(𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑇𝑀̂ ) = 𝐸𝑥𝑝[4.577 − 0.583 ∗ 𝐼𝑛(𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇) − 0.823 ∗ 𝐼𝑛(𝐿𝑂𝐴𝐷̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) − 0.117 ∗ (𝑆𝐻𝑈𝑇) 
                   (6.80)     (38.12)          (-5.79)          (-6.51) 
 
−0.118 ∗ (𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑇) + 0.038 ∗ (𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸) − 0.003 ∗ (𝐹𝐸𝐵) − 0.041 ∗ (𝑀𝐴𝑅) − 0.016 ∗ (𝐴𝑃𝑅) 
   (-6.51)           (14.46)                   (-0.08)            (-1.11)                    (-0.46)  
  
+0.0009 ∗ (𝑀𝐴𝑌) − 0.036 ∗ (𝐽𝑈𝑁) − 0.056 ∗ (𝐽𝑈𝐿) − 0.037 ∗ (𝐴𝑈𝐺) − 0.039 ∗ (𝑆𝐸𝑃) 
  (0.02)                        (-0.94)       (-1.54)         (-1.15)    (-1.20)  
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−0.031 ∗ (𝑂𝐶𝑇) − 0.00003 ∗ (𝑁𝑂𝑉) − 0.051 ∗ (𝐷𝐸𝐶)]                                (58.2)  
   (-0.92)                   (-0.01)         (-1.31)                                                            
 
𝑛 = 549,  𝑆𝑆𝑅 = 9.489,  𝑅2 = 0.823 
 
Rail rate regression estimate (OBEA: 112)  
(𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑇𝑀̂ ) = 𝐸𝑥𝑝[5.607 − 0.541 ∗ 𝐼𝑛(𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇) − 1.141 ∗ 𝐼𝑛(𝐿𝑂𝐴𝐷̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) − 0.162 ∗ (𝑆𝐻𝑈𝑇) 
                    (9.65)    (-34.40)                       (-9.39)                         (-8.72) 
 
−0.066 ∗ (𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑇) + 0.059 ∗ (𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸) + 0.038 ∗ (𝐹𝐸𝐵) + 0.061 ∗ (𝑀𝐴𝑅) + 0.015 ∗ (𝐴𝑃𝑅) 
   (-8.72)                    (22.14)        (1.19)            (-1.92)                  (0.46)  
  
+0.048 ∗ (𝑀𝐴𝑌) − 0.002 ∗ (𝐽𝑈𝑁) + 0.006 ∗ (𝐽𝑈𝐿) − 0.001 ∗ (𝐴𝑈𝐺) − 0.009 ∗ (𝑆𝐸𝑃) 
    (1.35)                   (-0.07)    (0.17)       (-0.04)             (-0.29)          
 
+0.027 ∗ (𝑂𝐶𝑇) + 0.050 ∗ (𝑁𝑂𝑉) + 0.061 ∗ (𝐷𝐸𝐶)]                   (58.3)  
  (0.86)                    (1.58)                (1.81)                                                                    
 
𝑛 = 495,  𝑆𝑆𝑅 = 7.868,  𝑅2 = 0.868 
 
Rail rate regression estimate (OBEA: 113) 
(𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑇𝑀̂ ) = 𝐸𝑥𝑝[3.849 − 0.453 ∗ 𝐼𝑛(𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇) − 0.886 ∗ 𝐼𝑛(𝐿𝑂𝐴𝐷̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) − 0.216 ∗ (𝑆𝐻𝑈𝑇) 
     (4.02)        (-37.48)        (-4.29)       (-8.67) 
 
−0.195 ∗ (𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑇) + 0.071 ∗ (𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸) − 0.00003 ∗ (𝐹𝐸𝐵) − 0.002 ∗ (𝑀𝐴𝑅) − 0.019 ∗ (𝐴𝑃𝑅) 
  (-8.67)                   (18.26)        (-0.01)    (-0.85)                     (-0.38)  
  
−0.014 ∗ (𝑀𝐴𝑌) − 0.022 ∗ (𝐽𝑈𝑁) − 0.012 ∗ (𝐽𝑈𝐿) − 0.002 ∗ (𝐴𝑈𝐺) − 0.023 ∗ (𝑆𝐸𝑃) 
  (0-.28)                    (-0.45)                   (-0.25)               (-0.04)                  (-0.53) 
  
+0.029 ∗ (𝑂𝐶𝑇) + 0.077 ∗ (𝑁𝑂𝑉) + 0.018 ∗ (𝐷𝐸𝐶)]                     (58.4)  
   (0.56)                   (1.42)                (0.37)                                                                            
 
𝑛 = 454,  𝑆𝑆𝑅 = 12.409,  𝑅2 = 0.880 
 
Regression results for all commodities and BEA regions show a good fit as represented 
by the R-squared. This means that the included explanatory variables account for large portions 
of variation in rate per ton-mile across commodities and regions. R-squared ranges from R2 =
0.904 for Barley shipments originating from BEA region (110 and 113) to R2 = 0.540 for 
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soybeans transported from BEA region (110). This means that 90% of the variation in rate per 
ton-mile can be explained by the included explanatory variables for barley while included 
variables can explain 50% of rate per ton-mile for soybean shipments emanating from BEA 
region (110). The high R-squared supports the use of this method to estimate elevator specific 
rail rates used in the link specific cost function. Most variables have the expected sign, although 
a few are statistically insignificant. Generally, the natural log of distance and load have a 
negative relationship with the natural log of rate per ton-mile for all commodities and regions. 
For example, wheat results for BEA region (110) indicate that a one percent increase in distance 
will lead to a 0.431 percent decline in rate per ton-mile while a one percent increase in tonnage 
per car will cause a 0.740 percent reduction in rate per ton-mile. Almost all dummies have (unit 
train in the corn model for OBEA 110 and 113 the exception). All relationships for shipment 
type have the expected sign. Shuttle and unit shipments dummy variables show that both types of 
shipments have comparably lower rates relative to multicar shipment. This is particularly 
exemplified in the wheat models and the corn estimate for BEA region (111 and 112). In all three 
soybean models (with two shipment types), unit shipments are shown to have lower rates relative 
to multicar shipments, which serve as the base. The literature on the seasonality of rail rates 
suggests that rates are higher in the fourth quarter compared to three quarters of the year 
following planting and harvesting patterns (e.g. Ndembe 2015). Monthly rail rate estimates vary 
by commodity and region with no particular discernable pattern.       
 
4.4. Truck Rates   
The U.S trucking industry, unlike railroads is very competitive. Competition stems from 
the less concentrated nature of the industry (there are significant number of firms in the 
industry). Additionally, the industry is characterized by lower fixed costs compared to railroads, 
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which need significant investment that is often sunk in way and structures before operations can 
commence. Starting a trucking firm is relatively easy. All that is needed is for an individual to 
purchase and register a truck to begin operation. The limited capital requirements and relatively 
simple structure of the industry also means that operational cost can be fully allocated to specific 
outputs. Despite this fact, the estimation of truck rates is complicated by the lack of information 
about the industry. Unlike railroads, which are required to provide operational and financial 
information to the federal government (Surface Transportation Board), trucking firms are not. 
This makes it difficult to obtain information on their operational characteristics (proprietary 
information). 
The lack of operational and cost information and the segmentation of the industry as a 
whole into truckload (TL) and less than truck load (LTL) sectors has led to the development of 
truck costing models aimed at estimating truck rates. Berwick and Dooley (1997) used an 
economic engineering truck cost model approach to estimate the trip cost of trucking movements 
while assuming that truck cost is representative of truck rate paid for specific haulage. Truck 
costs for individual trips are often modeled as a function of trip distance, operating 
characteristics (speed, payload, gross vehicle weight), vehicle characteristics or configuration 
(Rocky Mountain Double, conventional, tandem), and input prices (fuel, insurance, tires). More 
recently, Dybing (2012) developed a similar approach by making improvements to the (Berwick 
and Dooley 1997) model. He justified the use of truck cost to approximate rates on an 
assumption of the trucking industry being perfectly competitive. While truck cost may be 
reasonable approximation of rates, using the rates themselves is preferred. Since the model in 
this paper involves estimating a shipper cost function, rates paid are preferred. This study uses 
average long haul quarterly grain truck rates provided by USDA, Agricultural Marketing 
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Service, Grain Truck and Ocean Rate Advisory (GTOR). These rates are developed from 
national and regional surveys of grain elevators indexed by diesel prices. GTOR notes that diesel 
prices constitute the largest single input in truck operations; hence it constitutes the main 
determinant for rates paid for trucking services. These rates are provided by U.S regions. This 
study uses rates for the North Central region, which includes North Dakota among other states. 
Additionally, the rates are based on trucks with 80,000 pound gross weight (statutory weight 
limit for commercial trucks on highways) and long haul distances over 200 miles. Based on truck 
with 80,000 pounds gross weight, the payload (actual commodity weight is 55,000 pounds or 
26.6 tons. Truck rates from GTOR represent truck rates per loaded mile. Truck rates per ton-mile 
are estimated by dividing rates per loaded mile by the payload. This is expressed mathematically 
as follows: 
𝑇𝑅𝑇𝑀 =
𝑇𝑅𝐿𝑀
26.6
          (59) 
Where, 
𝑇𝑅𝑇𝑀 = 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑘 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑒 
𝑇𝑅𝐿𝑀 = 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑘 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑒 
 
The truck rate per ton-mile is converted to real terms (in 2010 dollars) by dividing by the general 
Gross Domestic Product price deflator (GDPPD).  
𝑅𝑇𝑅𝑇𝑀 =
𝑇𝑅𝑇𝑀
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐷
           (60) 
Where, 
𝑅𝑇𝑅𝑇𝑀 = real truck rates per ton − mile 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐷 = gross domestic product price deflator (2010 base)  
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CHAPTER 5. RESULTS 
5.1. Descriptive Statistics   
All data are aggregated by elevator, destination, commodity, and year. Table 2 shows 
descriptive statistics, including number of observations (yearly elevator to destination 
movements), mean, and standard deviation by commodity for main variables (in bold) and other 
related variables used in the link specific shipper transportation cost function estimation. Hard 
red spring wheat has the highest number of observations followed by barley, corn, durum, and 
soybeans, respectively.  
   Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Variables in Shipper Transportation Cost Function  
 
Variables 
Barley 
 
 
 
Mean 
{Std. Dev} 
Corn 
 
 
 
Mean 
{Std. Dev} 
Soybean 
 
 
 
Mean 
{Std. Dev} 
Durum 
 
 
 
Mean 
{Std. Dev} 
Hard Red 
Spring 
Wheat 
 
Mean 
{Std. Dev} 
Rail Rates 
($ per ton-miles) 
0.0539 
{0.0229} 
0.0399 
{0.0225} 
0.0398 
{0.0132} 
0.0496 
{0.0146} 
0.0484 
{0.0184} 
Truck Rates 
($ per ton-miles) 
0.0916 
{0.0118} 
0.0921 
{0.0108} 
0.0861 
{0.0143} 
0.0907 
{0.0109} 
0.0915 
{0.0113} 
Ton-Mile 
(000) 
2,956 
{ 7,776} 
35,337 
{ 67,426} 
58,526 
{91,460} 
9,309 
{19,624} 
18,289 
{38,894} 
Rail Ton-Mile 
(000) 
2,165 
{4,518} 
34,259 
{67439} 
58,184 
{91,582} 
9,064 
{19594} 
17,905 
{38,960} 
Truck Ton-Mile 
(000) 
792 
{5,904} 
1,077 
{5,524} 
342 
{2,338} 
245 
{1070} 
385 
{2,702} 
Link Distance 
(miles) 
951 
{635} 
1,323 
{530} 
1,217 
{538} 
862 
{593} 
945 
{624} 
Rail Distance 
(miles) 
988 
{683} 
1,376 
{571} 
1253 
{565} 
895 
{632} 
985 
{665} 
Truck Distance 
(miles) 
915 
{591} 
1,270 
{496} 
1,180 
{517} 
828 
{560} 
906 
{587} 
Observations  952 739 618 637 2002 
 
Rail rates, in general, are lower than those for truck across all commodities. Rail rates 
range from $0.0539 per ton-mile for barley to $0.0398 for soybeans. Truck rates, on the other 
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hand, range from, $0.0921 per ton-mile for corn to $0.0861 per ton-mile for soybeans. Truck 
rates do not show marked differences between different commodities, whereas noticeable 
differences are observed with rail rates.    
The ton-mile variable (output) represents the sum of total rail and truck ton-miles shipped 
by a grain elevator for a particular commodity, destination, and year. Ton-miles describe the 
movement of one ton over a mile. This shows that soybeans have the highest average ton-miles 
in thousands (58,526) while barley has the lowest ton-miles (2,956). Differences in output 
originate from variations in total tons shipped from an elevator to a particular destination in a 
year and distance of the shipment (link distance). A closer look at actual shipments by 
destination (Table 1) shows that 90% of soybean shipments are destined for the PNW, while 
more than 75% of barley shipments are destined for Duluth and Minneapolis St Paul, Minnesota. 
The average volume of soybeans shipped to the PNW is the largest volume in tons transported to 
any single destination among all five commodities between 2006 and 2013. The volume and 
distance combination makes soybeans the commodity with the highest ton-miles. Also, it is 
worthy to observe that rail ton-miles are the biggest contributor to total ton-miles. 
Link distance shows that corn (1,323 miles) and soybeans (1,217 miles) are transported 
the furthest relative to other commodities. This seems reasonable given the fact that 
approximately 90% of all corn in tons are shipped to Gulf (13%) and PNW (77.7%) destinations 
(see Table 1). Similarly, for soybeans, an estimated 93% by volume is transported to Gulf (3.4%) 
and PNW (90%) destinations. Durum (862 miles) and hard red spring wheat (945 miles) have the 
shortest average link distances. For Durum, looking at Table 1, this is likely the case due to the 
fact that a combined total of 70% of all volume transported in tons is destined for Duluth and 
Minneapolis St Paul, markets that are relatively closer compared to the two other major 
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destinations. In the case of hard red spring wheat, tonnage shipped to both Minnesota 
destinations and longer distance markets in the Gulf and PNW are almost evenly split. Barley 
link distance (951) is closer to that for hard red spring wheat. This similarity is reflected in the 
fact that 75% of barley is shipped to both Minnesota destinations.   
 
5.2. Econometrics Diagnostic Test 
The omitted variable version of the Hausman test explained previously is used to test for 
endogeneity of both rail and truck prices. This might arise if either of the prices is correlated with 
the error term due to an omitted variable, measurement error, or simultaneity (Wooldridge, 
2006). The test determines whether 3SLS (the instrumental variable technique) is a better 
estimator than SUR. The null hypothesis is to test the joint significance of predicted values for 
both rail and truck input prices and their interaction with other variables. Calculated F-statistics 
for each commodity are shown below and Table 3 shows the econometric procedure used based 
on rejection (3SLS) or failure to reject (SUR) for the joint significance null hypothesis. The null 
hypothesis of no joint significance is rejected for durum and soybean while we fail to reject it for 
barley, corn, and hard red spring wheat. Consequently, 3SLS is a better estimator for the former 
commodities and SUR is for the latter.  
Barley: 𝐹11,920 =
(58.23196 − 57.31162)/11 
57.31162/920
= 1.34 
Corn: 𝐹13,707 =
(76.34030 − 75.65220)/13 
75.65220/707
= 0.51 
Durum: 𝐹11,605 =
(24.84683 − 23.53997)/11 
23.53997/605
= 3.05∗ 
Hard Red Spring Wheat: 𝐹13,1970 =
(106.14191 − 105.01945)/13 
105.01945/1970
= 1.31 
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Soybean: 𝐹11,586 =
(27.61319 − 25.89326)/11 
25.89326/586
= 3.54∗ 
  Table 3: Hausman Joint Significance Test 
Commodity Ho: 𝑋1, 𝑋2, 𝑋3 … , 𝑋11 = 0 Procedure 
Barley Fail to Reject Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) 
Corn Fail to Reject Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) 
Durum Reject Three Stage Least Squares (3SLS) 
Hard Red Spring 
Wheat 
Fail to Reject Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) 
Soybeans Reject Three Stage Least Squares (3SLS) 
   * Significance at the 1%, 15%, 10% level of significance 
 
Concavity in modal rates for cost functions is tested by taking the characteristic roots 
(Eigen values) of the Hessian matrix for all observations in the sample for each commodity. For 
barley, corn, soybeans, and hard red spring wheat, the Eigen values are negative for all 952, 739, 
618, and 2002 observations, respectively, meaning that the cost functions are strictly concave in 
factor prices (negative definite). Characteristics roots are positive and negative 50% of the time 
for the 637 observations for durum (indefinite).  
 
5.3. Econometrics Procedure 
The model in equation 13 is estimated using the procedures specified in Table 3. There 
was also a consideration of including fixed effects. A test of fixed effects was performed for hard 
red spring wheat without the shuttle dummies. While a joint significant test (F-statistics = 12.4) 
showed that the elevator-destination fixed effects are jointly significant, the fixed effects 
exhibited high correlation with the shuttle dummy, making it difficult to isolate shuttle effects 
(impact of shuttle elevators was one of the major objectives of this study). Consequently, they 
were dropped from the estimation process for hard red spring wheat and other commodities. 
With other commodities, an additional concern over degrees of freedom arose due to the large 
number of fixed effects (e.g. 509 for wheat). Moreover, parameter estimates with and without the 
 85 
 
elevator-destination fixed effects for hard red spring wheat were not very different. Seemingly 
unrelated (SUR) estimates with fixed effects for HRS wheat are shown in Table A1of the 
appendix.  
To evaluate the potential differences in rail-truck competition for shuttle elevators in 
comparison to non-shuttle elevators, the shuttle dummy variable was used for the hard red spring 
wheat and corn estimations (again fixed effects were dropped). These represent the two 
commodities that use shuttle facilities extensively, based on data from the North Dakota Grain 
Movement Database. Results for all commodities are shown in Tables 4 through 8. Overall, 
models for all five commodities indicate that included variables explain much of the variation in 
the cost of grain transportation. The lowest system weighted R-Squared,  R2 = 0.9768 is that for 
barley,  
Since all continuous variables (except time) are divided by their means and are in natural 
logarithms, estimated coefficients on the first-order terms can be viewed as cost elasticity with 
respect to particular variable when all variables except time and the shuttle variables are at mean 
levels. In addition, estimated parameters for input prices (shipping rates) represent each mode’s 
share of total transportation cost according to Shephard’s lemma. Estimation results vary by 
commodity with rail modal share ranging from 0.88 for barley and corn to approximately 0.81 
for durum (note, however, that rail shares for corn and wheat are for non-shuttle elevators, only). 
Rail shares are 0.98 and 0.90 for shuttle elevators shipping wheat and corn, respectively. Truck 
shares range from 0.19 for durum to 0.12 Truck for barley and corn for non-shuttle elevators. For 
shuttle elevators, truck shares are 0.02 and 0.10 for wheat and corn. 
As expected, increases in truck and rail rates, as well as output (ton-miles) have positive 
effects on cost for all commodities. Since the parameter estimate on output is close to one for all 
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commodities, essentially a one percent increase in output leads to a one percent increase in real 
total transportation cost for all commodities. The output variable is statistically significant at the 
1% level in all cases. 
   Table 4: Barley SUR Parameter Estimates 
Parameter Name Parameter Estimate P-Value 
α0 Intercept 12.0280* 0.0001 
α1 In (Rail Rate) 0.8841* 0.0001 
α2 In (Truck Rate) 0.1159* 0.0001 
ρ1 In (Ton-Miles) 0.9750* 0.0001 
ρ2 In (Link Distance) -0.0083 0.7195 
ρ3 Time 0.0195* 0.0404 
τ11 ½ (In Rail Rate)2 -0.0951*** 0.0632 
τ22 ½ (In Truck Rate)2 -0.0951*** 0.0632 
β11 ½ (In Ton-Miles)2 -0.0008 0.7843 
β22 ½ (In Link Distance)2 -0.1811* 0.0003 
β33 ½ (Time)2 -0.0041 0.1435 
τ12 In (Rail Rate)*In (Truck Rate) 0.0951*** 0.0632 
χ11 In (Rail Rate)* In (Ton-Miles) 0.0347 0.0001 
χ12 In (Rail Rate)*In (Link Distance) -0.0861** 0.0161 
χ13 In (Rail Rate)*Time -0.0021 0.6612 
χ21 In (Truck Rate)*In (Ton-Miles) -0.0347* 0.0001 
χ22 In (Truck Rate)*In (Link Distance) 0.0861** 0.0161 
χ23 In (Truck Rate)*Time 0.0021 0.6612 
β12 In (Ton-Miles)*In (Link Distance) -0.0001 0.9867 
β13 In (Ton-Miles)*Time -0.0009 0.6048 
β23 In (Link Distance)*Time 0.0017 0.7320 
    *, **, *** Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
    # Observation = 952 
    System Weighted R2 = 0.9768 
    System Weighted MSE = 0.9214 
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   Table 5: Corn SUR Parameter Estimates  
Parameter Name Parameter Estimate P-Value 
α0 Intercept 14.2230* 0.0001 
α1 In (Rail Rate) 0.8842* 0.0001 
α2 In (Truck Rate) 0.1158* 0.0004 
ρ1 In (Ton-Miles) 0.9094* 0.0001 
ρ2 In (Link Distance) 0.2135* 0.0004 
ρ3 Time -0.0047 0.7235 
ρ4 Shuttle Dummy 0.0068 0.8702 
τ11 ½ (In Rail Rate)2 -0.0310 0.3569 
τ22 ½ (In Truck Rate)2 -0.0310 0.3569 
β11 ½ (In Ton-Miles)2 0.0048*** 0.0801 
β22 ½ (In Link Distance)2 -0.0697 0.3640 
β33 ½ (Time)2 0.0018 0.5426 
τ12 In (Rail Rate)*In (Truck Rate) 0.0310 0.3569 
χ11 In (Rail Rate)* In (Ton-Miles) 0.1156* 0.0001 
χ12 In (Rail Rate)*In (Link Distance) -0.2758* 0.0001 
χ13 In (Rail Rate)*Time 0.0076 0.1294 
χ14 In (Rail Rate)*Shuttle Dummy 0.0119 0.6516 
χ21 In (Truck Rate)*In (Ton-Miles) -0.1156* 0.0001 
χ22 In (Truck Rate)*In (Link Distance) 0.2758* 0.0001 
χ23 In (Truck Rate)*Time -0.0076 0.1294 
χ24 In (Truck Rate)*Shuttle Dummy -0.0119 0.6516 
β12 In (Ton-Miles)*In (Link Distance) 0.0039 0.6212 
β13 In (Ton-Miles)*Time 0.0018 0.2259 
β14 In (Ton-Miles)*Shuttle Dummy -0.0090 0.2884 
β23 In (Link Distance)*Time -0.0041 0.4808 
β24 In (Link Distance)*Shuttle Dummy 0.0062 0.8325 
Β34 Time*Shuttle Dummy -0.0066 0.3505 
    *, **, *** Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
    # Observation = 739 
    System Weighted R2 = 0.9919 
    System Weighted MSE = 0.8490 
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   Table 6: Durum 3SLS Parameter Estimates  
Parameter Name Parameter Estimate P-Value 
α0 Intercept 12.9752* 0.0001 
α1 In (Rail Rate) 0.8078* 0.0001 
α2 In (Truck Rate) 0.1922* 0.0001 
ρ1 In (Ton-Miles) 0.9689* 0.0001 
ρ2 In (Link Distance) -0.4556* 0.0001 
ρ3 Time 0.0281* 0.0010 
τ11 ½ (In Rail Rate)2 0.0441 0.7339 
τ22 ½ (In Truck Rate)2 0.0441 0.7339 
β11 ½ (In Ton-Miles)2 0.0084* 0.0008 
β22 ½ (In Link Distance)2 -0.1221*** 0.0590 
β33 ½ (Time)2 -0.0049** 0.0486 
τ12 In (Rail Rate)*In (Truck Rate) -0.0441 0.7339 
χ11 In (Rail Rate)* In (Ton-Miles) 0.0597* 0.0001 
χ12 In (Rail Rate)*In (Link Distance) -0.0464*** 0.0776 
χ13 In (Rail Rate)*Time 0.0329* 0.0001 
χ21 In (Truck Rate)*In (Ton-Miles) -0.0597* 0.0001 
χ22 In (Truck Rate)*In (Link Distance) 0.0464*** 0.0776 
χ23 In (Truck Rate)*Time -0.0329 0.0001 
β12 In (Ton-Miles)*In (Link Distance) -0.0271* 0.0001 
β13 In (Ton-Miles)*Time 0.0008 0.5276 
β23 In (Link Distance)*Time 0.0083 0.1833 
     *, **, *** Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
     # Observation = 637 
     System Weighted R = 0.9932 
     System Weighted MSE = 0.8418 
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   Table 7: Hard Red Spring Wheat SUR Parameter Estimates 
Parameter Name Parameter Estimate P-Value 
α0 Intercept 13.8206* 0.0001 
α1 In (Rail Rate) 0.8479* 0.0001 
α2 In (Truck Rate) 0.1521* 0.0001 
ρ1 In (Ton-Miles) 0.9752* 0.0001 
ρ2 In (Link Distance) 0.0053 0.7260 
ρ3 Time -0.0047 0.3629 
ρ4 Shuttle Dummy -0.1136* 0.0001 
τ11 ½ (In Rail Rate)2 -0.0192 0.5581 
τ22 ½ (In Truck Rate)2 -0.0192 0.5581 
β11 ½ (In Ton-Miles)2 0.0041* 0.0033 
β22 ½ (In Link Distance)2 -0.0384 0.1305 
β33 ½ (Time)2 -0.0008 0.5821 
τ12 In (Rail Rate)*In (Truck Rate) 0.0192 0.5581 
χ11 In (Rail Rate)* In (Ton-Miles) 0.0320* 0.0001 
χ12 In (Rail Rate)*In (Link Distance) -0.0446** 0.0175 
χ13 In (Rail Rate)*Time 0.0068** 0.0455 
χ14 In (Rail Rate)*Shuttle Dummy 0.1275* 0.0001 
χ21 In (Truck Rate)*In (Ton-Miles) -0.0620* 0.0001 
χ22 In (Truck Rate)*In (Link Distance) 0.0446** 0.0175 
χ23 In (Truck Rate)*Time -0.0068** 0.0455 
χ24 In (Truck Rate)*Shuttle Dummy -0.1275* 0.0001 
β12 In (Ton-Miles)*In (Link Distance) -0.0034 0.3327 
β13 In (Ton-Miles)*Time 0.0009 0.2408 
β14 In (Ton-Miles)*Shuttle Dummy -0.0057 0.1697 
β23 In (Link Distance)*Time 0.0005 0.8472 
β24 In (Link Distance)*Shuttle Dummy -0.0025 0.8427 
Β34 Time*Shuttle Dummy 0.0060*** 0.0562 
    *, **, *** Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
    # Observation = 2002 
    System Weighted R2 = 0.417 
    System weighted MSE = 0.9915 
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Table 8: Soybeans 3SLS Parameter Estimates 
Parameter Name Parameter Estimate P-Value 
α0 Intercept 14.4238* 0.0001 
α1 In (Rail Rate) 0.8795* 0.0001 
α2 In (Truck Rate) 0.1205* 0.0015 
ρ1 In (Ton-Miles) 0.9345* 0.0001 
ρ2 In (Link Distance) -0.2303* 0.0009 
ρ3 Time 0.0840* 0.0001 
τ11 ½ (In Rail Rate)2 -0.2371*** 0.0942 
τ22 ½ (In Truck Rate)2 -0.2371*** 0.0942 
β11 ½ (In Ton-Miles)2 0.0153* 0.0001 
β22 ½ (In Link Distance)2 0.1880*** 0.0647 
β33 ½ (Time)2 -0.0155* 0.0003 
τ12 In (Rail Rate)*In (Truck Rate) 0.2371*** 0.0942 
χ11 In (Rail Rate)* In (Ton-Miles) 0.0734* 0.0001 
χ12 In (Rail Rate)*In (Link Distance) -0.0165 0.6429 
χ13 In (Rail Rate)*Time 0.0222* 0.0050 
χ21 In (Truck Rate)*In (Ton-Miles) -0.0734* 0.0001 
χ22 In (Truck Rate)*In (Link Distance) 0.0165 0.6429 
χ23 In (Truck Rate)*Time -0.0222* 0.0050 
β12 In (Ton-Miles)*In (Link Distance) -0.0196** 0.0494 
β13 In (Ton-Miles)*Time 0.0090* 0.0001 
β23 In (Link Distance)*Time -0.0265* 0.0026 
   *, **, *** Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively  
   # Observation = 618 
   System Weighted R = 0.9886 
   System Weighted MSE = 0.5986 
     
 
The link distance variable is expected to have a negative effect on real total transportation 
cost since the model already controls for ton-miles. The sign for link distance is (unexpected) 
positively related to cost for corn and hard red spring wheat. The variable is not significant for 
the hard red spring wheat model, while that for corn is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Link distance has the expected negative sign for barley, durum, and soybeans. The negative sign 
is significant at the 1% level for the durum and soybean models while it is insignificant for 
barley. The time variable seems to suggest that real transportation cost is increasing over time for 
barley, durum and soybeans while it seems to be decreasing for corn and hard red spring wheat. 
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However, the parameter estimates for corn and hard red spring wheat are insignificant at widely 
acceptable levels of statistical significance.    
Another parameter of interest is the shuttle dummy for hard red spring wheat and corn. 
The shuttle dummy variable compares the effect on transportation cost between shuttle and non-
shuttle grain elevators. Shuttle elevators are expected to have lower total real transportation costs 
compared to other grain elevators. The shuttle dummy variable has an unexpected positive sign 
for the corn model and the expected negative sign for the hard red spring wheat model. However, 
the sign for the corn model is statistically insignificant, whereas that for hard red spring wheat is 
significant at the 1% level of significance. This suggest that shuttle elevators have a cost 
advantage over other elevators for transportation of hard red spring wheat.  
 
5.4. Modal Elasticities Non-Shuttle Elevators  
Estimated parameters from the econometric procedures in section 5.1 are used to 
calculate rail and truck transportation modal demand elasticities (cross-price) for non-shuttle 
grain elevators (shuttle elevator demand elasticities are presented in the next section). Recall that 
calculated demand elasticities are from a compensated demand function. They do not take into 
account the impact of a price change of the commodity on the output (assumes constant outputs). 
For the two mode case, the cross price elasticity of a given mode with respect to the other mode 
is equal to the absolute value of the own price elasticity of the first mode: (𝜀12 = |𝜀11|).  This is 
the case because modal compensated demand elasticities sum to zero: (𝜀11 +  𝜀12 = 0). Table 9 
shows modal factor shares and estimated elasticities at the means of all variables for all five 
commodities involved in this study. (i = 1, 2 for rail and truck respectively. 
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   Table 9: Non-Shuttle Elevator Modal Elasticities by Commodity  
 Barley Corn Soybean Durum Hard 
Red 
Spring 
Wheat 
Rail Factor share (𝑆1𝑙) 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.81 0.85 
Truck Factor Share (𝑆2𝑙) 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.19 0.15 
Elasticity of Substitution 𝜎12 1.93 1.30 3.24 0.72 1.15 
Rail price elasticity 𝜀11 = −𝜀12 -0.23 -0.16 -0.39 -0.14 -0.17 
Truck price elasticity 𝜀22 = −𝜀21 -1.70 -1.14 -2.85 -0.58 -0.98 
 
In examining Table 9, a general observation is that rail factor share is higher than those 
for truck across all commodities. This indicates that rail accounts for a higher proportion of 
transportation cost for all commodities transported. The share of transportation cost is highest for 
barley, corn, and soybeans (0.88) and lowest for durum (0.81). Conversely, truck share of total 
transportation cost is highest for durum (0.19) and lowest for barley, corn, and soybean (0.12). 
Rail (0.85) and truck (0.15) shares of transportation cost for hard red spring wheat are the second 
highest rail share and second lowest truck share respectively among all commodities.  
The elasticity of substitution 𝜎12 offers an indication about the substitutability (elasticity 
greater than zero) or complementarity (elasticity less than 0) of two inputs. Results indicate that 
both rail and truck are “Allen substitutes” across all commodities. That is, an increase in the 
price of trucking will lead to an increase in rail traffic (more shippers using rail for grain 
shipment). Rail and truck show the highest level of substitution in soybean transportation, while 
substitution is lowest for durum. This relationship is similarly observed with the cross-price 
elasticity of demand.  
Modal own-price elasticity is a measure of the responsiveness of quantity demand of a 
given mode to changes in its price. This can be used to assess different groups of grain shippers’ 
dependence on a given mode as well as assess the relative usage of different modes over 
different distances (link-dominance) and over time. As alluded to above, we can deduce cross-
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price elasticities from own-price elasticity (i.e., 𝜀12 = |𝜀11| and 𝜀21 = |𝜀22| ). In general, the 
own-price elasticities for rail across all commodities are significantly greater than negative one 
(inelastic) for rail (consequently cross price elasticity of rail with respect to truck is much less  
than one  across all commodities). This general observation suggests that, rail can increase its 
price or truck can decrease its price and there won’t be a big reduction in rail traffic for all five 
commodities. On the other hand, own-price elasticity for truck is much less than negative one for 
all commodities except wheat (about negative one) and durum (-0.58) (consequently, cross-price 
elasticity of truck with respect to rail is much greater than 1 for most commodities). This 
indicates that any increase in truck prices or decrease in rail prices will lead to a big reduction in 
truck traffic for four out of five commodities (excluding durum).  
Own-price elasticity for rail 𝜀11 ranges from a high of approximately -0.14 for durum, to 
a low of -0.39 for soybeans. Results for the rail price elasticities means that a one percent 
increase in rail prices will lead to a less than proportionate reduction in the quantity demanded of 
rail transportation. This reduction in rail traffic is lowest for durum and is highest for soybeans.  
Rail results indicate a high dependence on rail for all commodities, though more so for, 
wheat and corn shippers. The dominance of rail is also illustrated by considering cross-price 
elasticity with respect to truck. The relatively low cross price elasticity of rail with respect to 
truck rate 𝜀12 suggests that a reduction in truck rate will have very little effect on rail traffic (rail 
is the dominant mode either way). For example a one percent decrease in truck price will only 
decrease rail traffic by 0.39 percent for soybeans, which has the highest cross-price elasticity of 
rail with respect to truck price.  
Own-price elasticity for truck 𝜀22 ranges from a low of approximately -0.58 for durum to 
a high of -2.85 for soybeans. As opposed to the own-price elasticity for rail 𝜀11, the own-price 
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elasticity of truck 𝜀22 varies widely among different commodities. For example, results show that 
truck own-price elasticity 𝜀22 for durum (-0.58) is inelastic while for hard red spring wheat it is 
statistically not different from -1, and for the other three commodities it is elastic (less than -1). 
This means that for most commodities, a one percent increase in truck rate will lead to a more 
than proportionate decrease in truck traffic. The cross price elasticity of truck with respect to rail 
rates 𝜀21 indicates that reductions in rail rates are likely to have noticeable impacts on truck 
transportation for four out of the five commodities (excluding durum which shows very little 
impact). For example, a one percent decrease in rail rates will decrease truck traffic by 2.58 
percent for soybeans. This decrease in truck traffic from a reduction in rail rates is almost 7 times 
(in percentage points) higher than that observed from the effect of a reduction in truck rates on 
rail traffic 𝜀12 (cross price elasticity of rail with respect to truck rates). Calculated elasticities in 
Table 8 show that rail dominates most of the traffic for all but one commodity (durum).  
Rail dominance can be explained by the small size of the cross-price elasticity of rail with 
respect to truck rates (𝜀12) and the comparatively large cross-price elasticity of truck with respect 
to rail rates 𝜀21. The low 𝜀12 implies that shippers who ship by rail do not view truck as a good 
substitute for rail for all five commodities. On the other hand, the relatively high 𝜀21 for all 
commodities but durum suggests that barley, corn, hard red spring wheat, and soybean shippers 
who shipper by truck view rail as a good substitute for truck. These can be explained 
mathematically as well using the elasticity of substitution 𝜎12.  
The elasticity of substitution 𝜎12 = (
𝜏12
𝑆1𝑆2
) + 1 gets bigger as absolute deviation between 
rail and truck share |𝑆1𝑙 − 𝑆𝑙2| increases. This is shown for durum and soybeans as 𝜎12 increases 
from (0.72) to (3.24) with corresponding rise in the difference between rail and truck share from 
0.62 to 0.76 for durum and soybeans respectively. Rail share is larger than truck share, 𝑆1𝑙 > 𝑆𝑙2 
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for all commodities. Thus, since 𝜀21 = |𝜀22| = 𝜎12𝑆1 as such own price elasticity for trucking is 
high (elastic) for at least three out of five commodities. High own price elasticity for trucking 
means a high cross price elasticity of demand for trucking with respect to rail rate as well. The 
next section provides results on modal dominance by link distance (elevator-destination).  
 
5.5. Rail-Truck Link Dominance Non-Shuttle Elevators   
Initial results based on modal own-price elasticities in general indicate that the demand 
for rail is inelastic (price insensitive) across all commodities and that for truck is elastic (price 
sensitive) except in the case of durum. Since shippers who ship by rail do not view truck as a 
good substitute for rail for all five commodities and those who ship by truck view rail as a good 
substitute for truck, rail dominates (i.e.,  more will be shipped by rail compared to truck for most 
of the links).  
This fact can be explained mathematically using the elasticity of substitution. Rail is 
shown to dominate most of the traffic given that the deviation between rail and truck share 
|𝑆1 − 𝑆2| is large and 𝑆1𝑙 > 𝑆𝑙2. Not only is rail dominant for North Dakota grains, this 
dominance is likely to vary by distance shipped. Recall Koo el al (1993) have shown that rail 
tends to dominate truck at longer distances due to higher terminal costs , but lower line haul 
costs. However, previous studies have used various rules of thumb to determine distances at 
which rail dominates. By examining modal elasticities at different distances, we can determine 
dominance based on shipper behavior. In this section, we make determination about modal 
dominance for specific links, by examining the relationship between link distances and modal 
own and cross price elasticities. Recall the rule of thumb for link dominance. A link is described 
as truck dominant if the absolute value of the own price elasticity of rail is greater than one and 
twice that of the own price elasticity of truck given as |𝜀11| > 1 and |𝜀11| > 2|𝜀22|. A link is rail 
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dominant if the absolute value of the own price elasticity of truck is greater than one and twice 
the absolute value of the own price elasticity of rail |𝜀22| > 1and |𝜀22| > 2|𝜀11|. 
The literature on intermodal (rail-truck) competition, (e.g. Koo et al. 1993) suggests that 
due to comparatively lower fixed and terminal cost components, which compensates for a higher 
line haul component (e.g., fuel, labor, tire wear) trucking has a comparative advantage at shorter 
distances. Railroads on the other hand have a very high fixed cost and realize economies of haul 
as distance increases (specifically because fixed terminal cost can be spread over greater 
mileage). It is expected that rail will dominate long distances. Consequently, we expect own-
price elasticity for truck to increase (in absolute value) and that for rail to decrease as distance 
increases. We provide results for four commodities and exclude corn. The calculated elasticities 
for corn become unrealistic due to a large positive interaction term between truck rate and 
distance. Table 10 shows rail and truck own-price elasticities for barley at different distances. 
Results in Table 10 for selected links show that rail is the dominant mode for barley 
transportation. The own-price elasticity for truck (in absolute value) |𝜀22| is greater than 1 and 
twice that for rail (|𝜀22| > 2|𝜀11|) for all links from the smallest to the largest and for all other 
link distances in between.  
 Table 10: Barley Modal Elasticities Selected Links  
City (Elevator)-Destination Link Distance Rail |𝜀11|  Truck |𝜀22| 
Fairmount - Minneapolis St Paul, MN 192 0.12 4.81 
Leeds - Duluth, MN 400 0.16 2.46 
Crosby - Portland, OR 1250 0.23 1.66 
Williston - New Orleans, LA 2087 0.26 1.50 
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Figure 11: Barley Modal Elasticities by Link Distance 
 
Despite rail being inelastic and truck elastic for the entire range of link distances, it can 
also be observed that the elasticity for rail increases with distance and that for truck decreases 
with link distance, which is counter intuitive. This observation is illustrated in Figure 11 which 
traces changes in modal own-price elasticities in 50 mile increments for all link distances 
associated with barley shipments. This unexpected result suggests that truck is a stronger 
competitor with rail for longer distances for barley shipments from North Dakota. Results for 
durum are presented in Table 11 and Figure 12 below. Link and corresponding modal elasticities 
for durum indicate that the condition for modal dominance is not met for any link distances. 
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   Table 11: Durum Modal Elasticities Selected Links  
City (Elevator)-Destination Link Distance Rail |𝜀11|  Truck |𝜀22| 
Prosper -  Minneapolis St Paul, MN 248 0.16 0.57 
Harlow - Duluth, MN 500 0.15 0.58 
Scranton - Portland, OR 1250 0.14 0.58 
Williston – New Orleans, LA 2087 0.13 0.58 
 
 
Figure 12: Durum Modal Elasticities by Link Distance 
 
Although the absolute value of own-price elasticity for truck  |𝜀22| is greater than twice 
that for rail (|𝜀22| > 2|𝜀11|), the absolute value for truck elasticity is less than one (|𝜀22| < 1)  
for all links. Both rail and truck are inelastic for all distances. Rail own-price elasticity becomes 
smaller in absolute value as link distance increases. Trucking own-price elasticity increase 
slightly from the minimum observable link distance and remains constant. Hard red spring 
results are shown in Table 12 and Figure 13 below.  
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   Table 12: Hard Red Spring Wheat Modal Elasticities Selected Links  
City (Elevator)-Destination Link Distance Rail |𝜀11|  Truck |𝜀22| 
Fairmount - Minneapolis St Paul, MN 192 0.21 0.92 
Jamestown - Duluth, MN 400 0.20 0.94 
Berthold - Portland, OR 1300 0.17 0.97 
Williston - New Orleans, LA 2087 0.17 0.99 
 
 
Figure 13: Hard Red Spring Wheat Modal Elasticities by Link Distance 
 
Rail dominance is not met for all link distances for hard red spring wheat despite the fact 
that own-price elasticity for truck |𝜀22| is greater than twice that for rail (|𝜀22| > 2|𝜀11|) for all 
links. Rail increasingly becomes more inelastic while truck become less inelastic and becomes 
unit elastic for the longest link distance (see Table12 and Figure 13). Soybeans results are shown 
in Table 13 and Figure 14. 
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  Table 13: Soybeans Modal Elasticities Selected Links  
City (Elevator)-Destination Link Distance Rail |𝜀11|  Truck |𝜀22| 
Fairmount - Minneapolis St Paul, MN 192 0.55 1.75 
Max - Duluth, MN 500 0.48 2.10 
Hamberg - Portland, OR 1400 0.40 2.76 
Ray - New Orleans, LA 2041 0.37 3.16 
 
 
Figure 14: Soybeans Modal Elasticities by Link Distance 
 
The condition for rail dominance is met for all links for soybeans. The absolute value of 
the own-price elasticity of truck |𝜀22| is greater than 1 and twice that for rail (|𝜀22| > 2|𝜀11|) for 
all links. Rail becomes more inelastic as link distance increases (see Table 13 and Figure 14). 
Truck is markedly elastic as link distances increases. This is demonstrated by the noticeable 
increasing truck own-price elasticity. Own-price elasticity for truck is the steepest among other 
commodities as link distance increases. This suggest that soybeans are the most rail dependent 
commodity for long distance shipment among non-shuttle elevators.   
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5.6. Modal Elasticities over Time Non-Shuttle Elevators 
In addition to evaluating rail-truck competition for different distances for non-shuttle 
elevators, another important consideration is to evaluate how potential competition between both 
modes and relative usage has changed over time by commodity. Table 14 and Figure 15 shows 
average rail and truck own-price elasticities for barley between 2006 and 2013. Results in 
general show that rail is inelastic while truck is elastic between 2006 and 2013. However, the 
trend within this time period indicates that rail becomes relatively less inelastic between 2006 
and 2013. Rail average own-price elasticity in absolute value |𝜀11| becomes bigger. Truck on the 
other hand becomes less elastic from 2006 to 2013. This is shown by the relative decrease in the 
average absolute value of the own-price elasticity for truck |𝜀22|.    
   Table 14: Barley Modal Elasticities by Year    
Year Rail |𝜀11| Truck |𝜀22| 
2006 0.223 1.705 
2007 0.225 1.688 
2008 0.228 1.672 
2009 0.231 1.656 
2010 0.233 1.641 
2011 0.235 1.626 
2012 0.238 1.612 
2013 0.240 1.600 
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  Figure 15: Barley Modal Elasticities over Time 
 
The average rail and truck own-price elasticities for corn by year between 2006 and 2013 
shown in Table 15 and Figure 16 show that rail is increasingly becoming inelastic while truck 
increasingly gets elastic over time. For rail, this is exhibited by decreasing average own-price 
elasticity in absolute value |𝜀11| (see Table 15). For truck, this is demonstrated by increasing 
average own-price elasticity in absolute value |𝜀22| (see Table 15). This trend suggest that rail 
use is increasing while truck usage is decreasing over time in corn transportation (Figure 15).   
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  Table 15: Corn Modal Elasticities by Year    
Year Rail |𝜀11| Truck |𝜀22| 
2006 0.150 1.152 
2007 0.143 1.178 
2008 0.135 1.207 
2009 0.127 1.240 
2010 0.119 1.277 
2011 0.112 1.319 
2012 0.104 1.370 
2013 0.096  1.431 
 
 
Figure 16: Corn Modal Elasticities over Time 
 
The rail and truck own-price elasticities for durum and soybeans are not presented over 
time due to a large rail rate time interaction term in both models, rail and truck quickly revert to 
unreasonable levels. Truck share becomes negative in both models. Consequently, examining 
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elasticities over time for either commodity would be very misleading. The trend in elasticity for 
hard red spring wheat is presented in Table 16 and Figure 17. 
  Table 16: Hard Red Spring Wheat Modal Elasticities by Year  
Year Rail |𝜀11| Truck |𝜀22| 
2006 0.175 0.974 
2007 0.168 0.987 
2008 0.161 1.000 
2009 0.154 1.014 
2010 0.147 1.028 
2011 0.140 1.044 
2012 0.133 1.061 
2013 0.126 1.079 
 
 
    Figure 17: Hard Red Spring Wheat Modal Elasticities over Time 
 
 
Results for modal elasticities over time for hard red spring wheat indicate that the 
demand for rail is becoming more inelastic as reflected by the reduction in the own-price 
elasticity for rail |𝜀11| in absolute value (see Table 16 and Figure 18). Truck own-price elasticity 
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(absolute value) on the other hand 𝜀22 is shown to be increasing over time (becoming unit elastic 
in 2010 then fairly elastic after that period). The pattern exhibited by hard red spring wheat is 
closely related to that for corn, the other commodity that uses and has potentially been affected 
by shuttle grain elevators. This raises an interesting question about the likely differences between 
shuttle and non-shuttle elevators. Likely differences will be analyzed in the next section. Results 
presented so far have not explicitly evaluated the impact of shuttle grain elevators which have 
likely played a role in corn and hard red spring wheat transportation. Our next interest is to 
assess the role and likely differences between shuttle and non-shuttle grain elevators.  
 
5.7. Modal Elasticities Shuttle Elevators  
The model in equation (13) estimated with shuttle elevator dummies (those capable of 
shipping 100 railcars and above) and their interactions was used for hard red spring wheat and 
corn to assess whether the nature of rail-truck competition is different for shuttle elevators than 
for non-shuttle elevators. Specifically, this provides insight into the potential impact of shuttle 
services in the North Dakota grain supply chain. As alluded to previously, both corn and hard red 
spring wheat are two the commodities affected by shuttle elevators, based on data from the North 
Dakota Grain Movement database. Parameter estimates in Table 4 (corn) and Table 6 (hard red 
spring wheat) are used to calculate modal price elasticities for shuttle elevators and compared 
with the non-shuttle estimates obtained previously for both corn and hard red spring wheat. 
Results are shown in Table 17 below. 
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   Table 17: Shuttle and Non-Shuttle Corn and Hard Red Spring Wheat Modal Elasticities  
 Hard Red Spring Wheat Corn 
 Shuttle Other Shuttle Other 
Rail Factor share (𝑆1𝑙) 0.98 0.85 0.90 0.88 
Truck Factor Share (𝑆2𝑙) 0.02 0.15 0.10 0.12 
Elasticity of Substitution 𝜎12 1.79 1.15 1.33 1.30 
Rail price elasticity 𝜀11 = −𝜀12 -0.04 -0.17 -0.13 -0.16 
Truck price elasticity 𝜀22 = −𝜀21 -1.75 -0.98 -1.19 -1.14 
 
The calculated rail and truck shares for shuttle elevators are used to estimate modal price 
elasticities. Both rail and truck share for shuttles are obtained by summing the estimated modal 
rate parameter and that for the interaction between modal rate and the shuttle dummy variable. 
That for rail is given as: 𝛼1 + ?̂?14 ∗ (𝑠ℎ𝑢𝑡) while that for truck is given as: 𝛼2 + ?̂?24 ∗ (𝑠ℎ𝑢𝑡). 
Shuttle rail share for hard red spring wheat, 𝑆1𝑙 = 0.8479 + 0.1275 while the corresponding 
truck share is given as: 𝑆2𝑙 = 0.1521 − 0.1275. Similarly, calculated modal shares for rail and 
truck are: 𝑆1𝑙 = 0.8842 + 0.0119 and 𝑆2𝑙 = 0.1158 − 0.0119 respectively for corn. 
A general observation is that the rail factor share for shuttle elevators gets bigger (truck 
share gets smaller) compared to non-shuttle (previous estimate) for both commodities. This 
increase in rail share is more noticeable for hard red spring wheat, which increases by close to 
15% from 0.85 for non-shuttle to 0.98 for shuttle elevators. This increase in rail share represents 
a 14 percentage point increase for hard red spring wheat. Corn rail share on the other hand only 
increases by approximately 2 percentage points from 0.88 for other elevators to 0.90 for shuttle 
elevators. These share differences suggest that shuttle elevators are more rail intensive than non-
shuttle elevators. This points to likely differences between shuttle and non-shuttle elevators. 
Estimates for non-shuttle elevators for hard red spring wheat and corn obtained previously are 
compared to those for shuttle elevators in this section to evaluate these potential differences.  
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The cross price elasticity of demand for truck with respect to rail rates 𝜀21 indicates that 
reductions in rail rates for shuttle elevators are likely to have an even bigger impact in reducing 
truck traffic compared to non-shuttle elevators for both hard red spring wheat and corn. A one 
percent decrease in rail rates for shuttle elevators will decrease truck traffic more for hard red 
spring wheat (1.75 %) than for corn (1.19%). The relatively high 𝜀21 for shuttle elevators means 
that truck corn and hard red spring wheat shippers consider rail as an even better substitute for 
truck for shuttle compared to non-shuttle elevators. This view (or rail dominance) is strikingly 
bigger for hard red spring wheat compared to corn.   
On the other hand, the relatively low cross price elasticity of rail with respect to truck rate 
𝜀12 for shuttle elevators is an indication that reduction in truck rate will have an even smaller 
effect on rail traffic for shuttle elevators compared to that for non-shuttle elevators. This effect is 
even more so smaller for hard red spring wheat compared to corn. A one percent decrease in 
truck rate only decreases hard red spring wheat rail traffic for shuttle elevators by 0.04 percent. 
Related decreases for corn shuttle elevator rail traffic (0.13) is three times higher than that for 
hard red spring wheat. The relatively lower 𝜀12 for shuttle elevators compared to non-shuttle 
elevators for corn and hard red spring wheat traffic means that shippers who ship by rail from 
shuttle elevators view truck as an even lesser substitute for rail. This assessment of truck is even 
lower for hard red spring wheat shuttle shippers. Overall based on  𝜀12 and 𝜀21 rail is dominant 
for shuttle elevators, particularly for hard red spring wheat. We next undertake an in-depth 
comparison between shuttle and non-shuttle elevators beginning with hard red spring wheat.  
 
5.8. Modal Elasticities Shuttle and Non-Shuttle Elevators 
Shuttle elevators have made significant investments in their facilities in order to take 
advantage of lower shuttle rail rates. While shuttle rail service provides lower rail rates for 
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shuttle elevators, it also has been shown to offer other advantages; for example better service 
quality (e.g. shorter delays in delivery). Consequently, it is likely that the nature of competition 
between rail and truck is different for shuttle and non-shuttle elevators. Shuttle and other elevator 
rail price elasticities, and the trend by selected link distance for hard red spring wheat are shown 
in Table 18 and Figure 18 respectively. These results show that rail for shuttle elevators is more 
inelastic than that for non-shuttle elevators. 
   Table 18: Shuttle and Non-Shuttle Rail Elasticities Hard Red Spring Wheat 
Link Distance Shuttle Elevator Rail 
 |𝜀11−𝑠ℎ𝑢𝑡| 
Non-Shuttle Elevator Rail 
 |𝜀11−𝑛𝑜𝑛_𝑠ℎ𝑢𝑡| 
250 0.073 0.204 
500 0.061 0.192 
1000 0.049 0.179 
2000 0.036 0.167 
 
 
  Figure 18: Shuttle and Non-Shuttle Hard Red Spring Wheat Rail Elasticities   
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This means increases in rail rates will lead to lower traffic loss for shuttle elevators 
compared to non-shuttles. The advantage of shuttle and significant investment in shuttle facilities 
lead to more rail dominance for shuttle in comparison to non-shuttle elevators. This rail 
dominance for shuttle elevators is also shown with truck elasticities (Table 19 and Figure 19). 
These truck own-price elasticities for shuttle and non-shuttle elevators for selected link distances 
indicate that the demand for truck is fairly elastic for shuttle elevators and inelastic for other 
elevators. 
  Table 19: Shuttle and Non-Shuttle Truck Elasticities Hard Red Spring Wheat 
Link Distance Shuttle Elevator Truck 
 |𝜀22−𝑠ℎ𝑢𝑡| 
Non-Shuttle Elevator Truck 
|𝜀22−𝑛𝑜𝑛_𝑠ℎ𝑢𝑡| 
192 1.27 0.92 
200 1.28 0.92 
400 1.38 0.94 
1300 1.76 0.97 
2087 2.17 0.99 
 
 
Figure 19: Shuttle and Non-Shuttle Hard Red Spring Wheat Truck Elasticities 
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These results are plausible. If investment in shuttle facilities lead to more rail dominance 
for shuttle elevators, then we would expect truck own-price elasticity for shuttle to be more 
elastic than for non-shuttle elevators (shuttle elevators use relatively more rail than truck 
compared to non-shuttle elevators). Results presented above highlight the distinguishing 
characteristics of shuttle grain elevators. It is necessary to assess rail-truck competition for 
shuttle elevators as well. These are illustrated in Table 20 and Figure 20. 
  Table 20: Shuttle Modal Elasticities Hard Red Spring Wheat 
Link Distance Shuttle Elevator Rail 
 |𝜀11−𝑠ℎ𝑢𝑡| 
Shuttle Elevator Truck 
|𝜀22−𝑠ℎ𝑢𝑡_𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑘| 
192 0.078 1.274 
200 0.077 1.279 
250 0.073 1.308 
300 0.070 1.334 
2000 0.036 2.120 
 
Shuttle elevator absolute own-price elasticity for rail |𝜀11−𝑠ℎ𝑢𝑡| becomes smaller (more 
inelastic) as distance increases whereas that for truck |𝜀22−𝑠ℎ𝑢𝑡_𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑘| increasingly becomes 
bigger with increasing distance (see Table 20 and Figure 20). The fairly elastic truck own-price 
elasticity and fairly inelastic own-price elasticity for rail for shuttle elevators supports earlier 
findings that shuttle elevators are more rail intensive.  
A similar assessment done for corn to make comparisons between shuttle and non-shuttle 
elevators provided unexpected results. A large positive interaction term between distance and 
truck rates resulted in unrealistic rail and truck shares. Results to compare shuttle and non-shuttle 
elevators for corn were consequently not presented. However, overall results for hard red spring 
wheat from the previous section tend to suggest that rail dominates for longer distances and its 
use has been increasing over time for most of the five commodities under evaluation in this 
study. Specifically, there is an increasing commitment to rail for shuttle elevators, which 
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distinguishes them from other elevators. These factors together provide impetus to assess North 
Dakota shippers’ mode choice decisions in more detail. That will answer the question whether 
increase use of rail reflect potentially improved quality of service from shuttle elevators.  
 
Figure 20 Shuttle Modal Elasticities Hard Red Spring Wheat  
  
5.9. Mode Choice and Allocative Efficiency 
The likely increasing use of rail over time identified in section (5.3.1) and distinguishing 
characteristics of shuttles for hard red spring wheat in section (5.4 and 5.4.1) raises an interesting 
question about North Dakota hard red spring and other grain shippers’ mode choice decisions. 
Our analyses, so far, has assumed that shippers minimize the cost of transportation based on 
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important way to check for this deviation is to evaluate whether shippers’ mode choice decisions 
reflect cost minimization based on transportation rates. This will shed light on the relative usage 
of rail and truck. By examining shipper mode choices in this way, this study allows an 
assessment of service quality that does not rely on shipper survey that may or may not provide 
accurate assessment of service quality.  
Non-linear Seemingly Unrelated Regression results to test for cost minimization by 
commodity are shown in Tables 21 to Table 25. Similar to the previous estimation, all 
continuous explanatory variables are divided by their means and are in natural logarithms. Thus, 
estimated parameters for first order terms represent cost elasticity for the particular variable 
when all variables except time are at their means. Additionally, estimated parameters for input 
prices (shipping rates) represent each mode’s shadow share of total transportation cost. Most 
parameters have their expected signs and are significant at conventional levels. As expected, 
increases in both modal input prices and ton-miles (output) lead to increase in total transportation 
cost for all commodities.  
Truck rate is not statistically significant for durum and soybeans, while rail rate is 
significant for all commodities. Ton-miles are slightly greater than one or approximately equal to 
one and statistically significant at the 1% level of significance for all commodities. Again this 
indicates that a one percent increase in output leads to a one percent increase in real total 
transportation cost for all commodities. Link distance only has the expected negative sign for 
hard red spring wheat and soybeans. The sign for hard red spring wheat is statistically 
insignificant. The positive sign for link distance for barley and durum are statistically 
insignificant, whereas that for corn is significant. The time trend parameter for all other 
commodities except barley seem to suggest that transportation cost in real terms is decreasing 
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over time. This likely decrease is not significant for each of four commodities; however, the 
positive sign for barley is statistically significant at the 5% level. Overall results for all five 
commodities show that included variables explain most of the variation in total transportation 
cost across commodities as shown by high adjusted R-square for the cost functions. Adjusted R-
square ranges from 0.9730 for barley to 0.9926 for soybeans.  
Table 21: Barley Nonlinear SUR Parameter Estimates 
Parameter Name Parameter Estimate P-Value 
α0 Intercept 11.8656* 0.0001 
α1 In (k1 Rail Rate) 0.8783* 0.0001 
α2 In (k2 Truck Rate) 0.1218* 0.0314 
ρ1 In (Ton-Miles) 1.0302* 0.0001 
ρ2 In (Link Distance) 0.0390 0.4519 
ρ3 Time 0.0207** 0.0482 
τ11 ½ (In k1 Rail Rate)2 0.1342* 0.0001 
τ22 ½ (In k2 Truck Rate)2 0.1342* 0.0001 
β11 ½ (In Ton-Miles)2 0.0180* 0.4397 
β22 ½ (In Link Distance)2 0.0435 0.3101 
β33 ½ (Time)2 -0.0029 0.0001 
τ12 In (k1 Rail Rate)*In (k2 Truck Rate) -0.1342* 0.0001 
χ11 In (k1 Rail Rate)* In (Ton-Miles) 0.0606* 0.4927 
χ12 In (k1 Rail Rate)*In (Link Distance) 0.1586* 0.0001 
χ13 In ( k1 Rail Rate)*Time 0.0047 0.4927 
χ21 In (k2 Truck Rate)*In (Ton-Miles) -0.0606* 0.0001 
χ22 In (k2 Truck Rate)*In (Link Distance) -0.1586* 0.0001 
χ23 In (k2 Truck Rate)*Time -0.0047 0.4927 
β12 In (Ton-Miles)*In (Link Distance) 0.0358* 0.0001 
β13 In (Ton-Miles)*Time 0.0014 0.5613 
β23 In (Link Distance)*Time 0.0060 0.4214 
k2 Truck Factor of Proportionality 1 Normalized 
k1 Rail Factor of Proportionality 0.1227* 0.0001 
   *, **, *** Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
    # Observation = 952 
    Adjusted R2: Cost =  0.9730  
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  Table 22: Corn Nonlinear SUR Parameter Estimates 
Parameter Name Parameter Estimate P-Value 
α0 Intercept 14.2166* 0.0001 
α1 In (k1 Rail Rate) 0.8889* 0.0001 
α2 In (k2 Truck Rate) 0.1114* 0.0001 
ρ1 In (Ton-Miles) 0.9239* 0.0001 
ρ2 In (Link Distance) 0.1766* 0.0006 
ρ3 Time -0.0114 0.2579 
τ11 ½ (In k1 Rail Rate)2 0.0183 0.5018 
τ22 ½ (In k2 Truck Rate)2 0.0183 0.5018 
β11 ½ (In Ton-Miles)2 0.0109* 0.0086 
β22 ½ (In Link Distance)2 -0.0421 0.5342 
β33 ½ (Time)2 0.0025 0.3303 
τ12 In (k1 Rail Rate)*In (k2 Truck Rate) -0.0183 0.5018 
χ11 In (k1 Rail Rate)* In (Ton-Miles) 0.1261 0.0001 
χ12 In (k1 Rail Rate)*In (Link Distance) -0.2709 0.0001 
χ13 In ( k1 Rail Rate)*Time 0.0071 0.1590 
χ21 In (k2 Truck Rate)*In (Ton-Miles) -0.1261* 0.0001 
χ22 In (k2 Truck Rate)*In (Link Distance) 0.2709* 0.0001 
χ23 In (k2 Truck Rate)*Time -0.0071 0.1590 
β12 In (Ton-Miles)*In (Link Distance) -0.0067 0.4585 
β13 In (Ton-Miles)*Time 0.0011 0.3261 
β23 In (Link Distance)*Time -0.0044 0.3640 
k2 Truck Factor of Proportionality 1 Normalized 
k1 Rail Factor of Proportionality 0.7351* 0.0001 
 *, **, *** Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
   # Observation =739  
   Adjusted R2: Cost =  0.9780  
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  Table 23: Durum Nonlinear SUR Parameter Estimates 
Parameter Name Parameter Estimate P-Value 
α0 Intercept 13.0874* 0.0001 
α1 In (k1 Rail Rate) 0.9403* 0.0001 
α2 In (k2 Truck Rate) 0.0599 0.1761 
ρ1 In (Ton-Miles) 1.0200* 0.0001 
ρ2 In (Link Distance) 0.0280 0.3367 
ρ3 Time -0.0054 0.4499 
τ11 ½ (In k1 Rail Rate)2 0.1429* 0.0001 
τ22 ½ (In k2 Truck Rate)2 0.1429* 0.0001 
β11 ½ (In Ton-Miles)2 0.0292* 0.0001 
β22 ½ (In Link Distance)2 0.0962*** 0.0695 
β33 ½ (Time)2 0.0020 0.2867 
τ12 In (k1 Rail Rate)*In (k2 Truck Rate) -0.1429* 0.0001 
χ11 In (k1 Rail Rate)* In (Ton-Miles) 0.1029 0.0001 
χ12 In (k1 Rail Rate)*In (Link Distance) 0.0699** 0.0295 
χ13 In ( k1 Rail Rate)*Time 0.0197* 0.0106 
χ21 In (k2 Truck Rate)*In (Ton-Miles) -0.1029* 0.0001 
χ22 In (k2 Truck Rate)*In (Link Distance) -0.0699** 0.0295 
χ23 In (k2 Truck Rate)*Time -0.0197* 0.0106 
β12 In (Ton-Miles)*In (Link Distance) -0.0023 0.7346 
β13 In (Ton-Miles)*Time 0.0036** 0.0292 
β23 In (Link Distance)*Time -0.007 0.8915 
k2 Truck Factor of Proportionality 1 Normalized 
k1 Rail Factor of Proportionality 0.3321* 0.0001 
   *, **, *** Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
   # Observation =637  
   Adjusted R2: Cost =  0.9891  
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   Table 24: Hard Red Spring Wheat Nonlinear SUR Parameter Estimates 
Parameter Name Parameter Estimate P-Value 
α0 Intercept 13.7342* 0.0001 
α1 In (k1 Rail Rate) 0.9188* 0.0001 
α2 In (k2 Truck Rate) 0.0812* 0.0008 
ρ1 In (Ton-Miles) 0.9805* 0.0001 
ρ2 In (Link Distance) -0.0077 0.6074 
ρ3 Time -0.0004 0.9422 
τ11 ½ (In k1 Rail Rate)2 0.0211 0.4623 
τ22 ½ (In k2 Truck Rate)2 0.0211 0.4623 
β11 ½ (In Ton-Miles)2 0.0089* 0.0002 
β22 ½ (In Link Distance)2 -0.0407 0.1107 
β33 ½ (Time)2 -0.0006 0.6543 
τ12 In (k1 Rail Rate)*In (k2 Truck Rate) -0.0211 0.4623 
χ11 In (k1 Rail Rate)* In (Ton-Miles) 0.0979* 0.0001 
χ12 In (k1 Rail Rate)*In (Link Distance) -0.0285 0.1325 
χ13 In ( k1 Rail Rate)*Time 0.0118* 0.0037 
χ21 In (k2 Truck Rate)*In (Ton-Miles) -0.0979* 0.0001 
χ22 In (k2 Truck Rate)*In (Link Distance) 0.0285 0.1325 
χ23 In (k2 Truck Rate)*Time -0.0118* 0.0037 
β12 In (Ton-Miles)*In (Link Distance) 0.0042 0.2002 
β13 In (Ton-Miles)*Time 0.0011 0.1755 
β23 In (Link Distance)*Time 0.0014 0.6234 
k2 Truck Factor of Proportionality 1 Normalized 
k1 Rail Factor of Proportionality 0.6103* 0.0001 
    *, **, *** Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
   # Observation = 2002 
    Adjusted R2: Cost =  0.9852  
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Table 25: Soybeans Nonlinear SUR Parameter Estimates 
Parameter Name Parameter Estimate P-Value 
α0 Intercept 146939* 0.0001 
α1 In (k1 Rail Rate) 0.9928* 0.0001 
α2 In (k2 Truck Rate) 0.0072 0.8335 
ρ1 In (Ton-Miles) 1.0036* 0.0001 
ρ2 In (Link Distance) -0.0728** 0.0316 
ρ3 Time -0.0024 0.7549 
τ11 ½ (In k1 Rail Rate)2 0.0322 0.2374 
τ22 ½ (In k2 Truck Rate)2 0.0322 0.2374 
β11 ½ (In Ton-Miles)2 0.0206 0.0001 
β22 ½ (In Link Distance)2 -0.0271 0.5775 
β33 ½ (Time)2 0.0008 0.6741 
τ12 In (k1 Rail Rate)*In (k2 Truck Rate) -0.0322 0.2374 
χ11 In (k1 Rail Rate)* In (Ton-Miles) 0.1123 0.0001 
χ12 In (k1 Rail Rate)*In (Link Distance) 0.0016 0.9495 
χ13 In ( k1 Rail Rate)*Time 0.0069 0.2601 
χ21 In (k2 Truck Rate)*In (Ton-Miles) -0.1123 0.0001 
χ22 In (k2 Truck Rate)*In (Link Distance) -0.0016 0.9495 
χ23 In (k2 Truck Rate)*Time -0.0069 0.2601 
β12 In (Ton-Miles)*In (Link Distance) -0.0055 0.2928 
β13 In (Ton-Miles)*Time 0.0030** 0.0142 
β23 In (Link Distance)*Time -0.0015 0.7237 
k2 Truck Factor of Proportionality 1 Normalized 
k1 Rail Factor of Proportionality 0.4444 0.0001 
   *, **, *** Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
   # Observation = 618 
   Adjusted R2: Cost =  0.9926  
 
As expected, increases in both truck and rail rates have positive effects on total 
transportation cost for all commodities. These are statistically significant at conventional levels 
except truck rates for durum and soybeans that are not significant. These modal shares as well as 
factors of proportionality by commodity are the main parameters of interest in this section. They 
will enable assessment of cost minimization and grain shippers’ relative utilization of different 
modes. Summary results showing factor of proportionality, shadow share as well as actual share 
for all five commodities are shown in Table 26. Calculated actual cost shares are shown for 
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comparison. Shadow cost share range from 0.99 for soybeans to 0.88 for barley. All factors of 
proportionality are significant at the 1% level of significance.  
  Table 26: Cost Shares and Factors of Proportionality by Commodity 
Commodity Input Shadow Share Actual Share# Factor of 
Proportionality 
T-Test 
𝐻𝑜: 𝑘1 = 1 
Barley Rail 0.88 0.98 0.1227 -40.1* 
Truck 0.12 0.02 1  
Corn Rail 0.89 0.92 0.7351 -3.6* 
Truck 0.11 0.08 1  
Durum Rail 0.94 0.98 0.3321 -27.1* 
Truck 0.06 0.02 1  
Hard Red 
Spring  
Wheat 
Rail 0.92 0.95 0.6103 -5.9* 
Truck 0.08 0.05 1  
Soybean Rail 0.99 0.997 0.4444 -13.10* 
Truck 0.01 0.003 1  
*significantly different from 1,  
#Actual share 𝑆𝑖
𝐴 =
𝑆𝑖
𝑠
𝑘𝑖
∑ (𝑆𝑖
𝑠
𝑘𝑖
)𝑖⁄  
 
As pointed to earlier, actual cost are homogeneous of degree zero in(𝑘𝑖𝑠). Hence, the 
absolute value of all 𝑘𝑖s cannot be estimated. Consequently, that for truck (𝑘2) is normalized to 
one and that for rail (𝑘1) measured relative to the factor of proportionality for truck. Column five 
shows estimated factor of proportionality for rail and the normalized truck factor. As these 
results show, the factor of proportionality for rail is less than one for all commodities. Moreover, 
a t-test (column 6) shows that these factors of proportionality are statistically significantly 
different than one. This is an indication that North Dakota grain shippers do not employ an 
allocatively efficient mix of both rail and truck given market prices. The lower than 1 factor of 
proportionality for rail suggests that the shadow price of rail relative to its market price is low in 
comparison to truck. Hence there is an over utilization of rail compared to truck. This may reflect 
capacity limitations, poor service quality or unpredictable service quality for trucks. On the other 
hand, it could represent exemplary rail service. In any event, rail over utilization is a reflection of 
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the fact that there is a real or perceived advantage in using rail that is not reflected in market 
rates.  
 An interesting observation from the results in Table 26 is the relatively larger rail factor 
of proportionality for corn and hard red spring wheat (closer to one than other commodities). 
This suggests that there is less rail over utilization for both of these commodities in comparison 
to the other three. Additionally, both corn and hard red spring wheat are two of the commodities 
that use shuttle elevators extensively for grain transportation. This may suggest that the 
divergence of the shadow price from market price results from poor quality of truck service, 
rather than from exemplary quality of rail service. Shuttle elevators are likely to receive at least 
as high of a quality of rail service as non-shuttle elevators. The smaller divergence from 
allocative efficiency for these elevators may suggest that they also receive better truck service 
than non-shuttle elevators. In essence, truckers may feel more pressure to provide better service 
to shuttle elevators. The factor of proportionality closer to one for wheat and corn suggest the 
non-attainment of allocative efficiency observed for all groups of grain shippers will have a 
higher impact on transportation cost for barley, durum and soybean shippers compared to corn 
and hard red spring wheat shippers. Total transportation cost for the former three shippers will be 
comparatively higher compared to the latter two. Better quality of service provided to shuttle 
elevators by both modes in addition to relatively lower transportation cost may give corn and 
hard red spring wheat shippers a comparative advantage over barley, durum, and soybean 
shippers who lack access to shuttles.   
Table 26 also shows variation between shadow and actual cost shares. In all cases, the 
higher shadow truck share than actual truck share reflects the higher shadow price paid for truck 
in comparison to its market price. For barley, there is a noticeable difference between shadow 
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and actual cost shares. Shadow share for truck soybeans is almost zero. Shadow and actual cost 
share for corn, durum and hard red spring wheat show moderate differences.  
Allocative efficiency findings in this study are in contrast to those by Satar and Peoples 
(2010). They found that coal shippers with access to truck and rail use too much truck 
transportation in comparison to an allocatively efficient mix if mode choice is based on rates. 
They attributed observed price distortions to poor and unpredictable rail service, which cause an 
over use of truck. Grain shippers in North Dakota, on the other hand, use too much rail than an 
allocatively efficient mix. A potential reason for this observation is that rail provides a better 
quality of service compared to truck. Additionally, it could be that recent observations about 
congestion and dilapidating highway infrastructure has made shippers view trucking as a less 
viable alternative compared to rail. In fact, for reasons described previously, poor trucking 
service is the more likely reason. Another potential reason for increasing use of rail might be 
related to increased volume of production. Genetic engineering and improvements in science has 
given grain producers the ability to grow a variety of crops in large volumes for a very short 
period of time. To haul these commodities to market is easily done by rail without increasing 
crew size due to economies of size and shipping distance. Economies of size are difficult to 
attain with trucks due to the need to use a proportionate number of drivers and trucks for 80, 000 
pounds (federal weight limit for trucks on highways) increments in volume of grain. This makes 
rail a more viable option as well.  
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CHAPTER 6. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
The demand for grain transportation is derived from the demand for grains and related 
activities. Agricultural transportation demand evaluations are necessary for transportation policy 
analysis and carriers’ business operation decisions. Specifically, elasticities obtained from grain 
transportation demand studies can help regulators assess the nature of competition and help 
carriers in pricing decisions. The Class I railroad industry moved from a cost-based structure in 
the regulatory era to market-oriented differential pricing in the deregulatory environment, 
making intermodal competition (e.g. rail-truck) an important factor (Bitzan et al. 2003). 
Differential pricing is based on the idea that shippers with inelastic demand (lack of alternative) 
pay a higher rate for goods transportation. Grain shippers in North Dakota may lack an 
alternative competitive mode to rail, making knowledge about demand elasticities even more 
important. Carriers and shippers need to know the nature of transportation demand for their 
investment decisions. Carriers also use information on modal elasticities in pricing decisions.  
Estimation of a link-specific cost function facilitated comparative analysis of calculated 
modal demand elasticities and testing the cost minimization hypothesis for shippers of five 
different commodities. Demand elasticities enable examination of rail-truck competition over 
distance, time, as well as by elevator type (shuttle and non-shuttle elevators). A cost 
minimization test assessed whether shippers’ mode choice decisions were based on market rates 
(“allocatively efficient”). The links in the link-specific cost function involved individual grain 
elevator origins within the state and four principal destinations for North Dakota grains, 
including two Minnesota destinations (Minneapolis and Duluth), U.S Pacific North West, and 
Gulf. Two cities in the latter two regions were used as destinations (Portland, OR and New 
Orleans, LA respectively). Using specific elevators (disaggregate data) is a better reflection of 
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grain shippers’ choices. The choice of mode is made at the elevator level rather than at the 
regional level as used in previous other related studies (aggregate data). Inclusion of all four 
destinations for North Dakota grains enhances the accuracy of calculated elasticities (previous 
related studies only include two at most).   
A pricing model used to estimate elevator-destination specific rail rates indicated that 
included variables accounted for most of the variation in rail rates indicated by high R-squared 
values. These factors included distance, volume, shipment type (e.g. shuttle, unit, and multicar), 
year, and month of shipment. Truck rates were USDA Agricultural Marketing Services Grain 
Truck and Ocean Rate Advisory. As opposed to rail rates, the trucking industry is close to a 
perfectly competitive industry. As such, truck rates are viewed widely competitive (uniform). 
Both input price (rail and truck rates) were adjusted using the gross domestic price deflator. All 
other explanatory variables used in cost functions, including, link distance, output, elevator 
dummies, and time were generated from individual elevator shipment characteristics. 
Econometric diagnostic testing was undertaken to validate econometric procedures and curvature 
of the total transportation cost function. Endogeneity test results from an omitted variable version 
of the Hausman test showed that SUR was the preferred procedure for barley, corn, and hard red 
spring wheat while 3SLS was used for durum and soybeans models. Concavity testing also 
revealed that all cost functions except that for durum (indefinite) are strictly concave in factor 
prices.  
Estimation of cost models with either SUR or 3SLS indicated that variables included in 
equations explained much of the variability in grain shippers’ total transportation costs for all 
commodities. Estimated own-price elasticities for non-shuttle elevators showed a high rail 
dependence across commodities. This dependence was highest for soybeans. Grain shippers for 
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all five commodities who shipped by rail did not view truck as a good substitute as reflected by 
the low cross-price elasticity of rail with respect to truck. On the other hand, shippers who 
shipped by truck except durum shippers viewed rail as a good substitute for truck shown by a 
high cross price elasticity of truck with respect to rail.  
Calculated elasticities for shuttle elevators for hard red spring wheat and corn, two of the 
commodities affected by shuttle elevators, point to differences between shuttle and non-shuttle 
elevators. Dependence on rail increases with shuttle elevators for both commodities; even more 
so with hard red spring wheat. Shippers who ship by rail from shuttle elevators view truck as a 
lesser substitute compared to non-shuttle elevators. On the other hand, shippers who ship by 
truck see rail as an even better substitute. Shuttle elevators are more rail intensive than non-
shuttle elevators. Additional investments were made to upgrade existing elevators to shuttle 
capacity or to construct new shuttle facilities to enable shippers to benefit from economies of 
shipping size (lower rates) associated with large rail shipments. So higher rail intensity for 
shuttle elevators is reasonable.   
The Cost minimization test indicates that North Dakota grain shippers do not minimize 
total cost of transportation if their mode choice decisions are based on market rates. Something 
causes the shadow price of trucking to increase relative to that for rail (e.g. poor trucking service) 
or decreases the shadow price of rail (e.g. good rail service). In addition to providing better rail 
service, smaller divergence from allocative efficiency specifically observed with corn and hard 
red spring wheat (both commodities affected by shuttle elevators) point to better quality of 
trucking service compared to that offered to non-shuttle elevators. This is an important finding 
suggesting that investment in shuttle facilities may have benefits beyond those obtained from the 
ability to ship shuttle trains.   
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Results obtained herein have widespread implications. Structural changes observed in the 
U.S transportation industry and in the grain supply chain in production and handling have had 
some effects on the demand for grain transportation in North Dakota. One of the main rationales 
behind deregulation of the transportation industries was to increase operational efficiency. The 
environment provided by deregulation enabled the transportation industries to undertake cost 
reducing strategies and to innovate (Gallamore 1999). In rail grain transportation, for example, 
there has been increasing emphasis and use of shuttle trains. In the trucking domain, operational 
flexibility from elimination of route restrictions gave truck carriers the ability to reduce empty 
backhauls and reduce the cost of operation (Keeler, 1986). This likely increased the potential for 
trucks to compete with rail for longer distances, in addition to likely dominance of shorter 
distance hauls.  
Results here indicate that rail dominates the traffic for grain shipments out of North 
Dakota to all four principal destinations for North Dakota grains. Shuttle elevators were also 
shown to have played a role in corn and hard red spring wheat transportation. Grain elevators 
with shuttle capacity were shown to be more rail intensive than non-shuttle elevators based on 
calculated elasticities. Shippers’ view of truck as a lesser substitute for rail for shuttle elevators 
serves as likely incentive for carriers to expand track related investment to increase the use of 
shuttle elevators in grain. This study points to the fact that despite shippers in the state being 
highly dependent on rail for grain shipments, the impact of shuttle elevators needs to be 
considered when making assessments about possible linkages between dependency and captivity. 
Increasing use of shuttle elevators has led to less over utilization of rail based on market rates 
suggesting that shuttle elevators may receive better trucking service in addition to the obvious 
benefits of better rail service.  Other research has noted the impact of shuttle elevators on local 
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road degradation and increasing repair costs. Whether the benefits to shippers for increasing use 
of shuttle elevators outweigh related impacts to local communities is a question for further 
analysis. 
Results presented in this study are based on sound empirical and theoretical foundation. 
However, estimation procedures to calculate elasticities come with potential limitations. It is 
essential to discuss some of these limitations. First, analyses are based on estimated rather than 
actual rates. This has the implications that calculated elasticities may not be reflective of what 
shippers are facing. Also, using calculated rates to evaluate divergence between shadow and 
market rates (actual) paid by grain shippers involved in allocative efficiency assessment raises 
some concerns if observed rates or market rates are not reflective of what shippers pay.  
A Second limitation is the use of compensated demand elasticities (Hicksian) and the 
partial equilibrium nature of analysis. Compensated demand elasticities do not consider the 
effects of price change on total output shipped (ton-miles). However, using compensated demand 
elasticities is the most practical option given that to estimate Marshallian (uncompensated) 
demand elasticities will require knowledge about the demand elasticity for transported 
commodity. To our knowledge, no recent commodity specific studies exist. Additionally, using a 
hypothetical number such as one as the own-price elasticity of consumer demand for the 
transported commodity is arbitrary and can be misleading.  
The third limitation is the lack origin-destination data on local, relatively shorter distance 
movement of commodities. One of the principal objectives of this study was to identify the 
distance at which truck and rail compete. As illustrated previously, it is likely that trucks 
dominate shorter distance movements and rail relatively longer distances. Results here show that 
rail dominates most of the traffic possibly stemming from the fact that grain movements used in 
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this study are for out of state grain haulage representing relatively longer distance movements. 
Hence the cutoff point where each mode dominates is not observed in analysis. This presents an 
opportunity an opportunity for future research. This will entail assigning local elevator 
originating grain movements to local processing facilities. In the case of corn and hard red spring 
wheat for example, it could be assigning these movements to local ethanol plants and wheat 
mills. That way, the data could be representative of both local (relatively shorter distances) and 
out of state (relatively longer distance) grain haulage. This will improve the potential of 
observing cutoff dominance distances.  
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APPENDIX 
 
      Table A1: Hard Red Spring Wheat SUR Parameter Estimates with Fixed Effects1  
Parameter Name Parameter Estimate P-Value 
α0 Intercept 13.8875* 0.0001 
α1 In (Rail Rate) 0.9022* 0.0001 
α2 In (Truck Rate) 0.0978* 0.0001 
ρ1 In (Ton-Miles) 0.9839* 0.0001 
ρ2 In (Link Distance) 0.5320* 0.0001 
ρ3 Time -0.0085*** 0.0585 
τ11 ½ (In Rail Rate)2 -0.0898** 0.0648 
τ22 ½ (In Truck Rate)2 -0.0898** 0.0648 
β11 ½ (In Ton-Miles)2 0.0077* 0.0001 
β22 ½ (In Link Distance)2 0.3765** 0.0601 
β33 ½ (Time)2 0.0025** 0.0433 
τ12 In (Rail Rate)*In (Truck Rate) 0.0898*** 0.0648 
χ11 In (Rail Rate)* In (Ton-Miles) 0.0728* 0.0001 
χ12 In (Rail Rate)*In (Link Distance) -0.0817* 0.0012 
χ13 In (Rail Rate)*Time 0.0125* 0.0012 
χ21 In (Truck Rate)*In (Ton-Miles) -0.0728* 0.0001 
χ22 In (Truck Rate)*In (Link Distance) 0.0817* 0.0012 
χ23 In (Truck Rate)*Time -0.0125* 0.012 
β12 In (Ton-Miles)*In (Link Distance) 0.0049 0.2956 
β13 In (Ton-Miles)*Time 0.0020* 0.0098 
β23 In (Link Distance)*Time 0.9834* 0.0001 
         *, **, *** Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
         # Observation = 2002 
         System Weighted R2 = 0.9947 
         System Weighted MSE = 0.94.76 
            1 elevator-destination Fixed Effects not shown  
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        Table A2: Hard Red Spring Wheat SUR Parameter Estimates with No-Fixed Effects2  
Parameter Name Parameter Estimate P-Value 
𝛼0 Intercept 13.7449* 0.0001 
𝛼1 ln (Rail Rate) 0.9193* 0.0001 
𝛼2 ln (Truck Rate) 0.0807 0.0001 
𝜌1 ln (Ton-Miles) 0.9561 0.0001 
𝜌2 ln (Link Distance) 0.0046 0.7175 
𝜌3 Time -0.0021 0.6715 
𝜏11 1/2 (ln Rail Rate)
2 -0.0563*** 0.0778 
𝜏22 1/2(ln Truck Rate)
2 -0.0563*** 0.0778 
𝛽11 1/2 ln (Ton-Miles)2 0.0025** 0.0411 
𝛽22 1/2(ln Link Distance)
2 -0.0578** 0.0222 
𝛽33 1/2(Time)
2 -0.0005 0.7062 
𝜏12 ln (Rail Rate)*ln (Truck Rate) 0.0563*** 0.0778 
𝜒11 ln (Rail Rate)*ln (Ton-Miles) -0.0759 0.0001 
𝜒12 ln (Rail Rate)*ln (Link Distance) -0.0652* 0.0004 
𝜒13 ln (Rail Rate)*Time 0.0100** 0.0032 
𝜒21 ln (Truck Rate)*ln (Ton-Miles)  -0.07586* 0.0001 
𝜒22 ln (Truck Rate)* ln (Link Distance) 0.0652* 0.0004 
𝜒23 ln (Truck Rate)*Time -0.0100* 0.0032 
𝛽12 ln (Ton-Miles)*ln (Link Distance) -0.0039 0.2300 
𝛽13 ln (Ton-Miles)*Time  0.0014** 0.0502 
𝛽23 ln (Link Distance)*Time 0.0007 0.8041 
            *, **, *** Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
          # Observation = 2002 
          System Weighted R2 = 0.9913 
           System Weighted MSE = 0.9515 
              2 elevator-destination fixed effects not used 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
